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ABSTRACT
The Influence of Prosecutorial Overcharging on Defendant and Defense Attorney Plea Decision
Making: Documenting and Debiasing the Anchoring Effect
by
Stephanie Aurora Cardenas
Advisor: Saul M. Kassin, PhD
Strategic overcharging, a practice that some prosecutors readily employ to threaten defendants with
excessively severe sentences, undermines the Sixth Amendment right to trial by coercing
defendants to plead guilty rather than face penalties disproportionate to their alleged misconduct.
Legal scholars and psychologists have long suggested that strategic overcharging may elicit powerful
anchoring effects that bias defendants’, but not attorneys’, evaluations of the plea offer. The current
research sought (a) to examine the extent to which mock defendants and legal professionals were
susceptible to the anchoring bias, (b) elucidate the mechanism underlying susceptibility to the
anchoring effect in plea contexts, and (c) test the efficacy of debiasing strategies aimed toward
combating reliance on heuristics and improving information processing. Across three experiments,
mock defendants (Study 1; N = 479), practicing criminal defense attorneys (Study 2; N = 155), and
mock attorney-client pairs (Study 3; Npairs = 265) were willing to accept longer maximum jail
sentences to avoid a trial conviction when exposed to a higher versus moderate trial sentence even
when trial sentences were presented as unrelated to their case (Study 1; i.e., the number of months
left for an acquaintance to graduate from law school). Strikingly, these results demonstrate that
increasing the threatened trial sentence also increased decision-makers’ willingness to accept (or
recommend) higher maximum jail sentences without also increasing their perceptions of the
severity of the crime, the strength of the aggravating or mitigating evidence, or their likelihood of
conviction at trial. Anchor-biased sentencing judgments, in turn, explained decision-makers’ choice
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to accept the prosecutors’ discounted offer — even when perceived defendant culpability did not
(Study 2). In Study 3, making attorney-client pairs accountable for their decision-making increased
their willingness to elaborate on their ideas and the number of case-relevant arguments jointly
discussed but did not attenuate their vulnerability to the biasing effect of the anchor. In Study 2,
debiasing instructions to generate only mitigating evidence contradicting the appropriateness of a
highly threatening trial sentence attenuated the anchoring effect by leading defense attorneys to
recommend lower maximum sentences and to decline to recommend that their clients accept the
plea offer. This research supports the troubling conclusion that threatening severely harsh trial
sentences leads legal decision-makers to raise the bar for what they consider to be an acceptable
punishment and that raising that bar causes defendants’ and attorneys to accept plea offers they
would not otherwise accept or recommend. These findings reinforce the need for policies that
curtail the immense discretionary power of prosecutors to coerce plea decisions.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
The Sixth Amendment guarantees criminal defendants the right to trial. Yet an estimated
94% of federal and 97% of state convictions result from guilty pleas (Bureau of Justice Statistics,
2013; United States Sentencing Commission, 2018). These figures have risen to a level so high that
it prompted the U.S. Supreme Court to acknowledge that “criminal justice today is for the most
part a system of pleas, not a system of trials” (Lafler v. Cooper, 2012, p. 3).
To explain the rise of plea-bargaining legal scholars have implicated the combined threats
of mandatory minimum sentences and strategic overcharging (e.g., Graham, 2013; Petegorsky,
2012; Standen, 1993) — a practice that some prosecutors employ to threaten defendants who
exercise their right to trial with excessively severe sentences known as trial penalties (e.g.,
Alschuler, 1968; Caldwell, 2011; Wright & Miller, 2002). Inflated initial charges set the stage for
risk averse defendants to then accept subsequently reduced plea offers. Trial penalties subvert the
Sixth Amendment right to trial by coercing defendants — innocent and guilty alike — to plead guilty
rather than face penalties disproportionate to their alleged misconduct (for a comprehensive
discussion see special issues edited by Reimer & Sabelli, 2019).
Although artificially inflated “leniency” in plea offers is constitutionally permissible ( Brady

v. United States, 1970), this unethical practice has garnered widespread disapproval from psycholegal and legal scholars alike (see American Bar Association, Center for Professional
Responsibility, 2016, Model Rule 3.8), including the late Justice Antonin Scalia who argued that
prosecutorial overcharging “presents grave risks…that effectively compels an innocent defendant to
avoid massive risk by pleading guilty to a lesser offense” ( Lafler v. Cooper, 2012). Despite public
concerns over the potentially coercive nature of overcharging, the Supreme Court held that
“…threatening a stiffer sentence is permissible and part of any legitimate system which tolerates and
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encourages the negotiation of pleas” (Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 1978, p. 668). Even so,
overcharging and so-called leniency are not without limits. The Brady Court stipulated that offers
of leniency must not be so enticing as to “overbear the will of defendants” and the Bordenkircher
Court agreed that constitutional limits on prosecutorial discretion do exist (Brady v. United States,
1970, p. 750). Although neither Court specifies the bounds of prosecutorial discretion or coercion
of plea bargaining (vague declarations notwithstanding), they do acknowledge the importance of

some limits for avoiding the coercion of defendants.
Legal scholars and psychologists propose that overcharging likely distorts plea evaluations
by exploiting the human tendency to make judgments that are unduly biased toward an initially
presented value (Bibas, 2004). Thus, a more-severe threatened trial sentence serves as an anchor,
or reference point, against which defendants compare subsequently presented plea offers. But
exactly how anchoring may exert its influence in plea contexts remains unknown (Furnham & Boo,
2011).
In plea contexts, anchoring may be the result of relatively thoughtful, but ultimately biased,
information processing. For example, an application of the predominant anchoring theory of

selective accessibility suggests that consideration of the threatened trial sentence may trigger a
confirmatory search for information similar, but not dissimilar, to an outcome warranting the
threatened trial sentence (Strack et al., 2016). This search may lead anchor-biased defendants to
recall more inculpatory information suggesting the plausibility of the threatened trial sentence,
while failing to retrieve and consider exculpatory information. A biased evaluation of the evidence
may skew defendants’ perceptions of what an acceptable offer should entail.
Alternatively, an anchoring bias may result from less thoughtful processes in which the trial
sentence primes a high number or a broader sense of “magnitude” that consequently might
influence whether the plea offer is perceived as more or less harsh (Wilson et al., 1996). In either
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case, the result is that relative to the extremely threatening trial sentence, subsequent offers may
appear more just and acceptable. As such, overcharging may hinder the ability of defendants to
evaluate offers in a plea negotiation in an unbiased manner.
To safeguard defendants against the influence of this cognitive error, legal scholars have
claimed that defense attorneys may act as “debiasers” who use their wealth of knowledge,
experience, and expertise to guide defendants toward more rational decision-making (Bibas, 2004;
Scott & Stuntz, 1992). But research overwhelmingly supports the robustness of the influence of the
anchoring effect on non-legal and legal judgments (Furnham & Boo, 2011), including among legal
experts rendering sentencing decisions (for a meta-analysis, see Bystranowski et al., 2021). In
dyadic plea negotiations, the selective nature of the inculpatory and exculpatory information
accessed may, in turn, bias information exchange between defendants and their attorneys. Thus, it
remains unknown whether defense attorneys are less vulnerable than defendants to the anchoring
bias in plea negotiation contexts and, if so, whether they can effectively mitigate its influence on
defendant’s plea decisions.
Although defendants and their attorneys may be broadly incentivized to obtain favorable
and just plea offers, without sufficient motivation to engage in thorough, deliberative processing of
all case information, prior work suggests that their joint judgments may still be vulnerable to the
influence of the anchoring bias (de Wilde et al., 2018; Rutledge, 1993). One potential solution to
enhancing motivation is to make individual members within groups accountable for the process
that led to their group decision (Lerner & Tetlock, 1999). De Wilde and colleagues (2018)
demonstrated that process accountable groups focused more on anchor-inconsistent information
during deliberations and were less anchor-biased than unaccountable groups. Other work has also
found that explicit instructions and training to consider competing hypotheses and disconfirming
evidence attenuates the anchoring bias (Adame, 2015; Downen et al., 2018; Mussweiler et al.,

3

2000; Stein & Drouin, 2018). Thus, a successful debiasing strategy motivates the search of
information inconsistent with the threatened trial sentence (i.e., by disrupting confirmatory
hypothesis testing and encouraging consideration of alternative sentences instead).
To what extent do threatened trial sentences bias defendants’ plea decisions and defense
attorneys’ recommendations? Can motivating defendants and their attorneys to become
accountable for the process leading to their decisions lead to a more holistic representation of the
case evidence? Can increasing a decision-maker’s consideration of anchor-disconfirming evidence
debias the anchoring effects’ impact on their sentencing judgments and plea decisions? The
research reported in this dissertation seeks to answer these questions.
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Chapter 2: An Overview of a System of Pleas
To understand how defendants make plea decisions, early research historically favored a
rational actor model that assumes that defendants bargain in the shadow of the trial, basing their
plea decisions on the expected trial outcome and probability of conviction (Bibas, 2004). In
precise mathematical fashion, these variables can be used to evaluate plea offers such that a
rational defendant facing a 10-year sentence and an 80% probability of conviction (based on the
evidence) should only settle for a plea offer of 8 years or less. Although archival and experimental
data support the notion that evidence strength accounts for much of the variance in plea decisions
(e.g., Kramer et al., 2007; Redlich et al., 2016), other research finds that the shadow model is too
simplistic because it ignores the impact of substantial structural impediments of the justice system
and psychological biases present in plea negotiations (such as overcharging and cognitive heuristics)
which exert their own powerful influences on plea decisions (Redlich et al., 2017).
Strategic Overcharging and Trial Penalties
Excessive trial penalties — made possible by strategic overcharging — represent one such
type of structural impediment. Whereas judges historically wielded criminal sentencing powers, the
arrival of U.S. Sentencing Guidelines and the mandatory minimum sentences designated within
shifted that control to prosecutors, effectively transforming their charging powers into sentencing
powers (Petegorsky, 2012). Virtually unmitigated discretion over charging decisions at the pleabargaining stage — supported by the Bordenkircher Court — enabled prosecutors to charge
defendants with the specific, more severe crimes that activated mandatory minimum sentences with
the goal of securing guilty pleas (Standen, 1993; but see also Bjerk, 2005). Though the Supreme
Court in U.S. v. Booker (2005) ruled that mandatory sentencing guidelines are unconstitutional,
the guidelines continue to exert their influence in the form of ‘advisory’ sentencing
recommendations (Bennett, 2014). Thus, risk-averse defendants continue to be put in positions
5

where they may become pressured to accept charges that do not carry disproportionately higher
penalties.
Threatened trial sentences ensure that plea offers contain significant “plea discounts”, a
“glass half-full” term for trial penalties, that are coercively large. Laboratory experiments have
found that given a high enough plea discount, even innocent defendants can be coerced to plead
guilty (Bordens, 1984; Redlich & Shteynberg, 2016; Tor et al., 2010; Schneider & Zottoli, 2019;
Zimmerman & Hunter, 2018). This is not to say that plea discounts are inherently coercive. When
the sentence at trial is proportional to the defendant’s misconduct, then a reduction in the sentence
in exchange for a trial waiver may be appropriate and even desirable for all involved parties. The
issue lies in how prosecutors create this enticing sentencing differential — not by reducing
appropriate charges with proportional sentences, but by inflating initial charges in order to
artificially inflate reductions and discourage defendants who reasonably wish to avoid excessive trial
penalties.
In his foundational work on plea bargaining, Alschuler (1968) described the different
charging practices that prosecutors employ and their respective impact on sentencing outcomes.

Horizontal charging entails unreasonably multiplying charges for an offense against a single
defendant and leads to count bargaining. The result is that the defendant is faced with an
inordinately long list of offenses for which some evidence may exist, but which entails
consequences largely disproportionate to the alleged misconduct of the defendant. Vertical

charging involves charging a defendant with a more serious offense than is warranted by the
evidence and leads to charge bargaining. Defense attorneys interviewed by Alschuler (1968)
claimed that “prosecutors charge ‘the first degree of everything’ but accept a guilty plea to ‘the
second degree of any crime’ without serious negotiation” (p. 90). This is likely because charges
determined solely based on probable cause are unlikely to meet the more rigorous standard of
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reasonable doubt necessary to convict at trial. The result is that prosecutors threaten defendants
with charges that they know are unlikely to lead to a conviction at trial because they lack the
requisite evidence, and that carry punishment that is not proportional to the defendants’
misconduct (for similar arguments see Bibas, 2004; Graham, 2013; Lippke, 2011). By
overcharging prosecutors can secure indictments for charges carrying higher sentences from grand
juries based on weak evidence merely sufficient to demonstrate probable cause and do so in the
absence of the traditional safeguards of a criminal trial, such as cross-examination, access to
discovery, and effective counsel.
Evidence documenting the extent of the trial penalty abounds. For example, a recent report
by the National Association for Criminal Defense Lawyers, using data published by the Sentencing
Commission, found that defendants convicted at trial received sentences, on average, 3.27 times
higher than defendants who pled guilty for comparable crimes. For defendants charged with
burglary/breaking and entering and embezzlement, the trial penalty was nearly 8 times as high
(Jones et al., 2019; Fellner & Human Rights Watch, 2013; King et al., 2005; Ulmer & Bradley,
2006). Further, estimates based on archival data suggest that the average federal trial penalty is
around 39% or up to 64% percent in some cases (Kim, 2014). Field studies and interviews suggest
even higher rates. For example, Zottoli et al. (2016) interviewed felony-convicted offenders who
had been mandated to a community-based, alternative-to-incarceration program in New York City.
Adolescents (n = 55) who reported initially facing an average of 56 months of prison if convicted
for their original charges ultimately served an average of 1.4 months following a guilty plea
representing an astounding 98% plea discount. A smaller cohort of adult defendants encounters
plea discounts of 80%, on average. These findings demonstrate that defendants’ fears of
disproportionate punishment if convicted at trial are warranted.
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Excessive trial penalties undermine the Sixth Amendment right to trial by coercing
defendants — guilty and innocent, affluent and impoverished, Black and White — to plead guilty.
In a legal system purportedly intent on achieving justice and fairness for all, even guilty defendants
have a right to a presumption of innocence and should not be excessively punished merely for
requiring the government to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt (see Bregant, 2019).
Further, racial disparities evident across policing, prosecution, and sentencing suggest that racial
minorities, including Black and Brown people, disproportionately bear the brunt of trial penalties
which, in turn, contributes to their mass incarceration (for an overview see, Jones & Cornelssen,
2019). For example, implicit biases held by prosecutors might cause them to suggest higher
sentences for non-White compared to White defendants (Faigman et al., 2012 as cited in
Townson, 2019). Inflated initial sentences for non-White defendants are particularly damaging
when coupled with Edkins’ (2011) finding that, in a hypothetical plea scenario, defense attorneys
estimated being able to obtain pleas containing lower sentences for their White clients compared
to Black clients.
In light of the preceding evidence, it is unsurprising that legal scholars, networks of
practitioners, and justice advocate organizations have admonished prosecutorial overcharging and
published scathing reports documenting the extent of the trial penalty urging prosecutors to
“charge with restraint”, not “file the maximum possible charge as a matter of course” and not
“make a plea offer if you can’t prove the charge beyond a reasonable doubt” (Fair and Just
Prosecution, 2019, p. 5; Fellner & Human Rights Watch, 2013; Jones et al., 2019). Still, although
interdisciplinary scholars support the notion that overcharging enables trial penalties which
contribute to the coercion of defendants’ acceptance of plea offers they might not otherwise accept,
little actual research has empirically examined the underlying mechanism behind this claim (for
exceptions, see Schneider & Zottoli, 2019 and Petersen & Redlich, 2021).

8

Chapter 3: Decision-Making in Plea Contexts
Research psychologists have only recently begun in earnest to examine the structural and
psychological factors that lead defendants to plead guilty. So much so that the number of published
psychological articles on the topic of pleas since the Lafler v. Cooper ruling has more than doubled
in the span of 8 years — from 20 articles prior to 2012 to 41 articles as of April 2020 (see Figure 1).
Theorizing on the application of basic social and cognitive psychological phenomenon on pleas,
such as anchoring (Bibas, 2004; Redlich et al., 2017), social influences (Henderson & Shytenberg,
2019; Wilford et al., 2019), and fairness (O’ Hear, 2007; Khogali et al., 2018) have yielded critical
new insights about how defendants make decisions (for a comprehensive overview, see Edkins &
Redlich, 2019). Here I proposed to test the as-of-yet only theoretical application of anchoring to
decision-making in dyadic plea negotiations.
Judgments Under Uncertainty
Plea negotiations occur under uncertain conditions. Defendants, especially those without
prior experiences with the criminal justice system, face even greater uncertainty than their
attorneys. In deciding whether to accept or reject a plea offer, defendants may consider their
situation from several angles: Is the prosecutor bluffing? Can I trust my defense attorney to
zealously represent my best interests? Would a jury be sympathetic to my arguments? What is the
chance I will be found guilty at trial? Is this the best plea offer I can expect? A wealth of research
demonstrates that when people make judgments about topics about which they are unfamiliar, any
initially available salient value, impression, or perspective serves as an anchor point (Furnham &
Boo, 2011). In this way, even irrelevant or implausible information can become unduly influential
leading to a cognitive error known as the anchoring effect (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974).
In the standard anchoring paradigm, participants are first asked to estimate whether an
unknown value is larger or smaller than a provided value (leading to a comparative judgment), and
9

then asked to estimate the unknown value (leading to an absolute judgment). For example, in
Tversky and Kahneman’s (1974) seminal study, participants randomly generated a number (either
10 or 65) by spinning a wheel and then estimated the comparative and absolute proportion of
African states in the United Nations. Participants given the low anchor of 10, guessed, on average,
25%, whereas those given the high anchor of 65, guessed 45%.
Decades of research now demonstrate the robustness of this anchoring effect for contextirrelevant anchors (Klein et al., 2014), and even more so for context-relevant anchors (Glöckner &
Englich, 2015; Bystranowski et al., 2021) across several domains, including factual knowledge
(Jacowitz & Kahneman, 1995; Strack & Mussweiler, 1997), probability estimates (Plous, 1989),
consumer decisions and willingness-to-pay judgments (Green et al., 1998), motivated judgments
(Cervone & Peake, 1986; Joel et al., 2017; Langeborg, 2019), negotiations (Liebert et al., 1968; Orr
& Guthrie, 2005), and, most relevantly here, civil and criminal judgments (Bystranowski et al.,
2021).
Results from a recent large-scale replication (with over 5,200 participants) of the anchoring
effects found even larger effects than those reported in the original study ( ds = 1.17 – 2.42; Klein et
al., 2014; Jacowitz & Kahneman, 1995). Bystranowski and colleagues (2021) recently published a
meta-analysis of 93 effect sizes from 29 studies (N = 2177 legal professionals; N = 6372 lay people)
specifically on anchoring in legal decision-making. Results suggest a large effect size across studies
employing High vs. Low anchor designs (37 effect sizes from16 studies), z = .39, 95% CI [.31, .47],

d = .91, 95% CI [.69, 1.12], p < .001, and a medium-to-large effect size for studies employing
Control vs. Anchor designs (56 effect sizes from 19 studies), z = .27, [.21, .33], d = .58, [.44, .73], p
< .001. Estimates included in these meta-analyses were all individually determined limiting the
applicability of these findings to anchoring likely to occur in plea negotiations which involved
multiple parties.
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Although decades of research clearly point toward the robustness of the anchoring effect,
no one unitary theory explains the phenomenon. To reconcile the discrepant explanations that
have gained traction over the years, scholars suggest that the anchoring phenomenon may
comprise several phenomena characterized by superficially similar outcomes (i.e., assimilation to a
numerical anchor), but different non-mutually exclusive psychological explanations (Epley &
Gilovich, 2005, 2006; Turner & Schley, 2016). Such explanations include relatively thoughtful

high-elaboration processes (such as selective accessibility) and less thoughtful low-elaboration
processes (such as numeric priming; Wegener et al., 2010).
Ultimately my goal here was not merely to document the anchoring bias in plea settings,
but also to test interventions that would attenuate the anchoring bias. Because debiasing
interventions that correct for the very mechanisms that cause the bias are most effective (Galinsky
& Mussweiler, 2001), I first sought to identify the anchoring mechanism(s) that most closely
corresponded to the unique circumstances of plea negotiations. I began by considering that unlike
standard anchoring paradigms, plea bargaining often involves evaluation of varied relevant
background information (i.e., the case facts, circumstances, evidence), self-interested decisions, and
weighing of multiple viewpoints by multiple legal actors.

Anchoring and Adjustment Perspective
Tversky and Kahneman (1974) initially attributed anchoring to insufficient adjustment from
the original anchor. According to this account, people use the original anchor as a reference point
for where to begin the estimation process, and then try to adjust toward the correct value. People
often fail to sufficiently adjust away from the anchor because of uncertainty about the “true” value
and because they stop once they reach a value that is at the boundary of a range of plausible values
(Epley & Gilovich, 2006; Furnham & Boo, 2011; Quattrone, 1982). This explanation fails to
account for anchoring that occurs prior to the process of adjusting, such as when the absolute
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numeric judgment is unrelated to the anchor and thus adjustment from the informationally
irrelevant anchor is inappropriate (Jacowitz & Kahneman, 1995; Mochon & Frederick, 2013).
Anchoring that occurs prior to adjustment may instead be the result of other mechanisms.

Numeric and Magnitude Priming Perspective
The priming perspective suggests that any number in the immediate environment can serve
as a reference point, even when the number clearly lacks informational relevance. For example,
participants in one study reported that they would be willing to pay more for a meal at a restaurant
called “Studio 97” than one called “Studio 17” (Critcher & Gilovich, 2008). Other work
demonstrates a magnitude priming effect of qualitative anchors on judgments as well. In one study
participants who drew larger lines subsequently made larger estimates on a different scale than
those who drew shorter lines ostensibly because drawing larger lines primed a sense of “bigness”
(Oppenheimer et al., 2008). Similarly, Mochon and Frederick (2013) demonstrated that changing
the modality of the anchor itself from a numerical (e.g., $6) to a non-numerical value (e.g., a pack
of batteries) also biased absolute numeric judgments (e.g., price of a camera in dollars). Thus,
changes between the modality in which the anchor and the final judgment are presented do not
always attenuate the anchoring bias (e.g., Chapman & Bornstein, 1996).
This work suggests that both the perceived severity of the prosecutors’ threatened trial
charge (non-numeric) and sentence (numeric) may influence subsequent quantitative and
qualitative evaluations (e.g., of the strength of the evidence and sentence). However, because the
bulk of anchoring research has concentrated on the impact of numerical anchors on subsequent

numerical judgments, the current thesis focused on overcharging that leverages potential sentencing
outcomes rather than charges to avoid the confound of simultaneously varying charge and
sentencing outcomes or the added necessity of powering for an additional factor.
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Selective Accessibility Perspective
Though numeric priming accounts explain how irrelevant anchors elicit anchoring biases,
the scant available studies examining relevance suggest (though not conclusively) that greater
perceived informational relevance may lead to greater anchoring effects (Bystranowski et al., 2021).
In plea contexts, defendants and their attorneys evaluate a relevant threatened trial sentence in
relation to the available information. Thus, their plea decisions should be biased to the extent that
their evaluation of relevant information is biased by the presence of a high anchor. The leading
view of anchoring suggests anchoring biases are sometimes the product of thoughtful processes
such as confirmatory hypothesis testing (Strack et al., 2016).
The selective accessibility model assumes that anchoring is mediated by the selectively
increased accessibility of anchor-consistent information (Mussweiler et al. 2001). Specifically, in the
standard anchoring paradigm, when people contemplate an anchor, they do so by selectively
accessing information that is consistent with the hypothesis that the anchor represents the “correct”
value. Generating knowledge consistent with the anchor increases the availability of such
knowledge which, in turn, forms the basis for the final “absolute” judgment. But the knowledge
generated during this process is not representative of all the relevant knowledge that could be
brought to bear in the final judgment. The result of this selectivity is that, for the most part,
information that is similar to the anchor (rather than dissimilar) is retrieved and used to inform
ones’ judgments.
Applied to plea negotiations, this explanation suggests that defendants and their attorneys
may engage in a confirmatory search when evaluating a highly threatening potential trial sentence.
That is, when judging whether a sentence reflects the facts and circumstances of their case,
defendants and attorneys may selectively access inculpatory information that is consistent with the
notion that a highly threatening offer is appropriate (e.g., defendant lacks an alibi and was near the
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scene of the crime, therefore a higher maximum sentence is warranted). Whereas exculpatory
information that is inconsistent with the anchor (e.g., defendant was not identified by eyewitness
and no fingerprints were found at the scene) may not be equally activated or given as much weight.
The selectivity account suggests that when forming their final judgments, information consistent
with the threatened trial sentence will become more easily accessible than inconsistent information.
This biased information search, in turn, may influence judgments of what a lenient and fair offer
might entail, and whether to accept or reject a guilty plea.
A biased information search may also influence defendants’ perceptions of related case
attributes. For example, defendants and their attorneys may regard their crime as more severe or
estimate a higher likelihood of being found guilty for a more severe crime. Such a finding of the
impact of anchors on broader impressions of the defendants’ case would be alarming as research
demonstrates that the severity of the crime, including whether the offense is a misdemeanor or
felony, substantially influences defendants’ and attorneys’ plea decisions (e.g., Bushway & Redlich,
2012; McAllister & Bregman, 1986; Ulmer & Bradley, 2006; Champion, 1989; Meyer & Gray,
1997; Spohn & Cederblom, 1991). Thus, the current set of studies also examine how exceedingly
severe threatened trial sentences may also influence how defendants and their attorneys perceive
the severity of the defendants’ offense and their likelihood of conviction. Critically, biased
processing of case information may occur even if the defense acknowledges that the threatened
trial sentence is above the range of plea offers they would be willing to accept (Mussweiler &
Strack, 2001).
Several prior studies support the account of selective accessibility of anchor-consistent
information using varied methodologies including qualitative coding of information considered in
rendering judgments, and more “objective” measures, including reaction times (for an exception,
see Harris et al., 2019). For example, Mussweiler and Englich (2005) found that subliminal
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anchors (about car prices) increased the speed of categorization of anchor-consistent, semantically
related words (e.g., BMW for high anchor) in a lexical decision task. Similarly, Englich et al. (Study
4; 2006) found that legal experts exposed to a high rather than low sentencing demand (9 vs. 3
months on probation) categorized inculpatory information faster (as measured by reaction times).
Interestingly, there was no main effect of anchor condition on categorization of exculpatory

information. The authors suggest that because the determination of guilt is the primary hypothesis
being tested, a positive test will naturally lead to greater processing of incriminating information. In
contrast, defendants and their attorneys who are not necessarily making a determination of guilt,
but rather one of provable innocence or of appropriate punishment, may have information
processing goals that prioritize a search for disconfirming (rather than confirming) evidence in
response to extremely high threatened trial sentences (more on the role of motivational goals in
Chapter 4).
A naturally motivated search for disconfirming evidence would not necessarily undermine
the notion that overcharging elicits anchoring effects via selective accessibility of anchor-consistent
information. But anchoring that occurs despite the search for information contradicting the anchor
would suggest a different causal explanation for the biasing effect of the anchor on judgments and
decisions. Further, thoughtful information searches of either confirmatory or disconfirmatory
evidence do not necessarily preclude anchoring via less thoughtful processes. Anchoring biases
may still be present in plea judgments because, according to the attitude change perspective,
numeric anchors can take on multiple roles depending on how an anchor is processed.

Attitudinal Change Perspective
The perspective on numeric anchoring based on attitude change theories (such as the
elaboration likelihood model; ELM) suggest that anchors can be thought of as a persuasive
message that people evaluate in either a thoughtful (high elaboration; e.g., attending to strength of
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the central claims) or non-thoughtful manner (low elaboration; e.g., focusing on peripheral cues
such as source credibility; see Wegener et al., 2010).
In plea bargaining, a “persuasive message” that defendants and their attorneys evaluate is
the prosecutors’ threatened trial sentence. The defense may evaluate the threatened trial sentence
in a primarily thoughtful manner by considering case-relevant information such as the facts,
circumstances, evidence (i.e., via the central route). Additionally, or instead, people may evaluate
the threatened sentence in a less thoughtful manner (i.e., via the peripheral route) and become
influenced by peripheral factors, typically heuristics or cues (such as the magnitude of the
threatened sentence) that may have little bearing on whether the charges associated with the offer
are likely to lead to a conviction. Importantly, in the ELM, thinking is not always elaborative,
meaning that non-thoughtful processes can also lead to superficially large effects in attitude change
or judgments like those resulting from more thoughtful processes.
Non-thoughtful processing of stimuli may result from conditions of low ability (e.g., due to
high cognitive load) or low motivation (e.g., a lack of personal relevance) to thoroughly process
information. For example, Blankenship et al., (2008) found that although participants in both high
and low cognitive load conditions were susceptible to anchoring effects, anchoring that occurred
under low cognitive load involved greater use of anchor-relevant information, attitude change that
persisted over time, and an anchoring bias that was more invulnerable to attempts at social
influence. Similarly, proponents of the application of ELM to anchoring theorize that “there might
be relatively non-thoughtful versions of selective accessibility (in which people use few rather than
many anchor-consistent reactions activated by cursory confirmatory hypothesis tests)” (Wegener et
al., 2010, p. 8). This work suggests that greater elaboration of the materials alone should not
mitigate anchoring biases, but rather it is the deliberate search for disconfirmatory evidence that
should attenuate the anchoring bias the most.
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Scale Distortion Perspective
The scale distortion theory on anchoring explains anchoring as a distortion in the provided
response scale used for mapping judgments rather than a distortion of the internal representation
of the target value (Frederick & Mochon, 2012; Mochon & Frederick, 2013). Though scale
distortion theory does not necessarily predict different outcomes in anchor-assimilated judgments
from the selective accessibility account, it does suggest a different underlying mechanism. For
example, in the context of a small anchor (e.g., a 20-pound racoon), subsequent estimates of a
giraffe’s weight might be lower not because people believe the giraffe to weigh less, but rather
because larger numbers on the scale now appear larger and therefore, more appropriate for
communicating the weight of animals heavier than a giraffe. Thus, anchoring manifests itself as a
use of lower numbers on the response scale to communicate an unchanged mental representation
of the giraffe.
In support of scale distortion theory, Frederick and Mochon (2012) demonstrated that
asking people to judge a racoon’s weight in pounds prior to estimating a giraffe’s weight (also in
pounds) led people to underestimate the giraffe’s weight relative to the control group, but only
when the response scale remained unchanged. But when asked to estimate a giraffe’s heaviness on
a subjective scale, peoples’ estimates did not demonstrate any influence of the anchor condition.
Further, in other similar studies, the authors showed that despite providing anchor-assimilated
judgments about one aspect of the giraffe, other weight-related judgments such as height, gestation
period, amount of vegetation consumed, and the number of lions it could feed, were unaffected by
the anchor. From these results, Frederick and Mochon conclude the scale distortion account best
explains why anchoring sometimes occurs without any change in the underlying internal
representation, beliefs, or attitudes of the judged stimulus. The authors, however, admit that
selective accessibility is a more plausible explanation for anchoring that occurs in judgments of
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criminal sentencing where participants have a pool of knowledge to consider (e.g., rich case
materials), but less so in other domains where domain-relevant knowledge is less available.
Informational Relevance of the Anchor
Although the relevance of the numeric anchor is a key component of anchoring research
dating back to Tversky and Kahneman’s (1974) original studies, its impact on judgments involving
criminal proceedings remains largely unexamined (for the few exceptions, see Glöckner & Englich,
2015; Hans et al., 2018; Reyna et al., 2015; Helm et al., 2020). Psychological theories of anchoring
make separate predictions about the impact of relevant and irrelevant anchors on target value
assessments. On the one hand, low elaboration accounts such as numeric and magnitude priming
suggest that anchor relevance should have no impact, whereas high-elaboration accounts regard
relevance as a critical feature of the evaluation process. For example, in plea contexts, a highly
threatening trial sentence presented as relevant may convey to the defense that the prosecutor has
sufficient evidence to build a strong case against them or regards the crime as particularly severe
and worthy of equally severe punishment. These evaluations may make a defendant and their
attorney overestimate their likelihood of conviction and convince them that a higher plea sentence
may help them avoid the risk of conviction at trial. Conversely, an irrelevant threatened trial
sentence (e.g., a sentence pertaining to an unrelated legal case) should not evoke the same set of
thoughts as it has no factual bearing on the defendants’ case. Moreover, the implications of an
anchoring bias caused by an irrelevant trial sentence would bolster arguments against overcharging
that occurs in the absence of sufficient evidence to meet a higher standard of proof.
Choice Decision-Making Under Uncertainty
The anchoring literature has focused almost exclusively on the biasing influence of anchors
on numerical judgments. But in applied settings, it is also important to examine whether anchoring
biases extend from biased judgments to biased choices. Thus, one goal of the current work was to
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examine whether anchors lead decision-makers to assimilate their choices (e.g., plea decisions)
toward the anchor (e.g., threatened trial sentence) through their biased sentencing judgments (e.g.,
maximum acceptable sentence). Only one study has examined this prediction.
Brewer et al. (2007) found that providing physicians with an irrelevant anchor about a hypothetical
patients’ chances of having a pulmonary embolism biased their estimates of the likelihood that the
same patient might suffer an embolism but did not bias their treatment plans. High elaboration
and, to a lesser degree, low elaboration accounts of anchoring support the prediction that anchored
judgments may lead to anchored choices. Only one study has examined this prediction.
Brewer and colleagues argued that to demonstrate this assimilation effect in choice for the
current set of studies, the anchored judgments should mediate the relationship between the anchor
and the anchor-assimilated choice. If the judgment covaries with the anchor-choice correlation
completely, then we might expect the anchor to no longer influence choice after controlling for
judgments (i.e., complete mediation). For example, in plea settings, a highly threatened trial
sentence might cause a defendant to accept a more lenient plea offer, fully mediated by the
maximum jail sentence to which they would be willing to plead guilty (assuming no measurement
errors across variables).
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Chapter 4: Motivated Reasoning for Preferential Judgments
Conspicuously missing from many anchoring theories (although the attitudinal perspective,
less so) are the social factors that undoubtedly moderate the influence of the anchoring bias in
social situations in which people have preferred outcomes. In plea negotiations, defendants and
their attorneys are motivated parties with vested interests in particular desirable outcomes, not
merely factually accurate outcomes. Defendants know that their decisions have meaningful,
immediate, and distal direct (e.g., incarceration, probation) and distal indirect (collateral)
consequences (e.g., loss of income, housing, employment; Edkins & Dervan, 2018; Gordon &
Hellgren, 2018). Judgments accompanied by such self-relevant outcomes may be influenced by
motivational biases that lead individuals to seek, evaluate, and recall information in self-serving
ways (Kunda, 1990). For example, people attempt to reduce the discomfort of having engaged in
unethical behaviors (Gino et al., 2013) by recalling these past unethical behaviors in a self-servingly
biased manner (e.g., Escobedo & Adolphs, 2010; Kouchaki & Gino, 2016; Stanley et al., 2017).
Additionally, extreme overcharging can lead to a temporary state of perceived or actual
partial innocence, such as when prosecutors threaten to indict defendants who are guilty of some
misconduct with charges and sentences more severe than are warranted by their actual misconduct.
To the extent that overcharging leads to partial innocence, self-serving biases may also lead these
such defendants to view themselves more positively (Dunning et al., 1989; Epley & Dunning 2000)
by denying case facts, their knowledge, culpability, or the amount of harm caused (Bibas, 2004).
Whether partially innocent defendants make decisions as if innocent or as if guilty when their
culpability is ambiguous is less clear (Cardenas et al., 2020; Tor et al., 2010). Motivational biases
may thus render threatening anchors less potent when they oppose a person’s favored
interpretation of the circumstances in which they find themselves.
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Yet most anchoring research has focused on how people make judgments in the domain of
general knowledge, an area in which people have no intrinsic reason to prefer one outcome over
another, and in which a factually correct response exists (e.g., the height of the Brandenburg Gate,
the weight of the average giraffe). A small subset of work has examined anchoring biases in
preferential judgments using valuation tasks for which no correct response exists. These studies
require participants to indicate their willingness-to-accept or their willingness-to-pay for public
goods and services (Green et al., 1998). For example, in one study with a consequential decisionmaking situation in which participants could evaluate products and spend their own money, Ariely
et al. (2003) found that consumers’ preferential judgments and evaluations of the products were
influenced by irrelevant numeric anchors. But whether the anchoring bias exerts its influence to
the same extent when rendering preferential judgments is still the subject of some debate, with
some studies finding attenuated effects (Fudenberg et al., 2012) and others not (Yoon et al., 2019).
What explains what happens when people are asked to make subjective judgments in
domains where they may be highly motivated to reach certain outcome? Early research by Lord et
al. (1979) found that directional goals based on participants’ views on capital punishment biased
their evaluations of scientific evidence in a mock capital trial case. Similarly, Sherman and Kunda
(1989) found that caffeine users were less persuaded by studies concluding that high caffeine use
exacerbated progression of a serious disease. Threatened participants spontaneously generated
fewer strengths of the study and pointed to a greater number of methodological flaws including the
sample size, measurement validity of self-report, and the prestige of the research institution.
In anchoring contexts, few studies have assessed whether anchors biases preferential
judgments outside of the consumer preferences literature (e.g., Plous, 1989). For example, in two
studies, participants who received a high anchor estimated that they would be able to solve more
anagram puzzles (Cervone & Peake, 1986) and unscramble more sentences (Switzer & Sniezek,
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1991) than those who received a low anchor. In another study, anchors influenced participants’
estimations of the number of stairs they had walked and math problems they had solved (Cheek et
al., 2015). Such studies focused only on judgments made over preferred positive outcomes.
Only one study to date has explicitly examined the moderating role of motivation for

negative self-relevant judgments. Joel et al. (2017) asked participants to estimate the probability that
positive and negative self-relevant events (about their romantic relationships, employment, and
world events) would occur to them. The authors paired questions such as “What do you think the
chances are that your partner will one day fall out of love with you?” with either optimistic,
pessimistic, or no anchors. Across four studies, optimistic anchors suggesting a high probability of
positive events occurring led to the predicted anchoring effect, such that people overestimated
good things happening to them. Pessimistic anchors that suggested a high probability of negative
events occurring were ineffective. The authors concluded that self-threatening anchors fail to sway
peoples’ estimates of bad things happening to them. To what extent threatening anchors were
ineffective because they triggered an effortful, thorough search for disconfirming evidence remains
unknown. Excessive trial sentences are, of course, highly threatening to defendants and to their
attorneys who desire the best outcomes for their clients. Thus, it remains unknown whether
anchoring effects may be attenuated for individuals or attorney-client pairs providing preferential
judgments and decisions.
Self-interested defendants may also have a lower threshold for what constitutes an
unacceptably extreme threatened trial sentence relative to attorneys or disinterested others. Haby
and Brank (2015) suggest “that even implausible anchors will sway a defendant’s decision” (p. 30).
But research on implausibly high anchors is mixed, with some studies showing anchoring effects
with even extreme anchors (Chapman, 1994; Mussweiler & Strack, 2001; Mussweiler et al., 2000;
Strack & Mussweiler, 1997), and others showing merely attenuated effects (Sugden et al., 2013). In
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their meta-analysis, Bystranowski et al. (2021) found that the anchoring effect was largest for
moderate compared to high and low anchors (d = 1.00 [0.77, 1.23], p < .001), and that high
anchors produced the smallest anchoring effect sizes, though not significantly so (d = 0.77 [-0.42,
1.95], p = .07).
In one study, implausibly high anchors instead backfired, causing individuals to consider
the ways in which the anchor was different from the true answer (Wegener et al., 2001). In plea
context, one could easily imagine that a defendant charged with grand larceny when petit larceny
would be more appropriate would likely search for information disconfirming their involvement in
the more serious crime. Even if appropriately charged that same defendant might be willing to
accept responsibility for an appropriate sentence corresponding to petit larceny, but balk at the
prospect of serving a sentence 8 times as large. Hence, though anchoring effects are robust in the
literature, there are sufficient unexplored countervailing moderators present in plea contexts that
collectively suggest the necessity of further inquiry.
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Chapter 5: Requirements for Debiasing Interventions
Another important goal of the current research was to examine debiasing interventions for
the anchoring effect in legal judgments and decision-making. So few interventions have been tested
in legal contexts that Bystranowski and colleagues (2021) were unable to meta-analyze the efficacy
of any interventions. We know from research in the broader anchoring literature that correcting
for anchoring biases on judgment is notoriously difficult even in the presence of manipulations
designed to motivate effortful cognitive processing, such as forewarnings of bias (Chapman &
Johnson, 2002; Wilson et al., 1996) and financial incentives for accuracy (Englich et al., 2006;
Tversky & Kahneman, 1974; Wilson et al., 1996; Wright & Anderson, 1989). For example,
Wilson et al. (1996; Studies 4 and 5) attempted to debias the anchoring effect by offering to pay
the most accurate participant $50, warning of the effect of anchoring, and even the direction in
which the anchor was likely to bias responses, all to no avail. Thus accuracy motivation alone may
not entirely attenuate the anchoring bias (Epley & Gilovich, 2006; Simmons et al., 2010).
Attorneys as “Debiasers”
Many legal scholars have suggested that structural safeguards present in plea negotiation
proceedings, but absent in experimental anchoring paradigms, attenuate, or else entirely eliminate,
the anchoring bias in this setting. For example, Gigerenzer (1991) and Scott & Stuntz (1992)
claimed that attorneys mitigate any potential anchoring bias by assisting defendants with their
decision making. Korobkin & Guthrie (1997) suggested that attorneys ought to assist clients by
presenting them with all relevant information, identifying alternative choices, and “chang[ing] the
client's outlook” to avoid “cognitive errors” (p. 130). Although Bibas (2004) similarly argues for the
potential debiasing role of lawyers, he also identifies obstacles that may impede their efficacy —
such as the possibility that attorneys’ initial anchors may not be those of the case at hand, but
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rather based on self-serving biases, intuition (Kahneman & Klein, 2009), or dissimilar prior
experiences (Kahneman et al., 1982).
When attorneys are expected to attenuate their clients’ cognitive errors, what attenuates
attorneys’ own cognitive errors (Edkins, 2011)? Anchoring research on primarily civil legal
decision-making suggests that several of the assets that defense attorneys bring to the negotiating
table — their knowledge, experience, and expertise — may not make them invulnerable to
anchoring biases (Bystranowski et al., 2021). Findings on the impact of domain knowledge are
mixed with some work finding that it attenuates the anchoring bias (e.g., Englich et al., 2006;
Englich & Soder, 2009; Welsh et al., 2014; Wright & Anderson, 1989), but not always (e.g., Cheek
et al., 2015). This body of work finds that managers (Whyte & Sebenius, 1997), real-estate agents
(Northcraft & Neale, 1987), doctors (Brewer et al., 2007), and legal experts (Englich et al., 2006;
Englich & Soder, 2009; Xifen & Yong, 2018) are all susceptible to the anchoring bias. For
example, in Englich et al.’s (2006) experiment, junior lawyers decided sentencing decisions that
were anchored on an irrelevant sentencing anchor they themselves had generated by rolling a pair
of dice. In Bystranowski et al.’s (2021) meta-analysis, a test of the moderator of expertise further
demonstrated that legal professionals (N = 2177, including 244 law students) are indeed susceptible
to the anchoring effect. Though not significant, they did find a consistent trend in the direction of
attenuated magnitude of the anchoring effect for legal professionals compared to lay people (N =
6372; d = 0.84, [0.60, 1.16] vs. d = 0.94, [0.59, 1.22]), which is consistent with a prior meta-analysis
by Orr & Guthrie (2006) of experts in negotiation contexts. 1

These findings are inconsistent with Townson’s (2019) unpublished meta-analysis on anchoring in the broader
literature showing that the anchoring effect was actually larger for expert judges (14 studies, N = 762, Mw = .504, Varw =
.026,) than for amateur judges (50 studies, N = 6537, Mw = .378, Varw = .023; z(62) = 2.64, p < .01; r = .32). Townson’s
analyses on the subset of studies of legal decision-making — comparing actual judges and practicing attorneys (8 studies,
N = 396) to novices (26 studies, N = 4001) — found a similar result, namely, that greater expertise was associated with
greater susceptibility to anchors, z(32) = 2.09, p = .02, d = .063.
1
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It is worth emphasizing that results from prior studies of anchoring among legal experts,
though highly informative and suggestive, cannot be directly mapped on to plea bargain settings.
This is because research on anchoring in legal contexts has focused primarily on civil cases (76%:
43 of 56 effect sizes) in which respondents determined monetary damages (e.g., Hans et al., 2018).
In their meta-analysis, Bystranowski et al. (2021) found that the magnitude of the anchoring effect
was consistently larger, though not significantly so, among civil cases (keffect_sizes = 43, d = 1.00, [0.64,
1.36]) compared to criminal cases (keffect_sizes = 13, d = 0.79, [0.51, 1.07]).
Another limitation is that among the few studies involving criminal proceedings — none of
which relate to plea bargaining — the majority were conducted by Englich and colleagues (e.g.,
Englich et al., 2005; Englich & Mussweiler, 2001; Englich & Soder, 2009; Glöckner & Englich,
2015), were based on small sample sizes, and required participants to assign punishment to a thirdparty. The most relevant study to the current research presented legal professionals with a
hypothetical case containing a prosecutor’s (high or low) sentencing recommendation (Englich et
al., 2005). The presentation of defense attorneys’ sentencing recommendations were anchored on
the preceding prosecutors’ recommendation and partially mediated the impact of the prosecutors’
recommendations on respondents’ sentencing judgments. Such work supports the notion that
defense attorneys too may be vulnerable to anchoring effects, but not necessarily whether attorneys
providing plea recommendations or working jointly with defendants are similarly vulnerable.
Collectively, research on anchoring among legal experts suggests that despite their best
intentions to assist clients, defense attorneys may be vulnerable to the same cognitive errors that
likely afflict their clients. Plea negotiations represent a unique situation in which defense attorneys
utilize their own expertise and prior experiences in the service of counseling a client who is the one
who ultimately decides on the appropriateness of the plea offer. The susceptibility of defendants

26

and their attorneys to the anchoring bias suggests a need for a debiasing intervention that operates
at the dyad-level.
Multiple, Competing Anchors
Scholars have suggested that a prosecutors’ threatened trial sentence anchors naive
defendants (i.e., non-recidivists) on such a high value, that subsequent reductions appear extensive
by comparison (e.g., Bibas, 2004). This prediction is in line with research demonstrating that initial
offers strongly influence final negotiated outcomes (Neale & Northcraft, 1991). For example,
Liebert (1968) found that whereas uninformed bargainers set bids that were heavily influenced by
their opponents’ initial bids, informed bargainers used their opponents’ initial bids to gauge the
reasonableness of their opponents’ objectives. Similarly, Whyte & Sebanius (1997) separately
exposed pairs of individuals to an unreliable anchor (a housing list price) and then brought the
individual members together to render a decision as a group. Participants’ initial offers, aspiration

levels (least positive outcome which they would be satisfied), and bottom lines (least positive
outcome they would accept rather than abandon the negotiation) were all affected by an externally
provided initial offer. De Wilde et al. (2018) attributed Whyte and Sebanius’ results to their
methodological choice to expose individuals to the anchor before they had a chance to generate
their own anchors, unbiased by the negotiator’s anchor. De Wilde et al. claimed that when
individuals’ anchor-biased preferences enter the group’s discussion space, individual-level biases
will amplify group-level biases. Amplification occurs because groups tend to combine numerical
preferences by averaging them, or adopting the median preference (Davis, 1996). But what if
individuals consider the maximum amount of time they would be willing to spend in jail before
becoming exposed to the threatened trial sentence?
In plea negotiations, prior to exposure to the prosecutor’s anchoring threatened sentence,
defendants and defense attorneys may each have the opportunity to consider how much time in jail
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the defendant should be willing to spend. This initial consideration by each individual group
member can serve as a competing reference point, a self-generated anchor, against which
defendants (and their attorneys) later compare the threatened trial sentence. The competing

anchors hypothesis assumes that the judgments of individual members of a group result in
multiple, self-generated anchors that groups can be used as reference points (Sniezek, 1992).
Sniezek (1992) suggests that the existence of these multiple anchors impedes the typical anchoring
and adjustment process since multiple starting points must first be evaluated. Downen et al. (2019)
note that consideration of multiple starting points promotes “an iterative process in which an
anchor is provided, an estimation is made, and that estimation is then tested against the optimal
solution” (p. 5; Welsh & Begg, 2018).
Research shows that when multiple, self-generated anchor compete with an externally
provided anchor, the latter typically becomes less influential (Whyte & Sebenuys, 1997). For
example, though presenting the anchor at the group level, as de Wilde et al. (2018) did, did not
fully attenuate the anchoring bias, the authors argue the effect size found in their study was smaller
than the one found in the Many Labs replication of the anchoring effect (d = .97 vs. ds = 1.17 –
2.42; Klein et al., 2014). Research further shows that people insufficiently adjust from selfgenerated anchors (Study 1, Epley & Gilovich, 2006) and that accuracy motivation reduces the
anchoring bias more when the anchor is self-generated than when it is externally provided (Tversky
& Kahneman, 1974; Epley & Gilovich, 2006).
Consider-the-Opposite Strategy
Given that the selective accessibility perspective suggests that asking people to consider
anchor-disconfirming evidence should reduce the anchoring effect, multiple anchors theoretically
indirectly achieve this goal by increasing accessibility to more information beyond merely anchorconsistent information. One promising, even more direct debiasing method for increasing
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accessibility, termed the consider-the-opposite (COS) method (Mussweiler et al., 2000; Mussweiler
& Strack, 2000), requires generating reasons why the anchor may be inappropriate.
Mussweiler et al. (2000) tested this COS strategy. In one field study, car sales experts
incentivized for accuracy (by being told that they might be hired for a repair) were tasked with
estimating the value of the latest model of a car. Car experts (mechanics with 10+ years of
experience) who were asked to list reasons for why the anchor value might be inappropriate were
less influenced by the anchor (high or low) than those who were only asked to provide a price
estimate. Supporting the selective accessibility account, among experts who received the high
anchor (but not low anchor), the number of pieces of evidence generated was associated with their
estimates. Other studies have found similar results when applying the COS method to non-legal
judgment domains (e.g., weather forecasting; Adame, 2016; Joslyn et al., 2011) and legal judgments
(e.g., criminal sentencing; Wildermuth et al., 2019; Stein & Drouin, 2018). Downen et al. (2019)
found similar results after presenting participants with headlines that contained anchors (e.g.,
“Millard Fillmore was 10 years old when he became president!”) that were inconsistent — even
preposterous — with subsequently presented information (e.g., “By US law, an individual must be
at least 35 years old to become president”). Typically, the issue with this solution has been
motivating individuals to spontaneously consider opposite hypotheses on their own.

Motivating for Accuracy Through Process Accountability
Although the few available studies on anchoring in groups find that group-judgments are
also subject to anchoring effects in non-legal (Meub & Proeger, 2015; Whyte & Sebanius, 1997)
and legal contexts (Kimbrough et al., 2018; Study 1 of de Wilde et al., 2018), one study found
complete attenuation using a motivation-based process accountability strategy (Study 2 of de Wilde
et al., 2018). Specifically, de Wilde et al. (2018) found that process accountable groups made
sentencing decisions (in months) that were not significantly different between those exposed to the
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high (61 months) versus low (6 months) anchors, whereas the control group showed typical
anchoring effects.
Individuals made to be accountable for the process, rather than the outcome of their
decision-making, expect to have to justify their beliefs to others. According to Lerner and Tetlock
(1999) various manipulations of accountability exist: these include manipulating the mere presence

of another person (participant expects to have their performance observed), identifiability
(participant believes their performance will be linked back to them), evaluation (participant expects
to have their performance evaluated on the basis of some pre-established rules and for there to be
consequences to this evaluation), and reason-giving (participants expect to explain the rationale
behind their responses).
Decades of research show that process accountable individuals are less biased when
searching for information (Scholten et al., 2007; Ten Velden et al., 2010), are more reluctant to
accept unsupported alternatives (Davis et al., 1976), and make more critical self-evaluations, which
in turn motivates more effortful and deeper processing that impacts both initial encoding and
processing of information (Tetlock, 1985, 1982). For example, in one study, Tetlock (1983)
demonstrated that individuals motivated for accuracy using a process accountability manipulation
were less susceptible to the primacy effect when making verdict decisions in a simulated murder
trial. Of note, despite de Wilde et al.’s (2018) finding that process accountable groups discussed a
greater amount of anchor-inconsistent information, the number of anchor-inconsistent arguments
discussed, of which there were very few, did not predict sentencing decisions. Instead, de Wilde et
al. attribute their findings to process accountable participants stating their sentencing preferences
earlier in the discussion than control groups participants.
Although these findings overall seem inconsistent with prior research demonstrating that
increasing accuracy motivation (through financial incentives) is ineffective, other work finds that
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insufficient adjustment is often the result of uncertainty over which direction (upward or
downward) adjustment away from the anchor should occur. Because this is almost certainly not an
issue for defendants and attorneys making sentencing judgments who will likely always adjust from
the anchor in a downward direction (i.e., lower sentence value than the threatened trial sentence),
process accountability might be an especially effective debiasing intervention in plea negotiations.
Whether defense attorneys are already process accountable throughout plea bargain
negotiations merits some discussion here. External process accountability, in the form of internal
or external review of defense services (but also prosecutorial practices) is largely absent in the
current plea-bargaining system. This is because plea bargaining takes place not merely in the
shadow of the trial, but also in the shadows — that is, “in an unmonitored environment,” behind
closed doors, and away from public scrutiny (e.g., Henderson & Levett, 2019. p. 79). Plea
negotiations and counseling, as they are currently conducted, do not facilitate examination of finegrained factors, such as the completeness of the aggravating and mitigating information exchanged
in attorney-client deliberations because such conversations are privileged and because the public
transcripts and records — obligatory in trials — are virtually absent in plea negotiations, particularly
for indigent defendants. According to Laurin (2016), “the need to enhance ‘accountability’ for the
provision of indigent defense services is persistently identified as a top priority for mending the
system. . . from both reform advocates and actors within the system” (p. 374). Thus, plea
bargaining seems to lack much of the type of external accountability that is manipulated in the
current research (e.g., evaluations, reason-giving).
A lack of externally mandated accountability procedures, of course does not preclude the
existence of less formal, individual-level — that is, not resulting from procedural and substantive
office policies — process accountability. Put differently, attorneys may, of their own accord, hold

themselves accountable for monitoring and correcting for cognitive biases. Lacking descriptive data
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for this type of accountability, at most, we can infer the quality of real-world accountability in plea
counseling from prescriptive professional rules and guidelines for appropriate defense conduct and
from case outcomes. For example, the American Bar Association’s “Criminal Justice Standards for
the Defense Function” outlines an exhaustive list of non-mandatory “aspirational or . . . best
practices” that attorneys — privately retained, court-appointed, acting pro bono, or serving indigent
clients through legal aid or public defenders’ offices — should strive to adhere to in order to
adequately serve as “loyal and zealous advocates for their clients.” For example:
“Defense counsel should strive to eliminate implicit biases, and act to mitigate any
improper bias or prejudice when credibly informed that it exists within the scope of
defense counsel’s authority” — Standard 4-1.6(a) Improper Bias Prohibited
Yet, preliminarily at least, laboratory research finds that the presence of such biases is
clearly not always mitigated (e.g., Edkins, 2011). Most relevantly here for the argument that defense
attorneys are, at least, ethically encouraged to consider mitigating evidence regardless of threatened
trial penalties is the following standard:
“Defense counsel should not recommend to a defendant acceptance of a
disposition without appropriate investigation. Before accepting or advising a
disposition, defense counsel should request that the prosecution disclose any
information that tends to negate guilt, mitigates the offense or is likely to reduce
punishment.” — Standard 4-6.2(d) Negotiated Disposition Discussions
The extent to which defense attorneys procedurally engage in such ‘best practice’ behaviors
is unknown. One can imagine substantial variation in adherence to this high standard based on
counsel type (e.g., privately retained or serving indigent clients) as well as numerous structural
impediments (e.g., fee arrangements, caseloads, limited pre-trial criminal discovery) that likely
covary with the former (see “Combating Defense Attorneys’ Resigned Cynicism” in Wright &
Miller, 2002, p. 91-96). Some findings show better case dispositions from privately retained
counsel relative to court-appointed counsel (Champion, 1989), whereas other work fails to find any
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differences (for an overview, see Henderson & Levett, 2019). Together, converging evidence lead
us to suspect that plea bargain negotiations occur in an environment of low external, and perhaps
even low internal, process accountability.

33

Chapter 6: Overview of the Current Studies
Although legal scholars and psychologists have long suggested that overcharging may elicit
powerful anchoring effects that bias plea offer evaluations and coerce defendants to plead guilty, no
work has empirically investigated to what extent these claims may be warranted. If warranted, what
are the underlying mechanisms for this effect in plea bargaining settings, and what can be done to
mitigate the harmful impact of anchoring biases on defendant and attorney plea decisions? To
answer to these questions, I report three studies that collectively (a) demonstrate to what extent
defendants and legal professionals are susceptible to the anchoring bias, (b) provide information
about the possible mechanism behind why they may succumb to anchoring effects, and (c) test the
efficacy of two debiasing strategies focused on improving information processing of disconfirming
information.
To investigate a potential anchoring effect in plea bargain settings, mock defendants (Study
1), practicing criminal defense attorneys (Study 2), and mock attorney-client pairs (Study 3) read a
hypothetical plea scenario containing either a high or moderately sized maximum trial sentence
and decided to accept or reject (recommend or not recommend, for attorneys) a more lenient plea
offer. I began by assessing whether legal decision-makers involved in a plea negotiation are
vulnerable to anchoring effects when rendering legal decisions for themselves (S1, S3) or their
clients (S2, S3). Across all studies, I also examined whether anchoring or the consequences of
anchoring influence legal decision-makers’ evaluations of related case attributes such as evidence
strength and crime severity. Further, I tested the efficacy of interventions designed to attenuate
expected anchoring effects by requiring (S2) or motivating (S3) legal decision-makers to consider
anchor-disconfirming evidence and competing trial sentences.
To further gain insight into the mechanism underlying anchoring effects in plea
negotiations, across all studies, I isolated the effect of the sentencing differential from a pure
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anchoring effect on sentencing judgments and decisions caused by the threatened trial sentence.
Scholars agree that at least part of the coercion of strategic overcharging is that the combination of
an excessively threatening trial penalty enables an equally excessive sentencing differential. Studies
1-3 methodologically correct for the inevitable confound present due to the covariation of these
variables. Specifically, to disentangle these effects, at least one of the sentencing values that enables
calculation of the differential was be removed (either the threatened trial sentence or the plea
sentence).
Study 1 tested the hypothesis that neither value was necessary to elicit an anchoring bias on
sentencing judgments, by stripping the threatened trial sentence of its informational relevance
preventing calculation of a sentencing differential. Further, across all studies, mock defendants and
attorneys were instructed to provide maximum acceptable sentencing judgments — the maximum
sentence they would be willing to accept (or recommend) rather than risk a conviction at trial —

prior to learning of the numeric value contained in the plea offer. A failure to insufficiently adjust
sentencing judgments away from a threatened trial sentence would demonstrate the anchor-driven
biasing effect of threatened trial sentences beyond any influence of an enticing sentencing
differential. Studies 1-3 also tested the possibility that anchors exert a direct influence on
willingness to accept a plea containing numeric values corresponding to participants’ maximum
acceptable sentencing judgments (e.g., choosing to accept an offer equal to or lower than the
maximum sentence they previously indicated willing to accept).
All of the present studies were approved by the institutional review board of John Jay
College of Criminal Justice. In keeping with best science practices, all studies, materials, and
statistical analyses were pre-registered and will be made publicly available on the Open Science
Framework (https://osf.io/h6ktg/). I determined all sample sizes, stopping rules, exclusion criteria,
and analyses in advance of data collection for Study 1 and prior to viewing the data for Studies 2
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and 3. I provide an overview of the registration, sample size, design, and main dependent measures
for each study in Table 1. All exploratory analyses are indicated as such.
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Chapter 7: Study 1
Method

Pilot Testing.
To examine if anchoring in plea contexts occurs through high elaboration processes, I
constructed a rich case description that contained sufficiently memorable, relevant, and
unambiguously aggravating and mitigating arguments that participants could selectively access based
on the manipulations. I selected arguments to be included in the case materials based on results
from four pilot studies. The resulting hypothetical plea scenario serves as the main source
materials across all studies described here. An explanation of the creation of these materials and
pilot test results along with links to access materials and data can be found on OSF
(osf.io/m9435/).

Design and Statistical Power
Study 1 used a 2 (Anchor: High [24 months] vs. Moderate [4 months]) X 2 (Informational
Relevance: Irrelevant vs. Relevant) between-subjects factorial design in which 479 participants were
randomly assigned to conditions. An a priori power simulation using the superpower package in R
demonstrated that a sample of 480 participants was necessary to achieve 99% power to detect an
effect size of d = .69 for the main effect of anchor and 80% power to detect an effect size of d = .27
for the main effect of relevance (Lakens & Caldwell, 2021). The simulation using predicted means
and SDs based on pilot testing is available at osf.io/p6nmf/.2

2

Though seemingly large, these effect sizes were informed by Townson’s (2019) meta-analysis which found a Cohen’s

d of .77 for anchoring effects in law contexts and a Cohen’s d = .28 for informational relevance of the anchor. A metaanalysis by Bystranowski et al. (2021) published after data collection for this study took place also demonstrated that
the average effect size of anchoring studies in legal context ( n = 16, k = 37 effect sizes) employing High vs. Low
comparisons is d = .91, 95% CI [.69, 1.12]) and for studies employing Irrelevant vs. Potentially or Relevant anchors is,
d = .52, 95% CI [.42, 74]). Sample sizes from prior studies (from those included in Bystranowski et al.’s meta-analysis)
have been significantly smaller with an average of 104 participants (range: 30 - 349).
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Participants and Exclusion Criteria
In November of 2020, I recruited 667 adults for a 23-minute (SD = 10.76 mins) study
through Prolific, a crowd-sourcing platform that provides diverse samples producing more
generalizable data than undergraduate samples, and more valid and reliable data than Amazon’s
Mechanical Turk (Chandler et al., 2014; Chmielewsk & Kucker, 2020). Eligible participants were
18 years or older, could speak and understand English, were not a part of other crowd-sourcing
websites (e.g., Amazon’s Mechanical Turk), were US Nationals, and had not participated in any
prior pilot studies.
To ensure recruitment of participants for whom the mock scenario was not a priori
unrealistic, a pre-screening question prior to signing informed consent re-directed participants who
indicated they would find the imagining task ‘moderately’ (n = 74) or ‘extremely difficult’ (n = 29)
to the end of the survey. Of the remaining 564 participants, I excluded participants for not
consenting to participate (n = 2), reporting a non-matching age to the one they had previously
reported directly to Prolific (n = 3), failing an instructional attention check (n = 14), and for failing
the numeric anchor value stimulus attention check (n = 43)3. Results for all manipulation and
attention checks across all studies reported here can be found in the Supplemental Materials
(osf.io/ucq8z/). Remaining participants provided coherent responses to an open-ended question
about their plea reason and completed the survey in an amount of time that conformed with my
pre-registration (> 8.05 minutes). Finally, I excluded participants (n = 16) who provided maximum

Most anchor stimulus attention check errors occurred among participants in the moderate anchor condition who
reported having seen the high anchor (26 of 43; 60.46%). I did not exclude participants who failed the informational
relevance stimulus check, all of whom were in the irrelevant condition (n = 33). Relevance stimulus attention check
errors occurred only among participants in the irrelevant anchor condition. These participants reported that the
anchor had been relevant. Because participants selected the multiple-choice option containing a statement that
matched the materials they had been asked to read, many participants in the irrelevant anchor condition may have
inferred that they simply missed the relevant description while reading the materials. In sum, because compensation
was tied to passing attention checks such participants were almost certainly motivated to select the option that they
most thought would not disqualify them from receiving compensation.
3
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acceptable sentences (in months) that had a value outside the interval formed by the median plus
or minus 4.5 median absolute values (see Leys et al., 2013).4
After exclusions, the final sample consisted of 479 participants (Relevant, Moderate
Anchor: n = 116; Relevant, High Anchor: n = 121; Irrelevant, Moderate Anchor: n = 124;
Irrelevant, High Anchor: n =118) paid $3.50. Two-hundred and twenty-seven (47.39%) participants
identified as male, 226 (48.85%) as female, 14 as non-binary (2.92%), 1 (0.21%) as Other, and 1
(0.21%) did not wish to disclose their gender-identity. Ages ranged from 18 to 73 years (M =
32.76, SD = 12.51). Of these participants, 72.02% identified as White, 11.27% Hispanic/Latino,
8.35% as Black/African American, 13.99% as Asian, 2% as Other. Percentages exceed 100%
because several participants identified as multi-racial/ethnic. Additional sample characteristics can
be viewed in the Supplemental Materials (https://osf.io/ucq8z/).

Procedure and Materials
Eligible participants agreed to separate statements indicating that they would maximize their
web browser, complete the study in single sitting, and in an environment free from noise and
distraction. Participants read a description of a hypothetical plea scenario in which they had
become inebriated at a party, crashed their vehicle, and were then arrested for driving under the
influence followed by the relevant criminal legal code for the state of Arizona where they were told
the crime took place before. As in all studies reported here, the crime description was written in
the past tense, but the plea scenario took place in the present. I chose this DWI/DUI case because
it required that participants imagen themselves committing a non-violent offense which many
participants may find easier to imagine themselves, a friend, or loved one encountering. The

To avoid excessive loss of data, I originally pre-registered that I would use a criterion of 2.5 as long as this did not
require removal of more than 5% of participants. Using a criterion of 4.5, I removed 3.22% of participants.
4

39

current scenario has been used in similar research (e.g., Henderson & Shteynberg, 2019 and
Petersen & Redlich, 2021).
Anchor Manipulations. After reading the case description (Appendix A), participants were
randomly assigned to one of the four between-subjects conditions manipulating the numeric value
and the information relevance of the anchor. In the relevant anchor condition participants learned
of the maximum sentence they could face if convicted at trial:
“After talking with the prosecutor, Lloyd Pierce, your attorney informs you that you
can either go to trial or accept a plea offer. If you are found guilty at trial the
maximum sentence you could receive is [4/24] months in jail.”
In the irrelevant anchor condition, participants learned instead of an anchor that held no
informational value for their case: “Sam, an acquaintance of yours, is in law school and will
graduate in [4/24] months.”
Sentencing Judgments. As in the standard anchoring paradigm, participants across all
conditions provided a comparative judgment to the question of “Would you consider a maximum
sentence of [24/4] months in jail for your DUI case to be very lenient, appropriate, or very harsh
for your case?” (adapted from Glöckner & Englich, 2015) and then an absolute judgment (i.e., a
maximum acceptable sentence in months). Participants rated their confidence with their sentencing
judgment (0 = not at all to 100 = completely).
Related Case Attributes. Next, participants estimated the likelihood that they would be
found guilty if they took their case to trial (from 0% chance, ‘I would definitely be acquitted,’ to
100% chance, ‘I would definitely be found guilty’), rated the strength of each the aggravating and
the mitigating evidence (1= not at all strong to 7 = extremely strong), and the perceived severity of
the crime they were charged with committing (1= not at all serious to 7 = extremely serious).
Plea Willingness and Plea Decision. Next, participants indicated their initial plea
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decision (i.e., their willingness to accept a plea offer at values relative to the maximum acceptable
sentence; adapted from Petersen et al., 2021):
“The night before your court hearing, your defense attorney calls you at your home
and tells you: ‘The prosecuting attorney is willing to offer you a plea deal. Given the
facts and circumstances of your DUI case, which of the following options would
you choose?’
Participants had three options: (1) accept the plea offer if it is the same number or less than
the number of months in jail that they previously indicated willing to accept; (2) accept the plea
offer even if it a number of months in jail greater than the amount they previously indicated willing
to accept, but lower than the maximum sentence they might receive at trial; or (3) reject the plea
offer and take their changes at trial regardless of the number of months in jail offered to them. 5
After deciding, participants rated their confidence and provided an explanation for their decision.
Next, participants learned of the prosecutors’ take-it-or-leave-it plea offer decision:
“The next morning, you arrive at the courthouse for your hearing. As you stand in front of
the judge, your public defender arrives and asks the judge for a brief moment to discuss
with you some new developments concerning your case. ‘Okay, I just finished talking to the
district attorney handling your case. In exchange for your plea of guilty, the prosecutor is
offering to let you spend 2 months in jail.’ What is your decision concerning this plea
deal?”
Participants accepted or rejected this final plea offer and then rated their confidence in
their final plea decision, as well as the perceived leniency (1= not at all lenient to 7 = extremely

lenient) and fairness of the prosecutor’s plea offer (1 = extremely fair to 9 = extremely unfair) and
responded to a manipulation and an instructional attention check described in the Supplemental
Materials.

To ensure that participants recalled the maximum acceptable sentences they had previously provided, each “accept”
option displayed participants’ previously chosen sentencing judgment. Initial willingness to plead was, per my preregistration, recoded as a dichotomous variable (Accept = 0; Reject = 1). Responses to this question were collected for
exploratory purposes in Study 1 and 2. Results from logistic regression analyses predicting initial plea willingness can
be found in the Supplemental Materials (osf.io/ucq8z/).
5
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Perceived Evidence Strength Participants then rated the extent to which they perceived
each of 22 arguments as aggravating and mitigating using a 9-point bipolar scale (-3 =

extremely aggravating, 0 = neither aggravating nor mitigating, +3 = extremely mitigating).
Perceived Realism. Participants answered five questions assessing how realistic they
perceived the situation and case materials to be (1 = strongly disagree to 7 = strongly agree).
Example items are: “It was easy for me to imagine myself in this hypothetical plea scenario” and
“The situation described in the hypothetical plea scenario was realistic.” See Appendix B for full
scale. Responses were aggregated into a single 5-item Perceived Realism Scale (α = .73).
Participants then responded to a second manipulation check regarding the relevance of the anchor
to their plea decision (1 = ‘Not at all relevant to my plea decision’ to 7 = ‘Extremely relevant to my

plea decision’) and were reminded that their response would not affect their compensation.
Demographics. Participants reported their age, race/ethnicity, gender, household income,
highest level of education attained, whether they or someone they knew had been stopped by the
police for driving under the influence, and whether they had ever worked in law enforcement.6
The entire survey can be seen here: osf.io/nam37/.

Hypotheses
H1. A main effect of the magnitude of the anchor such that defendants would say they
would be willing to accept longer sentences after exposure to the high relative to moderate anchor
(H1a). A two-way interaction of anchor and relevance such that the difference between sentences

For exploratory purposes, I tested participants’ numeracy skills (see Petersen & Redlich, 2021 and Helm et al., 2021).
They completed the 3-item “General Numeracy Scale” (Lipkus et al. 2001l). Questions on this scale require
participants to make several calculations and provide a measure of their ability to engage in numeric reasoning (e.g.,
“Imagine that we rolled a fair, six-sided die1,000 times. Out of 1,000 rolls, how many times do you think the die would
come up even (2, 4, or 6)?”). I aggregated participants’ responses to the number of numeracy questions they answered
correctly (0 to 3). Participants got approximately 2 of 3 answers correct (M = 2.2, SD = .92). But the reliability of the
composite item was unacceptable low (.52) and could not be corrected. Thus, as indicated in my pre-registration, I did
not include this variable in my main analyses as a covariate.
6
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rendered following exposure to the high and moderate anchor conditions would be greater among
participants exposed to the relevant compared to the irrelevant anchor (H1b).
H2. A main effect of the magnitude of the anchor on plea decision such that participants
would accept more pleas after exposure to the high anchor compared to the moderate anchor. I
made no predictions about a main effect of relevance or two-way interaction.
H3. I predicted that mock defendants’ maximum acceptable sentences would mediate the
relationship between anchor condition and plea acceptance. In line with hypotheses 1 and 2, I
predicted that high anchors would lead to greater maximum acceptable sentences which, in turn,
would be associated with greater plea acceptances. I made no predictions about the potential
moderating effect of relevance.
H4. A main effect of the magnitude of the anchor on perceptions of the strength of the
mitigating (anchor-inconsistent) and aggravating (anchor-consistent) evidence. Given competing
hypotheses over whether defendants would naturally engage in confirmatory or disconfirmatory
testing, the direction of this effect was not specified (H4a). A two-way interaction of anchor and
relevance, such that among participants exposed to an informationally relevant anchor, the
difference in perceptions of the strength of the (mitigating and/or aggravating) evidence between
high and low anchor conditions would be greater than the difference in the irrelevant anchor
condition (H4b).
Results

Data Preparation
I fit binary outcome variables such as plea decisions to generalized linear models (i.e.,
logistic regressions) using the glm() function in the built-in stats package in R with parameters
estimated for a binomial error distribution. I used the aod package in R (Lesnoff & Lancelot,
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2012) to formally test the overall model fit, and the DescTools package (Signorell, 2021) to
compute bias-adjusted pseudo R2 Nagelkerke effect sizes.
Analytic Approach.

Sentencing Count Data. Test data from Pilot Studies 3 and 4 revealed that (1) sentencing
count data had conditional variances that vastly exceeded conditional means across conditions (i.e.,
overdispersion) and (2) that specifying a negative binomial regression model could better
accommodate for such overdispersion than a Poisson regression which assumes equidispersion
(Venables & Ripley, 2002). 7
Thus, across all studies I specified negative binomial regression models predicting
participants’ maximum acceptable sentences using the glm.nb() function in the MASS package
(Venables & Ripley, 2002) for R (R Core Team, 2021), supplemented with the emmeans package
(Lenth, 2021) to compute estimated marginal means. For each confirmatory analysis, I compared a
main model including the fixed effects for the anchor value (High [24-months] = 0 vs. Moderate [4months] = 1) and the legal relevance of the anchor (Irrelevant = 0 vs. Relevant = 1), against a model
including the Anchor X Relevance interaction term to test if sentencing judgments between anchor
conditions was different for relevant versus irrelevant anchors.

Additional Analyses. Though Student’s t statistic is most commonly reported in
psychology, given the unequal number of observations and variances across groups, for
consistency, I report Welch’s t test (1947) results which do not assume equal variances (Delacre,

Indeed, in Study 1, maximum acceptable sentences after removal of outliers were highly right-skewed, though
skewness (1.78) and kurtosis (3.51) measures were both within normal range. Dispersion was greater among responses
in the high-anchor condition where the conditional variance (44.28) grossly exceeded the conditional mean (M = 7.75).
I did not log-transform these count data and analyze them using OLS regression because this would have failed to
model the overdispersion and led to a loss of data (by taking the log of zero values). I tested the null hypothesis of
equidispersion assumed by Poisson generalized linear models against the alternative of over- or underdispersion using
the AER package in R (Kleiber & Zeileis, 2019). This test demonstrated that the equidispersion assumption was
violated (z = 9.36, p < .001). A likelihood ratio test confirmed that the negative binomial regression fit the data better
than the Poisson regression (χ2 = 749.09, p < .001).
7
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Lakens, & Leys, 2017). I report Mann-Whitney U test results for manipulation checks involving
the comparative judgment variable. I calculated bias-adjusted standardized mean differences (i.e.,
Cohen’s d or Hedges’ g; Hedges, 1985).

Manipulation Checks
Anchor. I assessed whether participants regarded the provided anchor value as harsh,
lenient, or appropriate compared to the maximum sentence they would consider appropriate for
their case (i.e., comparative judgment). As expected, participants in the high anchor condition
rated the anchor as harsher than those in the moderate anchor condition (p < .001), and relevance
did not influence comparative judgments (p = .53). See Table 2 for exact distribution.
Relevance. Participants in the irrelevant anchor condition regarded the anchor value as
significantly less relevant to their plea decision (M = 2.57, SD = 1.73) than those in the irrelevant
anchor condition (M = 5.92 of 7, SD = 1.21), t(431.25) = -24.62, p < .001 d = 2.22, 95% CI [-2.47, 2.01]. A value of 2 corresponded closely with “irrelevant” and 3 with “somewhat irrelevant”,
whereas a 6 corresponded with “relevant.” As expected, the anchor did not influence judgments of
the relevance of the anchor (M = 4.23, SD = 2.25), t(474.54) = 1.51, p = .13, d = -0.13, 95% CI [0.31, 0.05].

Bivariate correlations
Table 3 shows all bivariate correlations between the main dependent variables (sentencing
judgments and plea decision) and demographic characteristics. Only education was significantly
positively associated with plea decision and sentencing judgments.

Effect of Anchor and Relevance on Maximum Acceptable Sentences (H1a, b)
My main research question concerned whether numeric anchors would influence the
maximum jail sentence to which mock defendants would be willing to plead guilty. I predicted a
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main effect of the anchor such that participants would say they would be willing to accept longer
sentences after receiving highly threatening relative to moderately threatening anchors (H1a). I also
expected an Anchor X Relevance interaction such that the difference between the high and
moderate anchors would be greater among participants exposed to the relevant compared to the
irrelevant anchor (H1b). To test these hypotheses, I measured the maximum sentence that
participants would be willing to accept rather than risk a chance of conviction at trial. I report two
negative binomial regression models with treatment contrasts for anchor (High = 0; Moderate = 1)
and relevance (Irrelevant = 0; Relevant = 1): Model 1 with anchor and relevance as predictors and
Model 2 with the Anchor X Relevance interaction term.
A likelihood ratio test comparing the models indicated that Model 2 did not show
improved fit over Model 1, χ2(1) = 2.15, p = .14. Contrary to my prediction (H1b), the Anchor X
Relevance interaction term was not significant (b = -0.023, z = -1.47, p = .141) indicating that the
effect of the anchor on maximum acceptable sentences did not significantly differ based on the
legal relevance of the anchor. Results from Model 1 showed no effect of relevance (b = -0.10, z = 1.32, p = .188). In line with hypothesis 1a, there was a main effect of anchor condition (b = -0.69, z
= -8.93, p < .001). Mock defendants were willing to accept a maximum sentence that was on
average 3.87 months longer when exposed to the highly threatening sentence (M = 7.76 [7.01,
8.60], SD = 6.27) than when exposed to the moderately threatening sentence (M = 3.89 [3.48,
4.35], SD = 3.44; d = 0.74 [0.55 0.93]), even in the absence of a concrete plea offer (see Figure 2).
Results of all regression analyses described here are presented in Table 4.

Effect of Anchor and Relevance on Plea Decision (H2)
When presented with the prosecutor’s offer to a 2-month jail sentence in exchange for a
guilty plea, few participants rejected the plea offer (n = 95; 19.83%). The percentages of
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participants who accepted the plea deal across conditions were as follows: High/Relevant (85.95%),
High/Irrelevant (83%), Moderate/Relevant (75.86%), Moderate/Irrelevant (75.8%).
I predicted that exposure to the high anchor would be associated with a higher rate of plea
acceptances compared to exposure to the moderate anchor. I tested two binomial logistic
regressions predicting final plea decision decisions (0 = Accept, 1 = Reject). A likelihood ratio test
demonstrated that Model 2 with the Anchor X Relevance interaction term did not show improved
fit over Model 1, χ2(1) = 0.22, p = .640. Though Model 1 explained only 1.9% of the variance in
plea decision, the effect of the threatened sentence on plea decision is theoretically sensible and
evidenced from the overall significance of the model, χ2(1) = 5.6, p = .018. There was no effect of
relevance on final decision (b = -0.09, z = -0.41, p = .683), but consistent with my predictions,
Model 1 demonstrated a significant effect of anchor on plea decisions (b = -0.55, z = 2.36, p =
.018) such that mock defendants in the high anchor condition were more likely to accept a plea
offer than defendants in the moderate anchor condition (OR = 1.74 [1.10, 2.76], p = .018).
Participants who were exposed to the high anchor accepted the plea deal at a higher rate (84.51%)
than those exposed to the moderate anchor (75.8%). The high plea acceptance rate (likely due to
the highly lenient 2-month plea offer) may have overshadowed much of the effect of the anchor.
Results of all regression analyses described here are presented in Table 5.

Effect of Anchor Mediated by Maximum Acceptable Sentence (H3)
In support of my first and second hypotheses, participants indicated a willingness to accept
longer sentences and accepted plea offers at higher rates after receiving highly threatening anchors
compared to moderately threatening anchors. Next, I examined the prediction that the anchor
influences plea decision through participants’ maximum acceptable sentencing judgments. I fit a
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moderated mediation model with the mediation package for R (Tingley et al., 2014).8 I built the
mediation model by running three independent generalized linear models. I fit the first model (i.e.,
interaction of independent variables predicting the mediator) using glm() function and estimated
parameters for a Poisson distribution as the mediate function is not equipped to fit negative
binomial models.9 I fit the remaining two generalized linear models (i.e., independent variable and
mediator predicting outcome variable) also using glm() but estimated parameters for a binomial
distribution.
The results of this mediation analysis are presented in Figure 3. Partially consistent with my
hypothesis, the paths from the anchor condition to the maximum acceptable sentence and from
the maximum acceptable sentence to plea decision indicated significant effects. The indirect effects
of the anchor condition through the maximum acceptable sentence at each level of the moderator
were also significant (ps < .001). As expected from earlier analyses, the indirect effects at each level
of the moderator did not significantly differ, b = 0.02 [-0.06, 0.10], p = .56, indicating that the effect
of the anchor on plea decisions through sentences did not differ for participants who received the
irrelevant versus the relevant anchor.
Recall that there was a significant direct effect of anchor condition on plea decision, such
that participants exposed to the higher anchor accepted the plea offer at higher rates. Here,
however, the path from anchor condition was no longer significant when the maximum acceptable
sentence was included as a predictor. The coefficient is otherwise significant, b = 0.55, SE = .23, z

An examination of Mardia’s coefficients using the semTools package in R (Jorgensen et al., 2021) indicated that there
was multivariate non-normality in sentence responses, p < .001. To address multivariate non-normality present in the
data, I used robust standard errors approximated with 10,000 Monte Carlo bootstrap samples.
Notably, though the Anchor X Relevance interaction was previously not significant in the negative binomial model, it
was significantly different in the poisson model. I had pre-registered the code for a moderated mediation analysis
modelling the effect of anchor along a, b, and c’ paths (Hayes, 2018). However, because the interaction term of anchor
by relevance was only plausibly influential in the model predicting maximum acceptable sentence and not at all in
models predicting plea decision, I only tested the moderating effect of relevance along the a’ path. Results from a
mediation model without the moderator yielded identical results.
8

9
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= 2.37, p = .018. As such, although the direct effect in the mediation model controlling for the
maximum acceptable sentence is nonsignificant, the prerequisite conditions for establishing a
plausible mediation relationship were met (see Baron & Kenny, 1986). Model results were virtually
identical without the inclusion of relevance as a moderator. Collapsing across levels of the
moderator, the proportion of the effect of anchor on plea decision mediated through the
maximum acceptable sentences was 100% [67%, 188%], p < .001.

Effect of Anchor and Relevance Interaction on Evidence Evaluations (H4a, b)
Next, I turn to the question of whether the magnitude and relevance of the anchor
manipulations influenced perceptions of the aggravating and mitigating case evidence. I
hypothesized that if anchoring exerts its influence on judgmental decisions via thoughtful, effortful
processing of the evidentiary information, participants exposed to different magnitudes of the
anchors should differ in their perceptions of the strength of the anchor-consistent and anchorinconsistent evidence (H4a). For example, prior work suggests that mock defendants exposed to
the highly threatening anchor should rate the aggravating evidence (anchor-consistent) as more
aggravating, and/or the mitigating evidence (anchor-inconsistent) as less mitigating compared to
those exposed to the moderately threatening anchor. However, given the relatively self-relevant
nature of the legal decision-making task at hand, I also considered the possibility that mock
defendants might instead begin an automatic search for anchor-disconfirmatory information which
might result in perceiving the mitigating evidence as more mitigating and the aggravating evidence
as less aggravating. Below I investigate which of both possible outcomes, if any, occurred. Further,
I also examined the predictions laid out by the selective accessibility account, namely, that the
informational relevance of the anchor should moderate this biased search for information (H4b).
To test these hypotheses, I present results from two single-item measures of perceptions of
the strength of the aggravating and mitigating evidence completed prior to the decision-making
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task, as well as from two composite scales completed after the decision-making task also reflecting
evidence perceptions.10 The single-item measures have the benefit of capturing perceptions
unbiased by the decision-making task. But because the reliability and construct validity of a
composite item is likely to be much higher than for a single-item measure, I conducted analyses on
both items and report results from both for completeness.
Mitigating Evidence. Results of the regression analyses predicting perceptions of mitigating
and aggravating evidence strength are presented in Tables 6 and 7, respectively. Descriptively,
mock defendants across all conditions rated the mitigating evidence as moderately mitigating (Msingleitem

= 3.96 of 7, SD = 1.64; Mcomposite = 1.36 of 3, SD = 0.75).
To examine hypothesis 4a, I first fit linear regressions with anchor and relevance predicting

perceptions of the strength of the mitigating evidence using the 1-item pre-decisional measure:
Model 1 with and Model 2 without the Anchor X Relevance interaction. A likelihood ratio test
indicated that Model 2 did not significantly differ from Model 1, χ2(1) = 2.11, p = .376. Thus,
contrary to hypothesis H4b, there was no Anchor X Relevance interaction, b = -0.27, t(475) = 0.89, p = .377, indicating that the maximum sentence did not significantly bias mock defendants’
interpretations of the mitigating evidence just prior to their plea decision. Results from Model 1
demonstrated that, contrary to hypothesis H4a, neither the anchor, b = -0.18, t(476) = -1.17, p =
.242, or relevance were significant predictors of mitigating evidence evaluations, b = -0.21, t(476) =
-1.40, p = .163), F(2, 476) = 1.63, R2 = .003, p = .198.

To create the two composite scales, I used participants ratings of the extent to which they rated 20 arguments as
aggravating, mitigating, or neither on a bipolar scale (-3 Extremely aggravating, 0 = neither aggravating nor mitigating , +3
= extremely mitigating). These items can be seen in Appendix C. For ease of interpretation, I reverse scored ratings of
the 10 aggravating argument items. I describe the process of creating these scales, including the confirmatory factor
analyses using the Lavaan package in R, and results of their validity and reliability as constructs measuring evidence
evaluations in the supplemental materials (Rosseel, 2012; https://osf.io/ucq8z/).
10
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Next, I also examined whether the anchor influenced the post-decisional composite
measure of mitigating evidence. Model 2 (with the Anchor X Relevance interaction) did not differ
from Model 1, χ2(1) = 2.41, p = .137. Results from Model 1 again showed no effect of relevance, b

= -0.06, t(476) = -0.81, p = .418, or anchor condition, b = -0.09, t(476) = -1.37, p = .172, F(2, 476) =
1.57, R2 = 0.003, p = .29.
Aggravating Evidence. Next, I turn toward mock defendants’ perceptions of the aggravating
evidence. Descriptively, mock defendants across all conditions rated the aggravating evidence as
moderately aggravating (Msingle-item = 5.09 of 7, SD = 1.47; Mcomposite = 1.44 of 3, SD = 0.75). I fit two
models predicting aggravating evidence strength as measured by the 1-item pre-decisional measure
first. A likelihood ratio test indicated that Model 2 (with the Anchor X Relevance interaction) did
not significantly differ from Model 1 (without the interaction), χ2(1) = 1.52, p = .403. Again,
hypothesis H4b was not supported as here was no interaction, b = 0.22, t(475) = 0.83, p = .403.
Similar to the mitigating evidence results, Model 1 demonstrated that, contrary to hypothesis H4a,
neither the anchor, b = -0.02, t(476) = -0.12, p = .907, nor relevance were significant predictors of
aggravating evidence strength, b = 0.06, t(476) = 0.45, p = .656, F(2, 476) = 0.11, R2 = -0.000, p =
.898.
Next, I fit linear regressions with (Model 1) and without the Anchor X Relevance
interaction (Model 2) predicting post-decisional composite measure of aggravating evidence. A
likelihood ratio test indicated that Model 2 did not differ from Model 1, χ2(1) = 0.73, p = .392.
Results from Model 1 again showed no effect of relevance, b = 0.01, t(476) = 0.19, p = .85, or
anchor conditions, b = -0.10, t(476) = -1.41, p = .16, F(2, 476) = 1.01, R2 < 0.001 , p = .363.
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Exploratory Analyses
If anchoring exerts its influence through deliberate thoughtful processing, then the anchor
by relevance interaction should have influenced perceptions of the evidence. Although results did
not demonstrate this predicted relationship with evidence evaluations, it is possible that the
anchors still influenced participants’ perceptions of other case attributes. Recall that participants
rated the case attributes (i.e., severity of offense, estimated likelihood of conviction) prior to
rendering any plea decisions. Below I present results of linear regressions models with anchor and
relevance predicting perceptions of related case attributes in the order in which they responses
were collected. Likelihood ratio tests demonstrated that the interaction models did not significantly
differ from the main effects modes, p > .51, thus I report only results from the main effects
models. The full output of each of these regressions is available in Table 8. I also present results
from Welch’s t-tests assessing whether these perceptions of these attributes differed by plea
decision. Additional results pertaining to confidence measures can be found in the Supplemental
Materials (https://osf.io/ucq8z/).
Likelihood of Conviction. There was no no main effect of relevance or of anchor on
estimated likelihood of conviction at trial, F(2, 476) = 0.63, R2 = -0.00, p = .538. In line with the
shadow of the trial model, mock defendants who accepted the plea offer estimated a higher
likelihood of conviction (M = 78.04, SD = 19.28) than those who rejected the plea offer, (M =
61.19, SD = 22.09), t(131.64) = 6.82, p < .001, d = 0.85 [0.62, 1.08].
Severity. There was no main effect of relevance or of anchor conditions on perceived
severity of the crime charged, F(2, 476) = 0.96, R2 = 0.00, p = .38. Mock defendants who accepted
the plea offer regarded the crime they were charged with committing as more severe ( M = 5.12 of
7, SD = 1.19) than those who rejected the plea offer, (M = 4.65, SD = 1.46), t(126.36) = 2.86, p =
.005, d = 0.37 [0.15, 0.6].
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Evidence and Plea Decisions. Next, I examined whether participants perceptions of the
strength of the evidence (1-item measure) were associated with their plea decisions. I used the 1item measure here over the composite because participants provided this judgment prior to
encountering the plea offer, however results are identical when testing the composite variable
instead. Participants who accepted the plea offer (M = 3.82, SD = 1.66) regarded the mitigating
evidence as significantly weaker than those who rejected the offer (M = 4.52, SD = 1.47), t(158.23)
= -4.00, p < .001, d = 0.43 [0.2, 0.65]. Participants who accepted the plea offer (M = 5.29, SD =
1.43) regarded the aggravating evidence (1-item measure) as significantly stronger than those who
rejected the offer (M = 4.29, SD = 1.35), t(150.56) = 6.34, p < .001, d = 0.7 [0.47, 0.93].
Leniency. The main effects only model, F(2, 476) = 4.6, R2 = 0.01, p = .01, demonstrated
no effect of relevance, but an effect of the anchor condition. Participants in the high anchor
condition regarded the plea offer as more lenient (M = 5.24, SD = 1.53) than those in the
moderate anchor condition (M = 4.80, SD = 1.67), t(476) = 3.01, p = .003, d = 0.26 [0.10, 0.46].
Further, mock defendants who accepted the plea offer regarded the plea offer as more lenient ( M
= 5.45, SD = 1.32) than those who rejected the plea offer, (M = 3.28, SD = 1.53), t(131.06) = 12.69,

p < .001, d = 1.59 [1.34, 1.84].
Fairness. The main effects only model, F(2, 476) = 3.13, R2 = 0.01, p = .04, demonstrated
no main effect of relevance, but a main effect of the anchor condition. Participants in the high
anchor condition regarded the plea offer as fairer (M = 5.3, SD = 1.56) than those in the moderate
anchor condition (M = 4.95, SD = 1.56), t(476) = 2.49, p = .01, d = 0.22 [0.05, 0.40]. Further,
mock defendants who accepted the plea offer regarded the plea offer as fairer ( M = 5.54, SD =
1.28) than those who rejected the plea offer, (M = 3.45, SD = 1.51), t(129.41) = 12.36, p < .001, d =
1.57 [1.32, 1.82]. Perceptions of fairness and leniency were highly correlated, r = .63 [.57, .68], p <
.001.
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Study 1 Discussion
Results from Study 1 demonstrate that numeric anchors strongly influence mock
defendants’ judgmental sentencing preferences. Specifically, mock defendants informed about a
24-month maximum jail sentence were willing to accept maximum sentences over twice as long as
those exposed to a 4-month maximum sentence. Importantly, defendants were willing to accept
longer sentences even when the point of comparison was an obviously arbitrarily chosen maximum
sentence that they themselves had (incorrectly) reported as not having influenced their decisions.
Anchor-biased maximum sentencing preferences, in turn, influenced mock defendants’ plea
decisions. A willingness to accept a larger sentence was associated with greater acceptance of a
comparatively more lenient and fairer plea offer.
An additionally interesting finding is that defendants’ high anchor-assimilated sentencing
preferences (7.76 months) were closer to those of the unanchored calibration sample (6 months)
than they were to the high anchor (24-months). This preliminarily suggests that participants may
have adjusted away from their own unstated initial preferences rather than from the provided high
anchor. This makes the finding concerning the mediating role of maximum acceptable sentencing
judgments even more striking as it clearly differentiates sentencing preferences from the anchor
proper.
With regard to the mechanism underlying these anchored judgmental sentencing
preferences and plea decisions, in contrast to my predictions, results suggest that neither the
magnitude nor relevance of the maximum sentence biased peoples’ interpretation of the case facts.
For example, though participants exposed to the high maximum sentence were willing to serve
longer sentences they did not perceive the aggravating evidence as more aggravating, their crime as
more severe, or their likelihood of being found guilty at trial as higher. These findings are
inconsistent with the selective accessibility account of anchoring effects. Despite the availability of a
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large pool of knowledge relevant to the decision-making task (i.e., a 1018-word case summary with
over 20 relevant mitigating or aggravating case facts), people did not appear to differentially
interpret facts consistent with a shorter or longer sentence.
This study is not without limitations. Despite extensive quality checks, it is possible that
mock defendants simply did not pay as close attention to the case materials as might be required to
encode the information for later retrieval — though they spent an average of 5.31 minutes (SD =
2.73) reading these which suggests variability within normal range. Because participants lacked
domain knowledge and because instructions for what constitutes an aggravating or mitigating
circumstance came after the case materials, participants may have been less attuned to the
relevance of those case facts while reading the case materials. Still, participants were aware that they
would have to render a legal decision on the basis of the case description and circumstances were
selected for inclusion in these materials on the basis of lay peoples’ suggestions and relevance
ratings.
Having established that defendants are susceptible to anchoring effects, Study 2 examined
to what extent, if at all, legal experts might also be vulnerable to anchoring effects in plea contexts.
If defense attorneys — equipped with their own knowledge of sentencing guidelines (or routine
sentencing outcomes) and plea negotiation experiences — were to also become anchored on a
provided maximum trial sentence, then this would suggest that attorneys are not as equipped to
debias defendants’ anchoring biases as some scholars have suggested.
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Chapter 8: Study 2
Beyond examining whether anchors influence attorney’s judgmental sentencing preferences
and decisions, Study 2 also enabled a direct examination of whether instructions to retrieve and
consider the case facts contradicting the anchor effectively alter representations of the case material
thereby reducing the anchoring effects’ influence. To maximize ecological validity, all anchors in
subsequent studies were presented as informationally relevant maximum sentences.
Method

Design and Statistical Power
This experiment used a 2 (Anchor: High [24 months] vs. Moderate [6 months]) X 2
(Consider-the-Opposite Strategy: Pre vs. Post) mixed factorial design in which the latter factor is
within-subjects. An a priori power simulation analysis showed that a total N of 148 attorneys (n =
74 per cell of between-subjects factor) was sufficient to detect a small effect size for the Anchor X
COS interaction (Cohen’s f = .23) with 80% power Simulation including predicted means and SDs
available here: osf.io/ptq6y/.

Participants and Exclusion Criteria
In March and May of 2021, practicing defense attorneys were recruited through contacts
(e.g., at the Innocence Project) and by emailing state and national criminal defense attorney
associations and public defenders’ offices (e.g., Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers in New
Jersey, Indigent Defense Services). See recruitment letter here: https://osf.io/nx8wu/. Attorneys
received a $15 gift card for their participation in this 25-minute survey and were at the very end
informed about the option to donate their compensation to the Bail Project, a non-profit
organization that combats mass incarceration by helping defendants in pre-trial detention who
cannot afford bail.
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Although 274 attorneys consented to the study, only 209 started the survey and of these
173 provided a response to the two main variables (i.e., maximum acceptable sentencing
judgments); one attorney discontinued the study after seeing, but not completing, the COS-Strategy
and five discontinued after completing the COS-Strategy. Of the remaining 173 attorneys, five were
removed for providing sentencing judgments constituting outliers per pre-registered criteria, 11 for
completing the consider-the-opposite strategy incorrectly (i.e., by providing anchor-consistent
facts), and two for reporting being unable to generate anchor-inconsistent facts.11
The final sample comprised 155 attorneys from 17 states (56.7% from New York), who
were primarily female (54.83%) and White (78%). Ages ranged between 26 and 81 ( M = 43.89, SD
= 13.45). Attorneys were primarily (65%) public defenders with an average of 15.63 (SD = 13.29)
years of experience as criminal defense attorneys, having handled an average of 5073 cases
(Median = 1015, SD = 20,557). Attorneys indicated on having accepted a 500 (median) plea offers,
having rejected 200 (median) plea offers, and litigated 13 (median) cases by trial. Attorneys 10
(median) DUI cases per year and 150 (median) criminal cases per year, more broadly.

Materials and Procedures
Procedures for Study 2 resembled those of Study 1. The entire survey is available here:
osf.io/4ug3j/.

The latter two exclusion criteria were unanticipated and therefore not pre-registered. However, I removed data from
these participants as their failure to complete the COS manipulation as instructed was for the purposes of this withinsubjects study equivalent to not having received the experimental manipulation. Results from the dataset with n =173
were identical to those with n = 155 except for a no longer significant Anchor X Arguments interaction predicting
sentence judgments (H6a, b). A comparison of the demographics of attorneys who completed the survey (n = 155)
against those who did not complete the survey but provided demographics information ( n = 36) did not demonstrate
any significant differences between the two groups across demographic characteristics: age (p = .099), ethnicity (p =
.323), gender (p = .575), years of experience (p = .238), total cases handled (p = .292), or defense attorney type (p =
.983).
11
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Legal Background and Demographics. After consenting, attorneys responded to questions
pertaining to their legal experiences and demographics. Next, they were asked to imagine that they
were a defense attorney working in a public defenders’ office in their jurisdiction and that they
were representing Sam Peck, a client charged (though not yet indicted) with a felony DUI, who was
willing to plead guilty for a consideration. They then read a handwritten, bullet-point version of a
nearly identical hypothetical case scenario from Study 1 (osf.io/g4b69/). The description was
purportedly Sam’s account of the events preceding the arrest and the handwritten account
represented notes taken by the attorney participant during a call with Sam the morning after his
arrest. Pre-testing (n = 12) suggested that the notes were sufficiently legible.
Manipulation of the Anchor. After, half of attorneys were randomly assigned to encounter
the moderate anchor (n = 72) or a high anchor (n = 83):
“The prosecutor states that he is prepared to try your client for a felony DUI under
your jurisdiction's statutes. If convicted of these felony charges, the maximum jail
sentence Sam could serve is [6/24] months.”
The 24- sentence a represented value above the 100th percentile of the calibration sample,
whereas the 6-month sentence represented a value at the 50th percentile (based on Pilot 4). After,
attorneys responded to the comparative judgment question (1 = Very lenient to 5 = Very harsh),
provided a maximum acceptable sentencing judgment, and rated their confidence in this sentence.
Manipulation of Consider-the-Opposite Strategy. Next, attorneys were asked to generate
anchor-inconsistent arguments — i.e., arguments that suggested that the high sentence was “very
severe” or that the moderate sentence was “very lenient”:
“While seeking advice from a colleague about your client's case, your colleague tells
you that they think [6/24] in jail is [very lenient/very severe] for your client's DUI
case. Based on your understanding of your client's case, including all the
information you have read, please list as many relevant facts as you can think of that
might suggest that [6/24] is [very lenient/very severe] for this case.”
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Attorneys were provided with 11 labelled text fields (e.g., Case Fact 1-10 and Other
Relevant Case Facts) where they could list each anchor-inconsistent argument. On the next page
they were reminded of the maximum acceptable sentence they had previously provided and shown
a list containing all the anchor-inconsistent case facts they had just generated and asked whether the
did or did not want to revise their original sentence:
“Below are the case facts you listed that argue that the maximum sentence of [6/24]
is [very lenient/ very severe]. Given these reasons, do you wish to revise your
previous maximum sentencing recommendation? Please provide the revised or
unrevised (i.e., [their maximum acceptable sentence] months) maximum sentencing
recommendation in months below”.
Next, participants rated their confidence with this new sentence, estimated their client’s
likelihood of conviction and rated the strength of the aggravating and of the mitigating evidence,
and the severity of the offense. Questions were presented in a randomized order.
Plea Decision. Attorneys then decided whether to accept or reject a non-negotiable, timelimited exploding plea offer containing a 4-month sentence, rated their decision confidence, rated
the leniency and fairness of the plea offer, and provided an open-text explanation of their decision.
They also responded to exploratory measures including what other information they would
have liked to have had, rated the amount of resources and hours they would allocate to this case,
and judged the culpability of the defendant. Attorneys responded to attention checks, including a
manipulation check for the anchor and one for the COS condition; they also rated the realism of
the case materials using a shortened (3-item) version of the Perceived Realism Scale, the
plausibility of the anchor, and answered a few optional questions regarding their perceptions of
prosecutorial misconduct including the extent to which they considered charge-stacking and
seeking excessive sentencing a form of misconduct, and how often they encountered such
misconduct in their own cases. Finally, participants were offered compensation and debriefed.
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Hypotheses
H1. A main effect of anchor condition on the maximum sentence attorneys believed their
client should be willing to accept rather than go to trial, such that compared to moderate anchors,

high anchors would lead to greater pre-COS sentences (H1a) and greater post-COS sentences
(H1b). Though the true effect size in the population might differ, because I was only 55% powered
to detect an effect of COS according to the predicted means, I made no formal predictions about a
potential main effect of COS. I predicted that any potential main effect of COS on sentence would
be qualified by a cross-over two-way interaction of anchor by COS (H1c). Attorneys in the high
anchor condition would provide lower sentences post-COS compared to pre-COS, whereas
attorneys in the moderately threatening anchor condition would provide larger sentences post-COS
compared to pre-COS (H1d).
H2. I predicted that attorneys exposed to high anchors would accept the plea offer more
often than attorneys exposed to moderate anchors.
H3. In line with hypotheses 1 and 2, I predicted that attorneys’ maximum acceptable
sentencing judgments would mediate the relationship between anchor and plea decision (H3a) and
that COS would moderate the relationship between anchor and sentencing judgment (H3b).
H4. I predicted that high anchors would be associated with a greater number of arguments
generated than moderate anchors.
H5. A three-way interaction of anchor, anchor-inconsistent arguments, and COS on
maximum acceptable sentence. Among attorneys exposed to the high anchor, more arguments
generated suggesting that the anchor is very severe would be associated with lower post-COS
sentences relative to pre-COS sentences (H5a). In contrast, among attorneys exposed to the

moderate anchor, more arguments generated suggesting that the anchor is very lenient would
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either not be associated with post-COS sentences relative to pre-COS sentences, or positively
associated with higher post-COS sentences relative to pre-COS sentences (H5b).
H6. A two-way interaction of anchor and number of arguments generated on plea decision.
Among attorneys exposed to the high anchor, more arguments generated will be associated with
lower plea acceptance (H6a). Among attorneys exposed to the moderate anchor, more arguments
generated will be associated with greater plea acceptance (H6b).
Results

Data Preparation
COS Arguments. I reviewed each of the case facts attorneys listed and removed non-case
facts (n = 10 of 826) such as “nothing else matters” or “I can’t think of any” and anchor-consistent
facts where participants interpreted COS instructions incorrectly and wrote only anchor-consistent
case facts (n = 10). 12 I did not exclude responses based on whether they described an argument
directly provided or not provided in the case materials. On the rare occasion when attorneys
provided responses that appeared to contain more than one argument (e.g., “making unsafe lane
change” and “running stop sign”), I did not split these as the attorney clearly considered them as a
single argument. Attorneys, mercifully, provided one unique response per text field provided,
obviating the need for experimenter manipulation of the data which could have introduced bias.
Outliers. I pre-registered removal of outliers only for a comparison dataset to avoid loss of
data, but skewness and kurtosis for maximum sentence measures were both above pre-registered
criteria of +2 and +7, respectively. Thus, I applied the exclusion criteria for the comparison dataset

All such instances occurred when participants were asked to list reasons why a 6-month sentence was “very lenient”
in the moderate anchor condition. Only one participant in entire sample provided a 1 anchor-consistent fact after
listing several anchor-inconsistent facts. Further, because I provided attorneys with only 11 text fields, it is possible that
some attorneys would have listed more arguments — particularly those who used all 11 text fields (n = 5 in high anchor
condition vs. n = 1 in moderate condition). The fact that the distribution of the number of case facts provided was not
highly right skewed argues against this possibility.
12
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to the main dataset of removing outliers that had a value outside the interval formed by the median
plus or minus 3.5 median absolute values (ensuring removal of no more than 5% of dataset).
There were five very large pre-COS sentence outliers with a mean sentence of 45.4 months (SD =
24.1; high anchor: n = 3; moderate anchor: n = 2). Removal of these outliers led to a considerable
decrease in skewness (5.46 vs. 1.42) and kurtosis of sentences to acceptable levels (34.58 vs. 1.37).

Analytic Approach
The analytic approach for Study 2 count data resembled that of Study 1. 13 For models
involving the repeated measures of maximum acceptable sentences, I tested linear mixed-effects
models using the lme4 and lmerTest packages in R (Bates et al. 2014) with predictors as fixed

effects, and random intercepts for participants (i.e., to account for sentences nested in
participants).14 For each analysis with a predicted interaction, I used a likelihood ratio test to
compare the model with and without the interaction term. In cases where adding the interaction
term did not improve model fit, I report the main effects only model as this indicated a nonsignificant interaction.

Manipulation Check
As expected, a Welch’s t-test demonstrated that attorneys regarded the high anchor as
significantly more severe (M = 4.60 of 5, SD = 0.58) than the moderate anchor (M = 3.78, SD =

Similar to Study 1, sentences were right skewed resembling a negative binomial distribution (skewness = 1.49;
kurtosis = 1.96). Dispersion was greatest among responses in the high anchor condition (conditional variance: 12.41 vs
condition mean: 3.73) and the assumption of equidispersion was violated, z = 3.77, p < .001. A likelihood ratio test
confirmed that the negative binomial regression fit the data better than the Poisson regression, χ = 346.30, p < .001.
Next, I assessed dispersion for the sum of anchor-inconsistent arguments count variable. Though arguments appeared
largely normally distributed (skewness = 0.45; kurtosis = -0.44), the equidispersion assumption of the Poisson model
was also violated, z = 4.61, p < .001. Dispersion was somewhat greater among responses in the high compared to the
moderate anchor condition. A likelihood ratio test demonstrated that the negative binomial regression did not fit the
data better than the Poisson regression, χ (3) = 47.85, p = 1. Thus, because the dispersion parameter was not
considerably high = 1.86, in line with my pre-registration, I fit a Poisson model.
I preregistered that linear mixed effects models would also include random slopes to estimate the by-participant
differences between pre-COS and post-COS sentences. However, these models failed to converge — likely a result of
the near-zero (0.0002) variance explained by this random effect; thus, I report models without random slopes.
13
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1.18), t(100.48) = 5.40, p < .001. Notably, a 3.78 corresponds roughly with “Appropriate” and
“Harsh” on the 5-point comparative judgment scale (see Table 9). Seven attorneys incorrectly
reported the anchor they had been exposed to (6 errors in moderate anchor condition). Results
from main analyses without these participants did not differ, therefore I report results from the
larger dataset.

Bivariate correlations
I pre-registered I would run models with covariates (e.g., demographics, legal background)
that showed a bivariate correlation with main dependent variables, but there were no such
associations. Table 10 shows descriptive statistics and correlations for Study 2 variables.

Effect of Anchor and COS on Maximum Acceptable Sentences (H1a, b)
I hypothesized that, like mock defendants in Study 1, attorneys would also be willing to
recommend that their client accept longer sentences when exposed to high compared to moderate
maximum sentences (H1a), but that consideration of anchor-inconsistent arguments would lead to
lower post-COS sentences for attorneys in the high-anchor condition and increased post-COS
sentences for attorneys in the moderate-anchor condition. Descriptively, sentencing estimates
followed this predicted pattern with high anchors causing attorneys to report being willing to advise
4.24 (SD = 3.86) months of jail time compared to 1.38 (SD = 1.64, d =
0.94 [0.71, 1.17]) for attorneys in the moderate anchor condition. However, after considering
anchor-inconsistent arguments — the mitigating evidence for those in the high anchor condition
and the aggravating evidence for those in the moderate anchor condition — sentencing
recommendations decreased in the high anchor groups (M = 3.23, SD = 3.09) and increased in the
moderate anchor condition (M = 1.61, SD = 1.80; d = 0.63 [0.40, 0.86]). See Figure 4.
I examined whether these descriptive differences were significantly different using linear
mixed effects models with anchor (Anchor: High = 0, Moderate = 1) and COS (Pre = 0, Post = 1)
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predicting sentences. The model with the interaction was significantly different from the main
effects only model, χ2(1) = 7.39, p = .007. Results demonstrated the expected effect of the anchor
(H1a; b = -1.19, z = -5.53, p < .001), such that collapsing across COS condition, attorneys set
maximum acceptable sentences that were still on average 1.5 months higher when exposed to the
high anchor (M = 2.39 [1.85, 3.08], SD = 3.98) compared to when exposed to the moderate
anchor (M = 0.91 [0.66, 1.24], SD = 1.74), d = 0.47 [0.24, 0.69].
There was also a main effect of COS such that, collapsing across anchor conditions, overall
attorneys provided lower maximum acceptable sentences post-COS than pre-COS (b = -0.27, z = 3.34, p < .001), but this effect was qualified by the expected two-way interaction of anchor by COS
(H1b; b = 0.43, z = 2.65, p = .008). See Table 11 for full regression output. In partial support of
my hypothesis (H1c), attorneys in the high anchor condition provided sentences that were
approximately 20 days shorter post-COS compared to pre-COS (Mpre = 2.73 months, Mpost= 2.08;

p

tukey

= .005), however attorneys in the moderately threatening anchor condition did not provide

significantly different sentences post-COS compared to pre-COS, (Mpre = 0.83 months, Mpost= 0.98;

p

tukey

= .66). Further, attorneys exposed to the high anchor continued to provide post-COS

sentences that were significantly higher than those provided by attorneys exposed to the moderate
anchor (z = 3.54, ptukey = .002). Thus, though I did not observe the predicted two-way cross-over
interaction, results suggest that the intervention was helpful for reducing the anchoring bias among
attorneys in the high anchor condition, while not causing attorneys in the moderate anchor
condition to recommend more severe sentences for their clients.

Effect of Anchor on Plea Decision (H2)
Next, I examined whether biased sentencing judgments would translate into biased plea
recommendations: 44.7% of attorneys indicated that they would recommend their client plead
guilty to the felony DUI carrying a 4-month jail sentence. A logistic regression model with anchor
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predicting plea decisions was significant (Overall Model Fit: χ2 = 13.2, p < .001). This model
explained 12% of the variance in plea decision. Even more so than in Study 1, anchor condition
strongly predicted plea decision: attorneys in the high anchor condition were 3.53 [1.81, 7.07]
times more likely to accept the plea deal than those in the moderate anchor condition (58.5%
versus 28%), b = 1.26, SE = .35, z = 3.63, p < .001. The plea acceptance rates in the high and
moderate conditions are considerably lower than those observed in Study 1 (High: 84% vs
Moderate: 75%), a decrease that is almost certainly attributable to the decreased leniency of the
plea offer from 2 months in Study 1 to 4 months in Study 2.

Mediating Effect of Anchor on Plea Decision Through Maximum Acceptable Sentences (H3)
Consistent with my first and second hypotheses and Study 1 results, attorneys were willing
to advise longer sentences and recommend plea offers at higher rates after exposure to the high
relative to moderate anchor. Next, I examine the hypothesis that the anchor would influence plea
decision through maximum acceptable sentences. I report the results of two separate mediation
models: one demonstrating the mediating effect of pre-COS sentences and the other the mediating
effect of post-COS sentences.15
The results of the two mediation analyses are presented in Figure 5. Consistent with my
hypothesis, the paths from the anchor condition to maximum acceptable sentences (pre- and postCOS) and from maximum acceptable sentences to plea decision indicated significant effects in
both models. The indirect effects of the anchor condition through sentencing judgment were also
significant in both models (ps < .001). Like Study 1, the path from anchor condition was no longer

Given the prior significant interaction effect of anchor and COS on sentences, to test this hypothesis, I first attempted
to fit a pre-registered moderated mediation model similar to Study 1 with the notable difference of fitting two
generalized linear mixed models to account for the by-participant random intercepts. Attempts to run this mediation
model returned an error that after extensive troubleshooting proved unsolvable. In any case, the generalized linear
mixed model fitted with the anchor by COS interaction and sentencing recommendations predicting plea decision did
not demonstrate a significant interaction, b = 0.87, SE = 2.73, z = 0.319, p = .75.
15
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significant in the model when pre-COS sentence was included as the mediator (p = .23), or when
post-COS sentence was included instead (p = .076).

Effect of Anchor on Arguments Generated (H4)
I expected that criminal defense attorneys would find the task of generating anchor-

inconsistent arguments easier when it required them to generate mitigating arguments in the high
anchor condition rather than aggravating arguments in the moderate anchor condition. To test this
prediction, I fit a Poisson regression with anchor condition predicting total number of anchor
inconsistent arguments generated by attorneys demonstrated the hypothesized main effect of the
anchor, b = -0.40, SE = 0.07, z = -5.52, p < .001.16 Attorneys generated 2.07 more arguments when
instructed to generate arguments indicating that the high anchor was ‘very severe’ (M = 6.29, SD =
2.51) compared to when instructed to generated arguments that the moderate anchor was ‘very

lenient’ (M = 4.22, SD = 2.05).
Effect of Anchor and Arguments Generated on Maximum Acceptable Sentences (H5a, b)
Next, I examined whether the number of anchor-inconsistent arguments attorneys
generated, in turn, influenced whether they revised their initial maximum acceptable sentencing
judgments and the direction of that change.17
The model fitted only with anchor, COS, and all two-way interactions (Model 2) showed
improved fit over the model without interactions (Model 1), χ2(3) = 23.52, p < .001. However, in

A likelihood ratio test demonstrated that the negative binomial regression did not fit the data better than the Poisson
regression, χ (3) = 47.85, p = 1, thus in line with my pre-registration, I fit a Poisson model.
In my pre-registration I indicated that I would test an Anchor X Arguments X COS mixed effects negative binomial
model to examine this prediction, however the model had a very large dispersion parameter (θ = 173055.4) and failed
to converge. Thus, I square root-transformed sentences and arguments and report results from linear mixed effect
models with anchor (moderate as reference group), COS (post-COS as reference group), arguments generated and all
two- and three-way interaction terms as fixed effects and by-participant random intercepts for participants’ repeated
measures (i.e., maximum acceptable sentences). Because neither result for the mixed effects models with the squareroot transformed variables or for the negative binomial that failed to converge did meaningfully differed, for ease of
interpretation I report results from the linear mixed effects model with the untransformed variables.
16

2

17
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contrast to my predictions (H5a), the two-way interactions model (Model 2) did not significantly
differ from the model including all three-way interactions (Model 3), χ2(1) = 0.01, p = .92. This
indicated that the COS X Anchor X Arguments interaction was not significant, b = -0.01, SE =
0.12, t(151) = -0.97, p = .92.
I report results from the two-way interactions only model (Model 2) as these provides
insights into the relationships between arguments and maximum acceptable sentencing judgments.
Model 2 demonstrated significant effects of anchor (b = -5.26, t = -5.14, p < .001), arguments (b = 0.46, t = -3.68, p < .001), and COS (b = -1.53, t = -3.58, p < .001), as well as the expected significant
two-way interaction of Anchor X COS previously observed (b = 1.42, t = -4.5, p < .001). The
predictive effect of arguments suggests that holding all other effects constant, for each additional
argument generated the predicted change in sentence was -0.46 (i.e., ~13.8 days. This means that
generating more anchor-inconsistent arguments (either in favor of the sentence being very lenient
or very severe) was associated with lower maximum acceptable sentences collapsed across time
(i.e., pre- and post-COS).
Notably, there was a significant two-way interaction of Anchor X Arguments (b = 0.34, t
= 1.98, p = .049; see Figure 6). To examine the nature of the relationship between arguments and
maximum acceptable sentence for high versus moderate anchor conditions I probed this
interaction. Results showed that only the test for the simple slope of arguments generated by
attorneys in the high anchor condition, but not the moderate anchor condition, was significantly
different from zero (High slope: -0.42 [-0.66, -0.18] vs. moderate slope: -0.07 [-0.32, 0.17]). Thus,
lending partial support to hypothesis (H5b), only among attorneys exposed to the high anchor was
generating a greater number of anchor-inconsistent arguments associated with lower maximum
acceptable sentences.
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I interpret this interaction without assuming the order of causality because the three-way
interaction was not significant. Thus, these results do not suggest that generating more mitigating
arguments in the high anchor led to lower sentences post-COS, specifically. However, it is
interesting that generating fewer aggravating arguments in the moderate anchor condition was not
associated with lower maximum acceptable sentences — as we might expect if the order of causality
were reversed, such that attorneys who were pre-inclined to provide reduced sentences might not
generate as many arguments in favor of higher sentence. One reason for why this latter association
was not found may be attributable to floor effects evidenced by the high proportion of 0-month
sentences (42%) provided by moderate anchor-exposed attorneys as well as by a lack of power to
detect a three-way interaction.18 Thus, conservatively, I conclude that hypotheses H5a and H5b
were not supported. See Table 12 for full output of the two-way interaction model.

Effect of Anchor and Arguments Generated on Plea Decision (H6a, b)
I predicted that among attorneys exposed to the high anchor, more arguments suggesting
that 24-months was very severe would be associated with lower plea acceptances (H6a), but that
among attorneys exposed to the moderate anchor, more arguments suggesting that 6-months was
very lenient would be associated with higher plea acceptances (H6b). To test these possible
outcomes, I modeled a two-way interaction of anchor by anchor-inconsistent arguments predicting
plea decision. The logistic regression with the interaction was significant (Overall Model 2 Fit: χ2 =
14.5, p < .001) and showed improved fit over Model 1 without the interaction, χ2(1) = 6.08, p = .01
(see Table 13). Model 2 explained 18.66% of the variance in plea decision.

To more formally examine whether there was a difference in this negative association between arguments generated
and maximum acceptable sentences between high and moderate anchor conditions, I then compared the simple
slopes of arguments. The pairwise difference in the simple slopes of arguments for attorneys in the high versus
moderate anchor was significant (difference in slopes: -0.34; t(151) = -1.98, p = .049). This indicates that the difference
of the simple effects for the high versus moderate anchor on sentence decreases for each additional anchorinconsistent argument generated, but only up to 8 arguments (ps < .006); as more arguments are generated (max 11)
the difference in the relationship is no longer significant ( ps > .07 - .48).
18
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Results showed a main effect of anchor (b = 3.48, z = 3.81, p < .001, OR = 32.60) and
arguments (b = 0.29, z = 2.73, p = .006, OR = 1.34), as well as the predicted two-way interaction (b
= -0.37, z = -2.45, p = 0.014, OR = 0.69). In partial support for hypothesis H6a, probing this
interaction showed that among attorneys exposed to the high anchor, generating more arguments
was associated with greater plea rejections (b = 0.29 [0.08, 0.50], SE = 0.11). Though trending in
the expected direction, hypothesis H6b was not supported: among attorneys exposed to the

moderate anchor, greater arguments generated were not significantly associated with decreased
plea acceptances (b = -0.8 [-0.29, 0.13], SE = 0.11).

Exploratory Analyses
Below I present the results of two-tailed Welch’s sample t-tests (unless otherwise indicated)
examining the relationship between attorney perceptions of proximal case attributes, the anchor
and argument generation conditions, and their plea recommendations. As a reminder, attorneys
rated evidence strength, likelihood of conviction, and offense severity (in a randomized order)

prior to rendering a plea decision. All items are presented in the order in which attorneys
encountered them. Additional results pertaining to measures of attorney’s confidence in plea
decision, encounters with prosecutorial misconduct and perceptions of the strength of the
aggravating and mitigating evidence can be found in the Supplemental Materials
(https://osf.io/ucq8z/).
Estimated Likelihood of Conviction. Attorneys on average estimated a 66% (SD = 21.56, N
=151) likelihood of conviction. There was no significant effect of anchor on likelihood of
conviction, t(148.01) = 0.37, p = .71. Attorneys who indicating that they would recommend their
client accept the plea offer estimated a higher likelihood of conviction ( M = 72.05, SD = 20.34)
than attorneys who indicated that they would recommend their client reject the offer ( M = 60.69,
SD = 21.74), t(140.55) = 3.23, p = .002, d = 0.54 [0.2, 0.88].
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Mitigating Evidence. Attorneys exposed to the high anchor and asked to generate mitigating
arguments rated the mitigating evidence as significantly more mitigating (M = 4.91, SD = 1.56, N =
82) than attorneys exposed to the moderate anchor who instead generated aggravating arguments
(M = 4.24, SD = 1.38, N =70), t(149.8) = 2.82, p = .005. Finally, unexpectedly attorneys’ ratings of
the strength mitigating evidence did not differ based on whether they would recommend their
client accept (M = 4.42, SD = 1.54) or reject the plea offer (M = 4.69, SD = 1.51), t(137.29) = -1.07
, p =.29, d = .18 [-0.15, 0.51].
Aggravating Evidence. Attorneys exposed to the high anchor and asked to generate
mitigating arguments rated the aggravating evidence as significantly less aggravating (M = 3.82, SD =
1.56, N = 82) than attorneys exposed to the moderate anchor and asked to generate aggravating
arguments (M = 4.66, SD = 1.24, N =70), t(149.29) = -3.70, p < .001.
Finally, a Welch’s t-test demonstrated that attorneys’ ratings of the strength aggravating evidence
did not differ based on whether they would recommend their client accept (M = 4.21 SD = 1.53)
or reject the plea offer (M = 4.18, SD = 1.46), t(135.65) = 0.14, p = .89, d = -0.02 [-0.35, 0.03].
Severity. Attorneys exposed to the high anchor rated the severity of the charged crime as
significantly less severe (M = 3.65, SD = 1.19, N = 82) than attorneys exposed to the moderate
anchor (M = 4.04, SD = 1.1, N = 70), t(149.12) = -2.14, p = .03. Attorneys’ ratings of the severity
of the crime their client was charged with committing did not differ based on whether they would
recommend their client accept (M = 3.88, SD = 1.25) or reject the plea offer (M = 3.76, SD =
1.11), t(131.65) = 0.60 , p = .55, d = -.01 [-0.43, 0.23].
Leniency. There was no significant effect of anchor on attorney’s perceptions of the
leniency of the plea deal, t(145.25) = 1.30, p = .19, d = -0.22 [ -0.54, 0.11]. On average the plea
offer of 4-months was regarded as not very lenient (M = 2.78, SD = 1.54, N = 152), though
attorneys in the high anchor condition regarded it as somewhat more lenient ( M = 2.92, SD = 1.52)
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than those in the moderate anchor condition (M = 2.60, SD = 1.55). Attorneys who indicated that
they would recommend their client accept the plea offer regarded the plea offer as more lenient
(M = 3.52, SD = 1.57) than those who indicated that they would recommend their client reject the
plea offer (M = 2.14, SD = 1.21), t(120.42) = 5.82, p < .001, d = 1.00 [0.63, 1.37].
Fairness. There was no significant effect of anchor on attorney’s perceptions of the fairness
of the plea deal, t(145.51) = 1.59, p = .11, d = 0.12 [-0.20, 0.44]. On average the plea offer was
regarded as not very fair (M = 2.59, SD = 1.5, N = 152), though attorneys in the high anchor
condition regarded it as somewhat fairer (M = 2.77, SD =1.56, N = 82) than those in the moderate
anchor condition (M = 2.39, SD = 1.41, N = 70). Attorneys who indicated that they would
recommend their client accept the plea offer regarded the plea offer as more lenient ( M = 3.29,

SD = 1.57) than those who indicated that they would recommend their client reject the plea offer
(M = 2.03, SD = 1.2), t(120.13) = 5.36, p < .001, d = 0.92 [0.56, 1.28].
Time and Resources. Attorneys indicated that given other commitments and budgetary
constraints, they would allocate fewer time and resources (e.g., to hire an investigator, or expert)
when exposed to the high anchor (M = 4.76, SD = 1.71, N = 79) than to the moderate anchor (M =
5.31, SD = 1.52, N = 62), t(136.8) = -2.01, p = .046. This result was not significant in the main
sample, p = .06. Attorneys’ who indicated they would recommend their client accept the plea offer
reported that they would spend fewer time and resources on their client’s case (M = 4.55 of 7, SD
= 1.54) than those who would recommend their client reject the plea offer (M = 5.38, SD = 1.65),

t(136.99) = -3.08 , p = .01, d = .52 [0.18, 0.86].
Next, to examine whether anchor exposure predicted the number of hours attorneys
indicated they would be willing to spend on this case, I conducted a negative binomial regression
after removing 3 outliers (500-1,000,000 hours) to decrease kurtosis to < 8. Results showed that
attorneys were willing to spend significantly less time on this case when exposed to the high anchor
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(M = 37.96, Median = 20, SD = 42.82, N = 78) than to the moderate anchor (M = 53.61, Median =
30, SD = 61.74, N = 66), b = 0.34, SE = 0.02, z = 13.86, p = .03.
Attorneys’ who indicated they would recommend their client accept the plea offer reported
that they would spend approximately 20 fewer hours on their client’s case (M = 33.44, SD = 37.17)
than those who would recommend their client reject the plea offer (M = 55.65, SD = 65.23),

t(123.42) = -2.58 , p = .01, d = .43 [0.08, 0.77].
Perceived Defendant Culpability. Pilot testing demonstrated that 100% of participantdefendants (n = 69) indicated believing they were “guilty of driving under the influence as charged.”
However, in Study 2 roughly half (52%) of attorneys regarded their client as “innocent of the
driving under the influence of alcohol.” Prior work has demonstrated that attorneys agree that
there are circumstances under which even innocent defendants should plead guilty (Helm et al.
2018). I tested whether culpability predicted plea decision among the current sample of attorneys.
Strikingly, results demonstrated that defendant culpability was not significantly associated with plea
recommendations, χ2(1) = 0.12, p = .73, OR = 0.89 [0.46, 1.71]: 50.7% of attorneys who thought
the defendant was innocent chose to accept the offer compared to 53.65% of attorneys who
thought the defendant was guilty.
Next, I sought to examine whether the anchor condition was associated with perceptions of
culpability. About 59.7% of attorneys in the moderate-anchor condition believed their client was
innocent, whereas only 46.25% of attorneys in the high-anchor condition thought their client was
innocent. A logistic regression with anchor condition predicting attorneys’ perceptions of the
defendants’ culpability was not significant, χ2(1) = 2.6, p = .11, OR = 0.58 [0.30, 1.12].19

For the curious, attorneys who decreased their sentencing recommendations after generating evidence contradicting
the high anchor were evenly split between finding the defendant guilty ( n = 12) or innocent (n = 10). Attorneys who
provided evidence contradicting the low anchor were also evenly split between innocent (n =5) and guilty (n = 4).
19
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Compensation Donation. Recall that attorneys were given the choice of declining or
accepting payment (though some attorneys closed the survey before reaching this question ( n =12).
Among attorneys who chose to receive a payment (n = 113; 75%), those in the high anchor
condition subsequently chose to donate their compensation over receiving a $15.00 gift card more
often than attorneys in the moderate anchor condition by a margin of 46% to 27%, χ2(1) = 4.4, p =
.036, OR = 2.32 [ 1.07, 5.19].
Study 2 Discussion
This study demonstrated that practicing criminal defense attorneys were highly susceptible
to the anchoring effect — even more so than lay defendants evaluating a comparable plea offer in
Study 1, dRelevant_Condition = 0.94 [0.71, 1.17] vs. d = 0.83 [0.5, 1.1]. This marginal difference exists in spite
of the smaller difference between the high and moderate anchor conditions across studies (24 vs. 4
in Study 1 and 24 vs. 6 in Study 2). However, as this is the only study examining this anchoring
effect on attorney judgments in plea contexts, I conservatively interpret this as at minimum
evidence that legal professionals are also highly vulnerable to anchors in plea contexts. Further, I
found evidence that the consider-the-opposite strategy led attorneys in the high-anchor condition to
revise their advice about what constituted an acceptable maximum sentence for their client to
serve. On average, attorneys in the high-anchor condition decreased their initial sentences by ~1
month (range = 15), whereas attorneys in the moderate condition increased their initial sentence by
~1 week (range = 6). It is, however, worth noting that most attorneys did not revise their initial
maximum acceptable sentence (n = 122; 78%). But the size of the difference in months made by
attorneys who revised their initial advice would undoubtedly be highly meaningful to a real
defendant facing jail time. For example, the average decrease in sentence for the 22 of 83 (26.5%)

high anchor condition attorneys who revised their sentences was 4.04 months, whereas the average
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increase for the 9 of 72 (12%) attorneys in the moderate anchor condition who revised their
sentence was 1.55 months (see Figure 7).20
Moreover, maximum sentences predicted attorneys’ final plea decisions, mediated entirely
through their judgmental sentencing preferences. Attorneys’ recommendation to their clients was
that they should accept the prosecutor’s exploding plea offer of 4-months more often when they
were facing a maximum sentence of 24 compared to 6 months. Yet attorneys did not estimate a
higher likelihood that their client would be convicted when facing a higher maximum sentence. In
fact, attorneys exposed to the high anchor perceived the mitigating evidence as stronger, the
aggravating evidence as weaker, and the crime as less severe (very likely as a result of having spent
time considering each unique piece of evidence that argued against the higher sentence). 21 Indeed,
among attorneys in the high anchor condition, generating more arguments contradicting the
appropriateness of the maximum sentence was associated with greater rejection of the plea offer.
Yet despite this alteration in their evaluations of the case and many of its proximal attributes, most
attorneys exposed to the higher sentence overall pragmatically chose to recommend their client to
accept the offer, despite not even viewing it as more lenient or fairer.
Additionally interesting is the finding that although high-anchor exposed attorneys in Study
2 listed numerous pieces of mitigating and exculpatory evidence contradicting the 24-month
anchor, they tended to view their client as “guilty” of the DUI more often than attorneys in the
moderate anchor condition who generated aggravating evidence (53.8% vs. 40.3%, respectively).
Though these results were not statistically significant, they are still striking for several reasons,
including that high anchor-exposed attorneys viewed the defendants’ crime as less severe and the

Only one attorney in each condition changed their sentence by 1 month in the opposite direction (i.e., higher postCOS sentence among high anchor attorneys, lower post-COS sentence among moderate anchor attorneys).
Exploratory linear models with the anchor by arguments interaction predicting each proximal case attribute support
this account.
20

21
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defendant as guilty less often the more pieces of mitigating evidence they generated. This
preliminarily suggests that but for the intervention, high-anchor-exposed attorneys would have
come to view their client as culpable more often compared to moderate-anchor-exposed attorneys.
Even if it were the case that the anchor influenced perceptions of culpability, in line with prior
work and the shadow of the trial model, attorneys appeared to base their plea recommendations
on the strength of the evidence and the trial sentence — not on perceived client culpability
(Hellgren & Kassin, 2020; Kramer et al. 2017; McAllister & Bregman, 1986). These finding
suggests that the burden of combatting anchoring due to exceedingly high sentences should not rest
on the shoulders of defense attorneys.
This study is not without limitations. The intervention used in this study cannot be
characterized as subtle. Ideally, I would have used a fully crossed between-subjects design where
attorneys exposed to the high or moderate anchor would be asked to generate either anchorconsistent, anchor-inconsistent, or both forms of evidence. Such a design could tease out some of
the relationships between condition, intervention, and attorneys’ perceptions of the case more
clearly. Further, criminal defense attorneys are a difficult sample to recruit making concerns over
self-selection biases reasonable. The within-subjects component of this study had the benefit of
reducing the required sample size and of enabling the more difficult test of an intervention to
debias attorneys’ already anchor-assimilated judgments. But this approach is not without
disadvantages: for one, I cannot definitively rule out the possibility that findings regarding the
efficacy of the intervention may be, in part, the result of experimenter demand effects. The
instructions to provide a revised or unrevised sentencing judgment may have implicitly
communicated to participants that I as the experimenter wished for them to either alter or not alter
their judgment in light of the anchor-inconsistent reasons they generated. Because the nature of the
potential demand was likely unclear, whether attorneys correctly inferred or did not infer what my
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hypotheses were is not as important as whether they provided responses that reflected their
judgments rather than judgments resulting from satisficing or even reactance.
Still, several points suggest the validity of the current data. First, surveys were entirely
anonymous reducing potential fears of responses being tied to participants’ identity. Second, the
majority of attorneys did not provide revised responses which may either suggest that results
supporting the efficacy of the intervention are driven entirely by a select few non-extreme
deviations from initial sentencing judgments or that the majority of attorneys believed their original
response was still correct. Of note, for 20% of attorneys in the high anchor a downward adjustment
was not possible as the pre-COS maximum acceptable sentence they provided was 0 meaning
these results may underestimate the proportion of attorneys who would have revised their sentence
if possible. Third, converging evidence suggests a broader change among high anchor attorneys’
perceptions of the case (e.g., number of arguments generated, plea decision, evidence strength)
than might be expected from satisficing or reactance on a single question.
Finally, the current study design precluded more robust analyses of the potential high
elaboration mechanism underlying the anchoring effect. Examining peoples’ evaluations of the
case attributes after they provided their judgmental preferences and decisions has significant
limitations for establishing causality. Specifically, learning how people perceived related case
attributes across conditions — particularly conditions muddled by a within-subjects manipulation —
does not clearly reveal the source of these differences in evaluations. Was there a difference in the
way high versus moderate anchor-exposed attorneys represented the case in their minds postexposure to the anchor, only to then revise those evaluations following the intervention? Are the
differences in evaluations observed here the cause of the reduction of the reduced sentences or the

result of the reduced sentences?
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Chapter 9: Study 3
Whereas Studies 1 and 2 demonstrated that mock defendants and attorneys operating
independently are vulnerable to anchoring effects, Study 3 examined whether joint attorney-client
pairs working together would be similarly biased. Further, by collecting analyzing the quantity and
quality of information discussed by dyads engaged in the decision-making process, Study 3 was
better positioned to answer the question of whether (a) anchoring is the result of processes that do
not alter the individual’s beliefs or attitudes about the case and (b) whether the act of providing an
anchor-biased sentencing judgment could instead be the cause of changes in perceptions of the
case.
Method

Design and Statistical Power
In a 2 (Anchor: Extremely threatening vs. Moderately threatening) X 2 (Process
Accountability: Present vs. Absent) between-subjects factorial design, 277 attorney-client pairs (554
participants) were randomly assigned to conditions. An a priori power simulation analysis showed
that a total N of 256 pairs (n = 66 per cell) was sufficient to detect a small to medium effect size
(Cohen’s f = .18) with 80% power for the interaction of Anchor X Process Accountability
(simulation available here: osf.io/yu567/). After excluding data from 12 sessions, the remaining
sample of 131 pairs in the accountable condition and 134 pairs in the unaccountable condition is
much larger than past studies examining process accountability in groups (e.g., de Wilde et al.,
2018, n = 44 per cell; Nijstad & Oltmanns, 2012; n = 10 per cell; Scholten et al., 2007, n = 27 per
cell).

Participants and Exclusion Criteria
Participants were Prolific workers (n = 262), John Jay College of Criminal Justice
undergraduates (n = 16), and law students (N = 276) recruited between end of January and mid77

March 2021 for a three-part (70-minute) study. The latter group were recruited by contacting
professors teaching criminal procedure or related courses at every law school in the United States
(as listed on Wikipedia.com) and requesting that they forward an announcement about the current
study to interested students (see recruitment letter here: osf.io/gnrwb/). Prolific participants
received $15.00, undergraduates received four research experience points, and law students
received $25 with the possibility of earning $5 for each law student they referred to the study (max
$15 bonus). Sixty-one (22%) law students were recruited via this snowball sampling technique by 54
prior law student participants.
I excluded data from 12 pairs from analyses because the law student provided an incorrect
response to the process accountability manipulation (n = 2)22, a technical issue prevented both
group members from reading the same memo corresponding to their assigned condition (n = 5),
the law student indicated that she did not believe she would have to participate in an accountability
interview (n = 1), the defendant participated in a prior session (n = 1), the mock defendant
mistakenly participated as the mock attorney (n = 1), the session had to be terminated early
because the attorney did not understand the instructions (n = 1), and the mock defendant was
highly distracted and nonresponsive and could not complete the study (n = 1). All excluded pairs
except one contained a Prolific mock defendant.
The final sample (N = 530 participants) comprised 265 (54.3% female) mock defendants
and 265 mock attorneys (62.3% female). Across all participants, ages ranged from 18 to 77 years
with mock defendants (M = 34.8, SD = 13.09) being on average a few years older than mock
attorneys (M = 26.54, SD = 4.95). Among mock defendants, 72% identified as White, as 10.19%

Mock defendants who responded to this question incorrectly (n = 16) were not excluded from main analyses if
attorneys passed this check. I made this choice based on two reasons. First, attorneys were critically responsible for
communicating the accountability condition to participants and therefore a failure on their part compared to mock
defendants to pass this check was double troubling. Second, prior research by Femke et al. (2010) demonstrates that
asymmetric epistemic motivation in dyads can still lead to an increased search for more information.
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Hispanic/Latino, 9.8% as Black/African American, 13.4% as Asian, 2.3% as Other. Among mock
attorneys, 67.2% identified as White, as 11.7% Hispanic/Latino, 13.96% as Black/African
American, 22.42% as Asian, 2.6% as Other. Over half (62.2%) of mock defendants had a
bachelor’s degree or higher. Less than half of mock attorneys were in their first year of law school
(48.3%); others were in their second (25.3%), third (24.9%), and fourth (1.5%) years. Only 44.15%
reported having completed or being currently enrolled in Criminal Procedure or an equivalent
course. Nearly half of mock attorneys (49.43%) reported having worked in law enforcement or the
legal system compared to 3.1% of mock defendants. Finally, mock defendants reported a higher
average household income than mock attorneys (Median = 60,000 versus 30,000).

Materials and Procedure
Part 1. Participants signed up for a three-part online study. In reality, they completed a
brief introductory survey and a single session over Zoom. Law students and laypersons consented
to the study via a survey in Qualtrics.com and signed up for Part 2 (a zoom session) through a
Calendly meeting scheduler. Lay participants learned that in Part 2 they would be asked to imagine
being a defendant in a criminal case. Law students learned they would play the role of a mock
defendants’ public defender. To ensure that law students understood their roles, they were asked
to read 2-pages of relevant sections of the American Bar Associations’ “Criminal Justice Standards
for the Defense Function” (see Appendix D).23
Part 2. Procedures for Part 2 resembled those of Study 1. At the beginning of the 1-hour
session, one of 10 trained research assistants or I admitted participants one at a time into the zoom
call and changed their names to their corresponding role and their assigned unique participant
identifier (e.g., Attorney-02816). Participants had their cameras on the entire time and were only

Only 33 (12.45%) of those in the final sample recalled having previously read the ABA Standards. Next, all
participants received a calendar invitation containing a link to the Part 2 zoom video call.
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muted while completing individual tasks. Experimenters also had their cameras on the entire time
and were muted except when providing instructions and debriefing.
After the experimenter provided brief instructions, participants individually read the case
description and criminal legal code. Like de Wilde et al. (Study 1; 2018), prior to exposure to the
anchor, law students and lay adults individually provided their judgment for the maximum
sentence they or their client should be willing to accept. Pre-anchor sentencing judgments were
intended to serve as competing self-generated anchor that participants could ostensibly refer to in
their attorney-client discussions. On the last page of the individual portion of the survey, law
students read that as part of the role-playing part of the study they would be asked to read out loud
a few statements to their clients and submit joint responses using their survey on behalf of the pair.
Defendants learned the same information. To indicate completion, participants provided the
password displayed on the final page of the individual survey to the experimenter. A new password
was required to advance to the joint decision-making part of the study.
After both participants provided a password indicating having completed the first individual
portion of the study, the experimenter began the recording session audio. Participants were then
instructed that they should follow the guided instructions displayed only on the attorney’s survey
for the group discussion and to temporarily set aside the defendants’ survey. This meant that
attorneys would read out loud the comparative judgment and sentencing questions, as well as the
prosecutor’s demands as the case unfolded. Attorneys would also oversee the submission of grouplevel responses.
Participants were also told they would read “a very important memo from the researchers
before spending a few minutes discussing the case together prior to reaching a joint sentencing
decision that considered both of their viewpoints, even if those might initially differ”. Participants
learned that to simulate a real attorney-client discussion in the current online platform the

80

experimenter would be turning the sound off on their own computer to prevent the experimenter
from following the attorney-client discussion. Participants were asked to submit any further
questions via the Zoom chat. A password provided by the experimenter unlocked the attorney’s
survey and allowed participants to access the memo. These steps ensured that the experimenter
was not aware of which condition pairs were assigned to and that attorneys and their defendants
received the same randomly assigned memo.

Manipulation of Process Accountability. After unlocking the attorney survey, attorneys
introduced themselves (as prompted by a script) as the defendant’s “court-appointed public
defender.” I used an adapted version of an established procedure to manipulate process
accountability (De Wilde et al., 2018; De Dreu et al., 2000; Nijstad & Oltmanns, 2012; Scholten et
al., 2007; Siegel-Jacobs & Yates, 1996). Mock attorneys were randomly assigned via the Qualtrics
randomizer to the accountable or process unaccountable condition. They then shared a link to an
online “memo” that I created for this study with their “clients.” The memo in the process
accountable condition informed them that the experimenter would like to schedule the
aforementioned bogus third session — a follow-up post-study accountability interview about the
decision-making task to gain insight into the process by which attorney-client decisions are made.
Participants learned that as part of the interview, a legal decision-making expert would inquire
about the decision-making process in their group. The memo further underscored that participants
should come prepared to explain in great detail how their group reached their decision, rather than
what that the decision was (outcome accountability; Lerner & Tetlock, 1999; Patil et al., 2014). To
increase realism of this interview, they were asked whether they agreed to the storage and review of
their audio recording for evaluative purposes and then indicated their mutual availability for the
third session. Throughout the discussion, attorneys were also given space (text fields) to take notes
related to each joint decision on each survey page. Participants in the process unaccountable
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condition instead received a memo informing them that their upcoming discussion would be
completely anonymous and that neither group member would be asked to explain how or why
they arrived at their decisions. Process accountable memos emphasized four types of process
accountability previously described — (1) the mere presence of another, (2) identifiability, (3)
evaluation, and (4) reason-giving — whereas unaccountable memos emphasized the absence of
each of these components (Lerner & Tetlock, 1999). Process accountable and unaccountable
memos can be seen in Appendix E.

Sentencing Judgments. Immediately after the accountability manipulation, attorney-client
pairs encountered the anchor manipulation via a comparative judgment question framed as the
prosecutor’s demand rather than a mere maximum sentence. Attorneys read out loud to
defendants:
“I spoke with the district attorney handling your DUI case. You can either go to
trial or accept a plea offer. If you are found guilty at trial, the prosecutor has told
me that they will recommend a maximum sentence of [48/8] months in jail to the
judge." Now, based on the case (circumstances and evidence), please jointly decide
whether [48/8] is a very lenient, appropriate, or very harsh sentence.”
After encountering this maximum sentence, participants on average discussed the case for
6.14 (SD = 4.7) minutes before rendering a joint sentencing judgment. Next participants indicated
their initial plea preference before being asked to reach a final plea decision (same as Study 1).
Groups took on average 3.02 (SD =2.05) minutes to provide both plea decisions. After completing
the group decision-making part of the study, the mock attorney survey instructed the law student to
provide the mock defendant with a password so that they could both continue the next part of the
study independently and muted. Researchers stopped recording session audio at this time.

Perceptions of the Case and Plea Offer. Next, participants rated their confidence in final
plea decision, provided estimates of the likelihood of conviction, rated the strength of aggravating
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and mitigating arguments, severity of the offense, and the leniency and fairness of the plea deal.
Mock attorneys also rated their representation of their client (e.g., “I counseled my client to the
best of my abilities”) and indicated whether they would recommend that a real client in the same
situation accept or reject this plea offer.

Process Accountability Manipulation Checks. To measure the efficacy of the process
accountability manipulation, participants answered 9 questions regarding (1) whether they were
going to be process accountable (stimulus attention check: “The memo we read indicated that…”),
(2) the extent to which they felt motivated to process information systematically ( construct validity:
e.g., “During the group discussion, we weighed all the pros and cons thoroughly and in a balanced
way before making a decision”) and (3) the extent to which they believed they would be outcome
accountable (discriminant validity; e.g., “After the group discussion we will have to explain the
actual decisions we made, and not the way we arrived at those judgments”). Of the 5 measures
designed to assess greater elaboration of the materials and systematic information processing, scale
reliability based on 4-items was adequate (α = .68 [0.63, 0.72]; 1 item was dropped to increase
reliability). See Appendix G for all measures.

Additional measures. For exploratory purposes, mock defendants rated their perceptions
of their attorneys using a 9-item scale (α = .86 [.83, .88]) and attorney’s rated their perceptions of
their clients’ perceptions of them (α = .87 [.84, .89]). See Appendix F for the full scale. Law
students answered questions about their career goals, their actual experiences, if any, with plea
bargaining (e.g., through law clinics), their year in law school, and whether they had completed
criminal procedures. All participants responded to general demographic questions similar to Study
1 before being debriefed.

Information Exchanged. Research assistants verified the accuracy of the auto-generated
transcript of joint discussions. During the verification process, research assistants removed
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information identifying the accountability condition and coded whether participants had engaged in
a discussion of the case prior to exposure to either of the manipulations. Each verified transcript
was coded by one of five pairs of trained research assistants (RAs) and myself. All RA coders were
blind to hypotheses and accountability condition, but not anchor condition. Using the transcript,
Rater 1 and Rater 2 identified all circumstances discussed by participants as influencing their
decision-making using the following form (see here airtable.com/shrWXPsux54WjnFDi). RA pairs
independently rated each circumstance as having been discussed as either “mitigating”,
“aggravating”, “Both Mitigating and Aggravating” or “Neither Mitigating nor Aggravating”. Finally,
Rater 1 and Rater 2 met to resolve any disagreements and submit final ratings (κs > .72).
I tabulated the proportion of aggravating and mitigating arguments discussed that were
contained within the case description. The sum of these two information types, however, did not
comprise 100% of information exchanged. Seventy-two percent (n = 193) of attorney-client pairs
engaged in discussion over at least one additional circumstance not explicitly provided to them that
could influence their sentencing judgements or plea decision-making (e.g., willingness to publicly
express remorse, legal actors’ dispositions, the dangers of being incarcerated during a global
pandemic). Though the exchange of this type of information did not fall strictly within the selective
accessibility framework, we included it in our coding system for exploratory purposes. Below I
distinguish between analyses involving the sum of the total number of mitigating and aggravating
arguments discussed that were included in the case description and the sum of all information
exchanged regardless of source as it was of potential interest whether such discussions differed by
condition.

Deliberation Duration. To assess whether participants in the accountable condition spent a
greater amount of time discussing the case, I recorded the amount of time participants spent on
each survey page during the joint discussion beginning from exposure to the anchor to submission
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of their final plea decision. Part 2 sessions were average 50.88 (SD = 37.24; Median = 42) minutes
and were scheduled for 60 minutes. Sessions were allowed to go over time if necessary.

Collateral Consequences. Five pairs of trained research assistants coded each type of
collateral consequence discussed by participants during their joint discussion and met to resolve
disagreements. I summed the total number of unique consequences discussed by each group (κs >
.9).

Verbal Distances. To explore how well law students and lay persons identified with their
roles as mock attorneys and defendants, trained RAs and I coded for whether participants used
first-person, second-person, or third-person pronouns. More information including examples can
be found in the Supplemental Materials (https://osf.io/ucq8z/).

Hypotheses
H1. A main effect of anchor such that dyads would be more willing to accept longer
sentences after receiving the high anchor relative to the moderate anchor (H1a). No main effect of
process accountability on joint sentencing judgments (H1b). A two-way interaction of anchor and
process accountability conditions, such that under process unaccountable, jointly rendered
sentencing judgments would be higher for high relative to moderate anchors, but under process

accountable, joint sentencing judgments will show either no significant difference between anchor
conditions or an attenuated difference (H1c). Individually provided baseline estimates would be
associated with joint baseline estimates (H1d).
H2. A main effect of anchor on final plea decisions, such that the high anchors would be
associated with greater plea acceptances relative to moderate anchors (H2a). I made no predictions
about a main effect of process accountability or an anchor X process accountability interaction on
final decision.
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H3. I predicted that jointly rendered sentencing judgments would mediate the relationship
between anchor and plea acceptance. I made no predictions about the potential moderating effect
of process accountability.
H4a. A main effect of process accountability such that dyads in the process accountable
condition would discuss a greater number of mitigating and aggravating facts than those in the
unaccountable condition (H4a). A main effect of anchor on the number of mitigating and
aggravating arguments discussed included in the case materials (H4b). Given competing
hypotheses, I did not have a formal hypothesis about the direction of this effect. A two-way
interaction of anchor by process accountability such among dyads in the accountable condition that
there would be little or no difference between anchor conditions in the number of mitigating and
aggravating arguments discussed but there would be a difference between anchor conditions in the

unaccountable condition (H4c).
H5. A main effect of process accountability on the total amount arguments discussed such
that dyads in the process accountable condition would discuss a greater number of total arguments
(provided and not provided in case materials) than those in the unaccountable condition (H5a).
No main effect of anchor condition (H5b). No two-way interaction effect of anchor by process
accountability (H5c).
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Results

Analytic Approach
Similar to Study 1, sentencing count data were overly dispersed, thus I fit negative binomial
models.24

Data Preparation
For comparison purposes, I pre-registered the creation of a dataset with stricter exclusion
criteria. This dataset (N = 221 dyads) excluded 44 dyads excluding mock defendants who failed the
accountability manipulation stimulus check (n = 16), dyads that jointly rendered sentencing
judgments that had a value outside the interval formed by the median plus or minus 2.5 median
absolute values (n = 8; Leys et al., 2013), and/or attorney-client pairs that engaged in a premanipulation joint discussion (n = 24).25 Below I report results from confirmatory analyses on this
dataset only if they differ from results of the larger sample.

Pre-Manipulation Differences
As expected, linear regression with anchor and accountability predicting individually
generated baseline sentences did not demonstrate a significant effect of anchor (p = .88) or
accountability (p = .13). Similarly, a zero-inflated poisson regression on individually generated

Jointly rendered sentencing judgments were highly right skewed resembling a negative binomial distribution
(skewness = 2.6; kurtosis = 11). Dispersion was greater among responses in the high anchor where the conditional
variance (32.95) grossly exceeded the conditional mean, M = 6.07, and in the process unaccountable condition, M =
4.73, SD = 26.44. The assumption of equidispersion was violated, z = 3.77, p < .001. A likelihood ratio test confirmed
that the negative binomial regression fit the data better than the Poisson regression, χ (5) = 274.47, p < .001. Though
total arguments appeared fairly normally distributed (skewness = 0.28; kurtosis = -0.32), the equidispersion assumption
of the Poisson model was violated, z = 7.29, p < .001. Dispersion was comparable among the accountability conditions,
but greater among responses in the high compared to the moderate anchor condition. A likelihood ratio test
confirmed that the negative binomial regression fit the data better than the Poisson regression, χ (5) = 142.47, p < .001.
For consistency, I fit all argument count data to negative binomial regressions.
Specifically, in 8.66% of sessions attorney-client pairs discussed at least one piece of case information prior to reading
the anchor manipulation (n = 24) and/or just prior to reading the memo containing the accountability manipulation (n
=12). Participants under process accountability (n = 10) and unaccountability conditions (n = 14) both engaged in an
often several minutes long conversation prior to reading the high (n = 8) or moderate (n = 16) anchor. Regrettably,
experimenters did not observe this behavior due to instructions to remain blind to condition and give participants the
privacy they were promised by muting the audio on the experimenter’s computer.
24
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aspirational sentences did not show a significant effect of anchor (p = .68) or accountability (p =
.13).26 Unexpectedly, a linear regression on estimated likelihood of conviction prior to exposure to
any manipulation indicated a significant difference between anchor conditions, such that
participants who would later be exposed to the high anchor estimated a lower likelihood of
conviction (M = 66%, SD = 21%) than participants in the moderate anchor condition (M = 70%,

SD = 21%; F(1, 491) = 4.67, p = .031).
Manipulation Checks and Perceived Realism
Anchor. As expected, a Mann-Whitney U-test indicated that participants in the highly
threatening anchor condition rated the anchor as harsher than those in the moderately threatening
anchor condition, (p < .001), whereas accountability did not influence perceptions of the harshness
of comparative judgments (p = .20). See Table 14 for exact distribution.
Process Accountability. Participants spent an average of 2.59 minutes (Median = 1.96, SD
= 2.14) reading the process accountability memo compared to 2 minutes on the unaccountability
memo (Median = 1.36, SD = 2.13). A linear mixed-effects model with accountability as a fixed

effect and by-participant random intercepts to account for group membership on the 4-item
accountability manipulation check scale demonstrated the expected significant effect of process
accountability, b = -.20, SE = .09, t(265) = 2.16, p = .032, d = 0.19 [0.03, 0.37]. Dyads in the
process accountable condition indicated having weighed the information more thoroughly and
avoiding rushing the discussion or suppressing disagreements (M = 5.46 of 7, SD = 1.09)
compared to members of unaccountable dyads (M = 5.25, SD = 1.1).

For baseline estimates, I pre-registered I would run a negative binomial model, anticipating a similar distribution to
those I observed in Study 1 and pilot studies. However, after visually examining the distribution, I determined that the
current model would be more appropriate. For aspirational sentence I pre-registered a simple linear regression, but
the distribution contained an excess of zeros, thus I report results from a zero-inflated model (112 zeros of 532 values).
Results from the originally proposed analyses did not differ from those reported here.
26
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To examine whether the length of the discussion varied by condition, I fit a linear
regression with anchor, accountability, and the Anchor X Accountability interaction. There was no
main effect of anchor, b = 1.16, SE = 1.12, t(261) = 1.04, p = .3, or Anchor X Accountability
interaction, b = -1.7, SE = 1.57, t(261) = -1.01, p = .28, but there was a main effect of process
accountability (b = -3.53, SE = 1.11; t(262) = -5.57, p < .001, d = 0.69 [0.51, 0.86]). Discussions
among process accountable dyads (M = 13.41, SD = 7.5) were significantly lengthier than
discussions among unaccountable dyads (M = 9.04, SD = 5.04), even excluding the amount of time
spent reading the memo. Anchor condition was not associated with length of discussion, b = .31,

SE = .76, t(262) = 0.40, p = .69.
To assess whether participants were less focused on outcome accountability, they
responded to two statements. Process accountable participants agreed more strongly at the end of
the study that they would have to account for how their group arrived at their judgments and not
the actual judgments and decisions they made (b = -1.65, SE = .13, t(265) = -12.74, p < .001).
Process accountable groups disagreed much more strongly with a statement (reverse-scored)
suggesting that after their group discussion they would have to explain the actual decisions they
made and not how they arrived at those decisions compared to participants in the process
unaccountable condition (b = -.89, SE = .16, t(530) = -5.76, p < .001). As an instruction check,
individual members under process accountability rated the extent to which they expected to have
to justify their decision-making strategies (M = 7 of 9, SD = 2).

Bivariate correlations
Variables with significant bivariate correlations (e.g., attorneys’ and defendants’ individual
pre-anchor preferences and estimated likelihoods of conviction at trial), were included as
covariates in all Study 3 models. Tables 15 and 16 correlation matrices for Mock Defendant and
Mock Attorney variables, respectively.
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Effect of Anchor and Process Accountability on Jointly Rendered Sentencing Judgments (H1a-d)
On average, attorney-client dyads indicated that defendants would be willing to spend a
maximum of 4.7 (SD = 4.53) months in jail. Among accountable groups, attorney-client pairs
exposed to the high anchor set maximum acceptable sentencing judgments (M = 5.88, SD = 4.68)
that were on average 2.47 months great than those set by participants exposed to the moderate
maximum sentence (M = 3.41, SD = 2.04), d = 0.68 [0.33, 1.03]. Among unaccountable groups,
attorney-client pairs exposed to the high anchor provided maximum acceptable sentencing
judgments (M = 6.26, SD = 6.69) that were on average 2.97 months great than those set by
participants exposed to the moderate anchor (M = 3.29, SD = 2.29), d = 0.60 [0.26, 0.95]. See
Figure 8.
To formally test the main hypothesis that anchor and process accountability would
influence attorney-client pairs’ joint sentencing decisions, I fit three negative binomial regressions:
Model 1 with anchor (High = 0, Moderate = 1) and accountability (Accountable = 0,
Unaccountable =1); Model 2 with the Anchor X Process Accountability interaction; Model 3 with
covariates. A likelihood ratio test showed that Model 1 was not significantly different from Model
2, χ2 (1) = .23, p = .63. Thus, though the means were in the predicted direction, in contrast to
hypothesis H1c, the Anchor X Accountability interaction was not significant (H1c; b = -.10, SE =
.20, z = -.48, p = .63), indicating that the motivation-based debiasing intervention was not effective
at reducing the anchoring effect. Below I report Model 1 and Model 3 results.
Model 1 demonstrated the hypothesized main effect of the anchor (H1a; b = -0.60, SE =
0.10, z = -5.9, p < .001), and, as expected, no main effect of process accountability (H1b; b = 0.02,

SE = .10, z = .19, p = .85). Like Study 1, attorney-client pairs exposed to the high maximum
sentence set maximum acceptable sentencing judgments (M = 6.07, SD = 4.72) that were on
average 2.8 months great than those set by participants exposed to the moderate maximum
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sentence (M = 3.35, SD = 2.88), d = 0.69 [0.45, 0.94]. See Table 17 for the full output of this
regression model.
Adding covariates to Model 3 (without the interaction term), including attorneys’ and
defendants’ individual pre-anchor preferences and estimated likelihoods of conviction at trial,
greatly improved model fit, χ2(20)= 130.56, p < .001. The effect of the anchor remained significant
even after controlling for these covariates (b = -0.71, SE = 0.10, z = -7.20, p < .001, d = 0.85 [0.6,
1.10]). Notably, defendants’ (b = 0.07, SE = 0.01, z = 5.93, p < .001), but not attorneys’ (b = 0.01,

SE = 0.004, z = 1.52, p = .13), individual baseline sentencing estimates were highly positively
associated with maximum acceptable sentences lending partial support to hypothesis H1d. In
contrast, attorneys’ (b = 0.01, SE = 0.002, z = 3.58, p < .001), but not defendants’ (b = 0.003, SE =
0.002, z = 1.32, p = .18), estimates of the likelihood of conviction were positively associated with
joint sentences.

Effect of Anchor and Process Accountability on Joint Plea Decision (H2a)
Nearly half of mock attorney-clients pairs (43.01%) indicated that they would plead guilty to
the felony DUI and accept a plea offer carrying a 6-month jail sentence. Next, I fit three binomial
logistic regressions predicting final plea decision. A likelihood ratio test showed that Model 1
without the Anchor X Process Accountability interaction was not significantly different from Model
2 with the interaction term, χ2 (1) = .92, df = 1, p = .34. Model 1 model explained 9.1% of the
variance in plea decision and correctly classified 51.3% of cases. Even more so than in Study 1 and
like Study 2, anchor condition strongly predicted final plea decision (H2a; b = 1.09, z = 4.21, p <
.001; OR = 2.96 [1.80, 4.94]), whereas process accountability did not (H2; b = 0.08, z = 0.31, p =
0.76; OR = 1.08 [0.65, 1.80). Attorney-client pairs in the high-anchor condition were significantly
more likely to accept the plea deal than those in the moderate-anchor condition (56% versus 30%).
See Table 18 for full regression output of all three models.
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Mediating Effect of Jointly Rendered Sentencing Judgments Through Anchor and Process
Accountability (H3)
Next, I tested a mediation model to assess whether jointly decided maximum acceptable
sentences would mediate the relationship between anchor condition and final plea decision using
the same process as in Studies 1 and 2.27 Figure 9 shows the results of an analysis without covariates
(Figure 9a) and with covariates (Figure 9b). Along all model paths, covariates included
accountability condition, attorney and defendants’ individual baseline sentencing estimates, and
estimated likelihood of conviction. Across both models, like Studies 1 and 2, the paths from the
anchor condition to joint sentencing judgments and from sentences to plea decision indicated
significant effects, and the indirect effect of the anchor condition through joint sentencing
judgments was also significant. Unlike Studies 1 and 2, the direct effect of anchor on plea decision
remained significant and the proportion of the effect mediated was partial, 53.36% [.26, .88], p =
.001, rather than complete.

Effect of Anchor and Process Accountability on Mitigating and Aggravating Arguments Discussed
(H4a, b, c)
Next, I examined whether process accountability and anchor influenced perceptions of the
arguments. Though preceding analyses suggest that accountability had no discernible impact on
attorney-client pairs’ sentencing judgments or plea decisions, it remains possible that the lack of an
effect of accountability occurs despite greater elaboration of the case information.
Arguments Discussed as Mitigating. I tested negative binomial regression models with
(Model 1) and without the Anchor X Accountability interaction term (Model 2) predicting the
number of arguments discussed as mitigating. A likelihood ratio test indicated that these models

I pre-registered that I would run a moderated mediation model if process accountability showed a significant
interaction with anchor predicting either joint sentencing judgments or plea decision. No such interaction emerged.
27
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were not significantly different, χ2(1) = 1.17, p = .27. The interaction term was not significant, b = 0.17, SE = 0.16, z = -1.08, p = .28. The main effects only model demonstrated no effect of anchor
(b = -0.05, SE = 0.08, z = -0.62, p = .533), but the expected effect of accountability (b = 0.18, SE =
0.09, z = -2.29, p = .022). Participants under process accountability discussed more arguments as
mitigating (M = 4.59, SD = 2.87) than those under process unaccountability (M = 3.84, SD = 2.52),

d = 0.28 [0.036, 0.52]. See Table 19 for full regression output.
Arguments Discussed as Aggravating. A model with and without the anchor by
accountability interaction predicting the number of arguments discussed as aggravating also did not
significantly differ, χ2(1) = 0.00, p = .98. The interaction term was not significant, b = 0.002, SE =
.18, z = -0.01, p = .98. The main effects only model demonstrated no effect of anchor (b = 0.01, SE
= 0.09, z = 0.13, p = .89), but an effect of the accountability (b = -0.24, SE = 0.09, z = -2.74, p =
.006; Table 19). Participants under process accountability discussed more arguments as aggravating
(M = 2.61, SD = 1.79) than those under process unaccountability, M = 2.04, SD = 1.56, d = 0.34
[0.09, 0.58]. See Table 19 for full regression output.
Thus, in contrast to my hypothesis, anchor condition did not influence discussion of case
relevant information (H4a), and though process accountability did lead to greater discussion of
both mitigating aggravating evidence (H4b), the Anchor X Accountability interaction was not
significant (H4c).

Exploratory Analyses
To examine the impact of the anchor and accountability on attorney-client pairs’
evaluations of proximal case attributes, I ran a series of linear mixed effects with anchor and
process accountability as the fixed effects, and random intercepts for each attorney-client pair. The
random intercepts of group membership were a significant predictor in all models, ps < .001.
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Estimated Likelihood of Conviction. A likelihood ratio test of the null model predicting
estimated likelihood of conviction significantly different from a model with my fixed factors, χ2(2) =
4.21, p = .121, or from one with the interaction term of anchor by process accountability, χ2 (3) =
2.31, p = .51. Among attorney-client pairs that chose to accept the plea offer, mock attorneys
estimated a higher likelihood of conviction (M = 65.48, SD = 24.6) than mock attorneys in pairs
that chose to reject the plea offer (M = 54.24, SD = 26.16), t(203.06) = 3.26, p = .001, d = 0.44
[0.17, 0.72]. Similarly, among attorney-client pairs that chose to accept the plea offer, mock
defendants estimated a higher likelihood of conviction (M = 78.61, SD = 19.68) than mock
defendants in pairs that chose to reject the plea offer (M = 52.14, SD = 25.99), t(218.19) = 8.61, p
< .001, d = 1.13 [0.81, 1.44].
Strength of Mitigating Arguments. A likelihood ratio test of the null model predicting the
judged strength of the mitigating evidence was not significantly different from a model with my
fixed factors, χ2(2) = 0.84, p = .66 or from one with the interaction term of Anchor X
Accountability, χ2(3) = 1.11, p = .76. Additionally, a non-pre-registered exploratory linear mixed
effects model demonstrated that jointly discussing more arguments as mitigating was associated
with perceiving the evidence as more mitigating, b = 0.25, SE = 0.03, t(265) = 7.24, p < .001,
whereas discussing more arguments as aggravating was associated with perceiving the mitigating
evidence as weaker, b = -0.25, SE = 0.06, t(265) = -4.37, p < .001.
A non-pre-registered exploratory linear mixed effects logistic regression with mock attorney
and defendants’ perceptions of the strength of the mitigating evidence as fixed effects and random
intercepts for group membership indicated that both attorney’s, b = 0.39, SE = 0.13, z =-2.94, p =
.003, OR = 1.46 [1.16, 1.85], and defendants’ perceptions, b = 0.58, SE = 0.15, z =-3.91, p < .001,
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OR = 1.75 [1.35, 2.26], of the mitigating evidence as stronger were associated with greater plea
rejection.
Strength of Aggravating Arguments. A likelihood ratio test of the null model predicting the
judged strength of the aggravating evidence was not significantly different from a model with my
fixed factors, χ2(2) = 1.20, p = .55, or from one with the interaction term of anchor by process
accountability, χ2 (3) = 1.34, p = .72. Additionally, a non-pre-registered exploratory linear mixed
effects model demonstrated that jointly discussing more arguments as aggravating was associated
with perceiving the evidence as more aggravating, b = 0.30, SE = 0.06, t(265) = 5.22, p < .001,
whereas discussing more arguments as mitigating was associated with perceiving the aggravating
evidence as weaker, b = -0.21, SE = 0.03, t(265) = -6.10, p < .001.
A non-pre-registered exploratory linear mixed effects logistic regression with mock attorney
and defendants’ perceptions of the strength of the aggravating evidence as fixed effects and random
intercepts for group membership indicated that defendants’ perceptions of the mitigating evidence
as stronger, b = -0.79, SE = 0.16, z = -4.95, p < .001, OR = 0.46 [0.33, 0.62], but not attorney’s
perceptions, b = -0.16, SE = 0.10, z = -1.54, p = .12, OR = 0.85 [0.70, 1.04], were negatively
associated with greater plea rejection.
Crime Severity. Participants tended to view the crime as moderately severe ( M = 4.36, SD
= 1.49), with defendants (M = 4.62, SD = 1.44) viewing it slightly more severely than attorneys (M =
4.1, SD = 1.5). A likelihood ratio test of the null model predicting the judged severity of the
offense charged was not significantly different from a model with my fixed factors, χ2(2) =3.29, p =
.19, or from one with the interaction term of Anchor X Accountability, χ2(3) = 5.17, p = .16.
A non-pre-registered exploratory linear mixed effects logistic regression with mock attorney
and defendants’ perceptions of the severity of the crime charges as fixed effects and random
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intercepts for group membership indicated that defendants’ perceptions of crime severity were
negatively associated with greater plea rejection, b = -0.30, SE = 0.10, z = -3.08, p = .002, OR =
0.74 [0.61, 0.90], such that defendants who regarded the crime as more severe were more likely to
accept the plea offer. Similar to Study 2, mock attorney’s perceptions of severity were not
associated with plea decision, b = -0.06, SE = 0.09, z = -0.65, p = .52, OR = 0.95 [0.80, 1.12].
Leniency. Defendants perceived plea offer as slightly more lenient (M = 2.96 = 7, SD =
1.68) compared to mock attorneys (M = 2.74, SD = 1.5); but overall perceptions of leniency were
closer to not at all lenient than to extremely lenient. A likelihood ratio test of the null model
predicting the judged leniency of the plea offer was significantly different from a model with my
fixed factors, χ2(2) =16.81, p < .001. As expected, participants in the high anchor condition
regarded the plea offer as more lenient than those in the moderate anchor condition, b = -0.68, SE
= 0.17, t(265) = -4.07, p < .001. The interaction term of Anchor X Accountability was not a
significant predictor, b = .16, p = .64, and did not lead to a significantly different model from one
without the interaction term, χ2(1) = 0.22, df = 1, p = .64.
A non-pre-registered exploratory linear mixed effects logistic regression with mock attorney
and defendants’ perceptions of the leniency of the plea deal as fixed effects and random intercepts
for group membership indicated that both attorney’s, b = -0.33, SE = 0.13, z = -2.52, p = .01, OR
= 0.72 [0.56, 0.83], and defendants’ perceptions of greater leniency, b = -0.73, SE = 0.17, z = -4.4,

p < .001, OR = 0.48 [0.35, 0.65], were negatively associated with greater plea rejection.
Fairness. Defendants perceived plea offer as fairer (M = 3.42 = 7, SD = 1.85) compared to
mock attorneys (M = 2.97, SD = 1.6); but overall perceptions of fairness were closer to not at all
fair than to fair. A likelihood ratio test of the null model predicting the judged fairness of the plea
offer was significantly different from a model with my fixed factors, χ2(2) =7.85, p = .02. As
expected, participants in the extremely threatening anchor condition regarded the plea offer as
96

more lenient than those in the moderate anchor condition, b = -0.49, SE = 0.17, t(265) = -2.92, p =
.005. The interaction term of Anchor X Accountability was not a significant predictor, b = .20, p =
.56, and did not lead to a significant different model from one without the interaction term, χ2(1) =
0.33, p = .56.
A non-pre-registered exploratory linear mixed effects logistic regression with mock attorney
and defendants’ perceptions of the fairness of the plea deal as fixed effects and random intercepts
for group membership indicated that both attorney’s, b = -0.29, SE = 0.13, z = -2.15, p = .03, OR
= 0.75 [0.58, 0.97], and defendants’ perceptions of greater fairness, b = -0.95, SE = 0.24, z = -3.92,

p < .001, OR = 0.39 [0.24, 0.62], were negatively associated with greater plea rejection.
Additional exploratory analyses pertaining to measures of verbal distances, law student’s
private recommendations, confidence in plea decisions, discussion length, number of collateral
consequences discussed, and perceptions of mock attorney can be found in the Supplemental
Materials (osf.io/ucq8z/).
Study 3 Discussion
Consistent with Studies 1 and 2, the sentencing judgments of attorney-client pairs were
vulnerable to the anchoring effect. Biased sentencing judgments, in turn, mediated the relationship
between the trial sentence and final plea decisions, albeit to a smaller degree than in prior studies
reported here. In contrast to my predictions, the joint sentencing judgments and plea decisions of
process accountable dyads were not significantly different from those of unaccountable dyads.
Though accountable participants discussed a greater amount of information, their discussion — not
unlike that of unaccountable participants — was largely focused more on the mitigating evidence
than the aggravating evidence. The current study also replicates prior findings on the influence of
multiple anchors on reducing but not eliminating the anchoring effect (e.g., Imhoff & Nikolaus,
2021; de Wilde et al. 2018). Presently, mock defendants’ and, to a lesser degree, mock attorneys’
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individual pre-anchor sentencing judgments influenced their joint decisions. Setting pre-anchor
maximum acceptable sentences may partially explain why, only in Study 3, did sentences not fully
mediate the anchoring effect on decisions
In line with the competing anchors hypothesis (Sniezek, 1992) and my predictions,
participants in Study 3 used their pre-anchor sentencing preferences as reference points when
evaluating the anchor. This is evidenced by findings demonstrating the influence of these initial
sentencing preferences (primarily defendants’, but also mock attorneys’) on joint sentencing
judgments. In line with past findings (de Wilde et al. 2018; Study 1, Epley & Gilovich, 2006;
Whyte & Sebenuys, 1997), when dyads self-generated anchors competed with the externally
provided anchor (i.e., the prosecutor’s demand), the result may have been a minor attenuation of
the anchoring effect rather than the wholesale elimination for high anchor.
The lack of an effect of accountability on sentencing judgments in the current study cannot
be explained by a failure of the accountability manipulation. Accountable groups compared to
unaccountable groups spent considerably more time discussing the case, and specifically discussing
more mitigating, aggravating, and anchor-consistent arguments. One explanation for the failure of
the accountability condition to attenuate the anchoring effect is that dyads did not spend more time
discussing anchor-inconsistent arguments (i.e., arguments contradicting the appropriateness of the
anchor) specifically (M = 2.06 vs. 1.89) as they did in de Wilde et al.’s Study 2 (Control: M = 0.44,

SD = 0.20 vs. Process Accountable: M = 0.52, SD = 0.24). Regardless, de Wilde et al. did not find
that anchor-inconsistent arguments in particular explained the attenuated anchoring effect (they do
not report results from anchor-consistent argument types). Instead they attributed the attenuated
anchoring effect of their Anchor X Accountability interaction, F(1,83) = 4.32, p = .041, ɳp2 = 0.050,
to the differences in initially expressed anchor preferences in the accountable group compared to
the control group. In contrast, in Study 2, attorneys selectively generated in quick succession an
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average of over 6 anchor-inconsistent arguments, all mitigating, in the high anchor condition. Thus,
though accountable groups did engage in a more holistic discussion of the case materials than
Study 2 participants, this work suggests that it is discussion of anchor-inconsistent arguments in
particular that may attenuate the anchoring effect.
Though prior work by de Wilde et al. (2018) examining the anchoring effect on mock jury
groups’ legal decisions demonstrated a similar finding with respect to anchor-assimilated sentencing
judgments, the current work extends those findings in several ways. First, dyads in the current study
were comprised of a mock defendant and their advocate, rather than two equally positioned mock
jurors. The differences between participants’ roles are perhaps most obviously reflected in the
varying degrees to which the mock defendants’ pre-anchor sentences and mock attorneys’
estimated likelihoods of conviction influenced plea decisions. Anecdotally, during their joint
discussions, attorneys tended to actively defer the final say on sentencing judgment and plea
decisions to their clients, often emphasizing how the defendant would be the one to bear the brunt
of the consequences, rather than the attorney making these results more generalizable to plea
bargaining. Such behavior fits with notions of what makes for a “good” defense attorney (e.g.,
Hollander-Blumoff, 2007).
Second, as part of their role-playing participants rendered hypothetical self-relevant
judgments and decisions that though unaccompanied by consequential outcomes required
participants to think through what they would do if they were facing a similar situation in their own
lives. Arguably, the nature of this task created some incentive to render judgments that at least fit
with their conception of how they would behave, including the deliberateness with which they
would approach the decision-making process; the broadly high level of accountability across
conditions (M = 5.36 of 7) lends support to this latter point. Further, other evidence suggests that
dyads provided more lenient judgments for themselves in the current study compared to Study 1.
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For example, over half of dyads — without any prompting — discussed the potential collateral
consequences of their hypothetical decision and provided both pre-anchor maximum acceptable
sentences that were considerably lower than those in the calibration sample ( Medians = 3 versus 6,
respectively).
Third, the current study is the first to examined not only biased joint sentencing judgments,
but also their impact on choice legal decision-making in groups. Though an effect on sentencing
judgments alone would be cause for concern as a willingness to set higher maximum acceptable
sentences could lead to poorer outcomes in a more dynamic back-and-forth negotiation, the
findings here speak to the enormous influence of the anchor on final decisions about waiving or
asserting one’s right to trial.
In sum, this study indicates that even when accompanied by mock attorneys motivated to
achieve more defensible outcomes, and when equipped with preferences about the maximum jail
sentence they were willing to serve, mock defendants’ sentencing judgments and decisions were
vulnerable to excessively threatening trial sentences.
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Chapter 10: General Discussion
The goals of the present thesis were to (a) examine the extent to which mock defendants
and legal professionals are susceptible to the anchoring bias, (b) elucidate the mechanism
underlying vulnerability to the anchoring effect in plea contexts, and (c) test the efficacy of
debiasing strategies aimed toward combating reliance on heuristics and improving information
processing. The results of three studies with varied methodologies and samples demonstrate that
mock defendants and legal professionals alike relied on a numerical anchor when making
sentencing judgements and plea decisions. Specifically, maximum trial sentences — even
informationally irrelevant ones (Study 1) — considerably influenced the maximum sentence to
which mock defendants, real criminal defense attorneys, and mock attorney-client pairs were
willing to plead guilty. The gap between decision-makers’ preferences for maximum sentences
when exposed to high versus moderate trial sentences was considerable, translating to several
additional months of incarceration. Interestingly, even though decision-makers’ anchor-assimilated
sentencing preferences were on average between 1 and 2 years lower than the threatened trial
sentence, these anchor-biased sentencing preferences either fully (Studies 1 and 2) or partially
(Study 3) explained their choice to accept (or recommend) prosecutors’ discounted plea offers at
higher rates.
A second goal of the current work was to clarify the mechanism underlying the anchoring
effect in plea negotiations. Experimental evidence from Studies 1 and 3 suggest that exposure to
threatened trial sentences of varying magnitudes did not tend to differentially bias judgments of
related case attributes including perceived crime severity, evidence strength, defendant culpability,
or the quantity of mitigating and aggravating case facts jointly discussed. The most consistent
determinant of decisions in the plea literature, the estimated likelihood of conviction, was similarly
unaffected by the magnitude of the maximum trial sentence. Effectively other than the sentencing
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judgment, decision-makers’ holistic impressions of the case remained unchanged by the anchor
regardless of whether it was communicated as a prosecutors’ demand or as an arbitrarily chosen
value.
Only with regard to perceptions of the plea offer did exposure to the maximum trial
sentence lead to differences between anchor conditions, such that participants exposed to a higher
compared to moderate anchor regarded the offer as more lenient and fairer. This finding is not
terribly surprising — though no less alarming — given that anchors and even participants’ anchorassimilated sentencing judgments determined the sentencing discounts participants would receive if
they accepted the offer. In Study 2, when attorneys generated evidence contradicting the
appropriateness of the maximum trial sentence, the significant difference in perceptions of
leniency and fairness of the plea deal observed in prior studies did not emerge. These findings
provide preliminary support the notion that anchoring effects elicited by threatened trial sentences
do not result from biased interpretations of the evidence, but rather from inflated perceptions of
the leniency and fairness of the plea deal.
The finding that anchoring effects in the current study are neither explained by or lead to
biased evaluations or exchange of case-relevant information does not preclude the efficacy of
interventions designed to alter information processing. In line with my predictions, instructions to
consider anchor-inconsistent evidence led to a reduction of the anchoring effect among attorneys
presented with a highly threatening trial sentence. Asymmetric consideration of only the mitigating
evidence led a quarter of defense attorneys exposed to the high anchor to reduce their maximum
acceptable sentencing recommendations by an average of 4 months. Reduced maximum
acceptable sentences also attenuated the anchoring effect between high and moderate anchors, and
were, in turn, associated with a lower rate of plea acceptances — though the overall acceptance rate
was still greater among attorneys exposed to high compared to the moderate anchor.
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Study 3 demonstrated that motivation to process information more deliberately and
thoroughly did not lead to changes in the amount of information exchanged between anchor
conditions or in attorney-client pairs’ sentencing judgments and plea decisions. This finding
suggests that though accountability may work for mock jurors rendering decisions about a thirdparty defendant, they are less effective for debiasing anchoring in hypothetical self-relevant
decision-making. Taken together, results from these interventions are in line with emerging work
demonstrating that explicit instructions to consider the information contradicting the anchor are
more effective for debiasing the anchoring effect than other less direct accuracy warnings (e.g.,
Brewer et al. 2017).
This research supports the troubling conclusion that maximum sentences lead legal
decision-makers to raise the bar for what they consider to be an acceptance sentence and that
raising that bar causes them to accept plea offers they would not otherwise accept. The
implications of this work reinforce the need for policies that curtail the immense discretionary
power of prosecutors to set the arena with excessive sentences.
Legal Relevance of the Anchor
It may seem rational that mock defendants and legal professionals became anchored on a
provided maximum sentence; after all, a larger sentence can convey information relevant to the
determination of the sentencing judgment, such as the severity of the crime, the evidence
supporting the prosecutions’ case, the prosecutors’ confidence in prosecuting the case, and so on.
What is striking about these results is that increasing the trial sentence increased the maximum
sentence participants were willing to accept to avoid a trial conviction, as well as their willingness to
accept a plea deal, without also increasing their perceptions of the severity of the misconduct, the
evidence strength, or the likelihood of conviction.
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Past work examining the impact of anchor-biased award damages on perceptions of the
litigants and liability and causality judgments has yielded mixed results. In a study by Chapman and
Bornstein (1996), the authors found that the more money the plaintiff requested the greater the
damages that mock jurors’ (n = 56) awarded the plaintiff, even when the amount requested was
implausibly low or implausibly high (i.e., $100, $20,000, $5 million, $ 1 billion). But similar to the
current study, anchors did not differentially influence mock jurors’ estimates of the plaintiff’s
medical expenses, perceptions of the plaintiff’s suffering, evaluations of the evidence, or of the
defendants’ liability — attributes that ought to be related to damages award decisions. Jurors
influenced by the anchor to award the plaintiff higher damages did so despite reporting feeling that
the plaintiff was more selfish and less generous.
Although lacking ecological validity, the inclusion of a legally irrelevant and inadmissible
numeric anchor in Study 1 enabled a test of the hypothesis that a maximum sentence need not
convey information about the defendants’ case to influence sentencing judgments and plea
outcomes. Results demonstrated that mock defendants failed to sufficiently adjust away from an

irrelevant maximum trial sentence and rendered plea decisions that were not significantly different
from those of defendants exposed to a maximum sentence explicitly relevant to their case. Study 1
also extends findings from the few available studies manipulating relevance in legal decisionmaking studies. These prior studies have focused on the impact of inadmissible or meaningless
anchors on mock jurors’ sentencing judgments (Glöckner & Englich, 2015) and punitive award
damages (Hans et al., 2018; Reyna et al., 2015) but not on choice decision-making. Thus, the
current studies are the first to demonstrate the impact of numeric anchors on a non-numeric
choice outcome (a plea decision) for participants rendering preferential judgments. Future studies
might seek to replicate this finding in a setting with greater consequences attached to the decision.
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The Role of Expertise: Attorneys as “Debiasers”
This research finds that experienced criminal defense attorneys and mock defendants
advised by law students acting as their advocates were no less susceptible to the power of the
anchoring effect than inexperienced mock defendants completing an unsupervised online survey.
Though similar to Bystranowski et al.’s (2021) meta-analysis, which found that legal professionals
were not significantly less biased than lay samples, the current results suggest a larger effect size for
the anchoring effect among attorneys than other participant samples.
Ironically, one reason why at least mock attorneys may have failed to help defendants
adjust the maximum sentence they would be willing to accept further away from the anchor was
their faithfulness to the criminal defense practice of deferring to their client’s wishes, a finding
reflected by the lower variance in sentencing judgments explained by attorney’s individually
rendered sentencing preferences compared to their clients’ preferences. In 17% of dyads mock
attorneys also indicated that they would have likely counseled a real client in an identical situation
to make a different plea decision. Similarly, past research surveying real attorneys has found that
their recommendations were highly influenced by defendant’s preference about whether to plead
guilty or go to trial (Kramer et al., 2007).
Implausible Anchors
Though the 48-month anchor was chosen from sentencing guidelines corresponding to an
aggravated felony DUI (due to the suspended license and injury to a person) in the State of
Arizona, participants almost unanimously regarded it as very harsh. This anchor far exceeded the
distribution of unanchored sentencing preferences collected in Pilot Study 3 and Study 3. Study 3
adds to the limited and inconclusive literature on the impact of anchors perceived as implausibly
high. Prior work has demonstrated that implausible anchors lead to larger anchoring effects
(Chapman, 1994; Mussweiler & Strack, 2000, 2001; Strack & Mussweiler, 1997), attenuated effects
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(Sugden et al., 2013), or even backfire effects (Wegener et al., 2001). A recent meta-analysis found
that implausibly high anchors led to smaller effect sizes, though the differences were not significant
(Bystranowski et al., 2021). In Study 3, the finding that the 48-month anchor caused decisionmakers to consider the ways in which the anchor was inappropriate — by discussing more anchorinconsistent (i.e., mitigating) evidence than anchoring theory would have predicted — suggests the
kindling for a backfire effect was present.
But the 48-month anchor, which one defendant referred to as “insulting,” still caused a
powerful anchoring effect — a finding that argues against the backfire effect in plea negotiations and
suggests that non-credible anchors may unduly influence mock defendants’ sentencing judgments
and decisions in plea contexts (Chapman, 1994; Mussweiler & Strack, 2000, 2001; Strack &
Mussweiler, 1997). It is not terribly difficult to speculate why attorney-client pairs exposed to the
high anchor did not reject the plea offer more often than moderate anchor pairs — the risk of
retaliation and of serving 4 years in jail might be incentive enough to tamp down any backfire-like
impulses on plea decisions.28 But what can explain the lack of a backfire effect of this “insulting”
trial sentence on non-binding sentencing preferences?
Selective accessibility proponents offer one potential explanation focused on how the
hypothesis for testing the appropriateness of implausible anchors as the ‘true’ value differs from
testing for plausible anchors. Rather than test the hypothesis that the provided implausible anchor
value is correct for the judgment, people are thought to instead test the possibility that the

boundary of the range of possible values is correct response (Mussweiler & Strack, 1999). After
adjusting the boundary of the value of distributions of plausible anchors (e.g., from 0-6 months to

One attorney eloquently articulated this very fear: “The risk here is that if you go to trial, the DA is going to be
butthurt that you didn't take the deal and recommend a higher sentence.”
28
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3-9 months) people are then thought to test the appropriateness of the new boundary values and
provide judgments corresponding to this determination. Indeed, one potential example of the type
of thought process that might lead to “boundary” shifting concerns defendants’ fears (and
attorneys’ warnings) of retaliation:
“Defendant: My brain wants to say one [month], but I don't know if that would
make somebody on the prosecuting side really angry and want to slap me with
more time as retaliation for saying one month.”

Implications
The lack of an effect of the anchor on conceptually related case attributes is at first glance
puzzling because the sentencing judgment, regardless of the mechanism that produced it, could
have been used as the basis for these other judgments. For example, a willingness to serve a
maximum of 7 months in jail after exposure to the high anchor, relative to 3 months if exposed to
the low anchor, could activate stereotype-consistent information about the type of crime warranting
longer sentences (e.g., the more severe kind) or the type of evidence necessary to prosecute this
type of crime (e.g., more aggravating, less mitigating). Alternatively, lacking specific domain
knowledge pertaining to plea negotiations, mock defendants perhaps had varying interpretations of
what a higher sentence may or may not communicate about how the prosecutor or other relevant
legal actors (such as the judge or jury) might perceive the case. For example, defendants who
consider a particular sentence to be very severe might interpret the severity of that sentence as
indicating either something disadvantageous about their case — causing them to focus on the
aggravating factors (e.g., “This sentence is very harsh; The prosecutor must consider this a
particularly severe offense; they must have enough aggravating evidence in their favor to
prosecute”) — or as something advantageous — causing them to focus on the mitigating factors (e.g.,

107

“This sentence is too harsh for the crime; the pedestrian sustained only a minor injury and so the
offense was not too severe; I think the jury will see that”).
Another possible source of variance in interpretations, which is orthogonal to whether the
sentence communicates something positive or negative, is the type of attribution assigned to the
prosecutors’ behavior (Jones & Davis, 1965): namely, defendants may make an external attribution
about the source of the severe sentence (e.g., “This maximum is part of the prosecutors’ scare
tactic”) instead of (or in addition to) the expected internal attribution. One mock defendant in
Study 3 who regarded the 48-month threatened sentence as particularly egregious went on to
speculate that the prosecutors’ intent in charging so severely was related more to his or her
personal motives or to sexism than to the defendants’ case:
Defendant-292: “Must be an election year . . . does the prosecutor want me to
make an anonymous donation to his reelection campaign?” and “I think the
prosecutor's bluffing. I think he's trying to take advantage of you [mock attorney],
because you're a young woman and he's trying to bully you.”
These interpretations may vary systematically (e.g., based on peoples’ views on the fairness
of the criminal justice system) or non-systematically. The lack of a consistent effect of the anchor
on evidence discussed or judgments of the evidence may reflect greater random error in
evaluations due to defendants’ lack of expertise. One could argue for a different set of predictions
for anchoring that occurs among experts who have domain-knowledge. For example, a sentence
disproportionately severe relative to their clients’ alleged misconduct might signal a more limited
set of positive or negative (and internal or external) possibilities to an experienced plea negotiator
(e.g., “The standard sentence for a DUI is X, because this sentence is significantly greater than that,
the prosecutor must be bluffing”).29

Even legal professionals inexperienced with plea negotiations can use their limited domain knowledge to infer
“implicit[ly] coercion” of large sentences, as one mock attorney from Study 3 did: “48 months exists as a strong scare
29
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More practically, the finding that the magnitude of the threatened trial sentence did not
influence legal decision-makers’ perceptions of the case evidence is a positive one given the
extensive body of research, including studies using self-report, experimental, and archival methods,
demonstrating the influence of perceived evidence strength on defendants’ (e.g., Champion, 1989;
Peterson-Badali & Abramovitch, 1993; Viljoen et al., 2005), defense attorneys’, prosecutors’, and
judges’ plea decisions (e.g., Bushway et al., 2014; Kramer et al., 2007; Kutateladze et al., 2015;
McAllister, 1990; Pezdek & O’Brien, 2014; Redlich et al., 2016). Scholars have long claimed that
overcharging coerces defendants into accepting plea offers they might not otherwise accept. This
work demonstrates that exceedingly large sentences did not differentially influence defendants’
perceptions of many of the fundamental factors involved in the plea decision-making process —
including the probability of conviction or the perceived strength of the evidence; instead, excessive
sentences may have led defendants’ more comfortable with accepting larger sentences rather than
risk a longer sentence if convicted at trial.

Procedurally Unjust Plea Bargains
It is procedurally unjust that defendants threatened with higher sentences — holding nearly
everything else about the case constant — may encounter a form of pragmatic representation from
their attorneys that includes ignoring perceived innocence and a decreased willingness to allocate
resources and time to their case. It is the height of irony then that excessive sentence can cause
mock defendants and their attorneys to accept and recommend plea offers they might not
otherwise agree to, all while judging the plea deal as fairer and more lenient. One hopeful finding
is that though mock defendants and attorneys anchored on a higher maximum sentence regarded

tactic to prevent someone who might have great or even not great mitigating facts to share to exercise their
constitutional right to go to trial.”
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the offer as fairer, their overall perceptions of the plea offer was that it was more unfair than it was
fair.
A broader inquiry into the defendants’ perceptions of the overall fairness of the process
and the outcome were outside the scope of the current work. But the extent to which defendants
feel coerced during plea negotiations could have important consequences for their willingness to
obey the law in the future and for their perceptions of the legitimacy of the justice system, including
its legal actors and rulings (see Hollander-Blumhoff & Tyler, 1997). Overcharging is a threat to that
legitimacy — particularly when the outcome is the reduction of a defendants’ autonomy to seek
legal counsel, to argue their case, and ultimately to exert their right to trial. Indeed, attorneys
tended to agree (although not as vehemently as might be expected) that overcharging constitutes a
form of prosecutorial misconduct and estimated that a third of cases of they handled involved
some form of misconduct, more broadly defined.
One interesting question future research to examine is whether informing defendants (and
reminding their legal advocates) about the various acts of prosecutorial discretion and misconduct
with regard to plea bargaining influences their plea judgments and decisions. Recent work
examining lay peoples’ procedural justice perceptions of various aspects of plea bargains
preliminary shows that at least third-party outsiders tend to be more influenced by case-relevant
factors (e.g., evidence strength, sentence severity) than procedural aspects of the case (e.g., the
coerciveness of the plea situation) (Khogali et al., 2018). It would be of interest to demonstrate
whether the same is true of defendants.
Prosecutorial overcharging undermines the perceived legitimacy and confidence in the
fairness of the justice system. To preserve defendants’ rights to fair adjudication, district attorney
offices should heed the advice of advocates who have proposed ways for increasing the procedural
justice of plea bargaining for defendants including using objective criteria to make and respond to
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plea offers, explaining plea offers, considering the defendants’ arguments, and avoiding “highpressure tactics that show disrespect for defendants’ legal rights” (see O’Hear, 2008, p. 468).
Limitations and Future Directions for Research
For all the benefits that tightly controlled experiments confer, they are not without
limitations, the present research included. Several methodological choices enabled a clearer test of
the hypothesis that anchor-exposed people selectively retrieve and discuss information from
memory. Across all studies, participants were prevented from taking notes while reading case
materials and were not allowed to review the case after exposure to the anchor. One limitation of
this restriction is that it placed the burden of demonstrating confirmatory testing on appropriate
encoding of the information therefore preventing examination of other forms confirmatory
hypothesis testing that do not rely on selective memory retrieval. Even though the most memorable
and relevant arguments were selected for inclusion in case materials based on pre-testing, even
after pooling their shared knowledge, Study 3 dyads only discussed, on average, 28% (5.38 of 19)
of the provided case evidence. Hence, despite extensive data quality checks it is possible that Study
1 participants paid even less attention to the case materials than Study 3 participants who were
expecting to engage in a conversation over the materials. The opportunity to refer back to the case
materials would have enabled participants seeking evidence contradicting the appropriateness of
the trial sentence to locate further anchor-inconsistent evidence. The ability to rely on external
sources of information coupled with the directives of the process accountability manipulation
could have also enabled participants to obtain a more holistic and unbiased interpretation of the
case facts because in their search for disconfirmatory evidence they may have also encountered
more confirmatory evidence.
Another methodological choice of import concerns the ordering of the accountability
manipulation. It is possible that learning they would have to justify their decisions prior to reading
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the materials would have enhanced the effect of this manipulation by also increasing motivation to
encode the information, ultimately increasing the amount of information available for retrieval.
Thus, though accountable dyads spent more time (M = 7.45 mins, SD = 4.22) discussing the case
prior to rendering a sentencing judgment than unaccountable dyads ( M = 4.86 mins, SD = 3.72),
the fact that process accountable dyads discussed, on average, just 1 more piece of evidence
suggests they could have benefitted from better encoding of the information. Prior work
demonstrates that motivation at time of retrieval is significantly less important for enhancing
retrieval than motivation at time of encoding (Kassam et al. 2009). Placing the accountability
manipulation earlier in the memorial process would have prevented an examination of biased

retrieval of information. For example, accountable dyads may have become so oriented toward the
goal of processing information holistically that they would have been invulnerable to the anchoring
effect for reasons unrelated to selective retrieval. Though this ordering would not have been a good
test of whether selective retrieval causes the anchoring effect, it may have been a better test of
whether earlier accountability prevents the anchoring effect on the front-end of the encoding stage.
Third, in the anchoring on legal decision-making literature, as in the current studies,
presentation of the anchor routinely follows participants’ reading of the case materials. This
ordering choice makes ecological sense for studies with mock defendant samples insofar it is highly
unlikely that real defendants would have knowledge of the maximum trial sentence for a DUI

prior to experiencing and acquiring knowledge of the event (and specifically of a sentence
corresponding to a charge that exceeds their misconduct, unless they are repeat offenders).
Similarly, attorneys likely also review the basic facts of their clients’ case prior to beginning
negotiations with the prosecutor and learning the charges and corresponding sentence on which
they may wish to indict the defendant. But there are situations in the real world in which awareness
of the anchor precedes knowledge of the case facts such as when the relevant ‘advisory’ sentencing
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guidelines are known. Such situations lend themselves to the interesting possibility that awareness
of the anchor prior to knowledge of the case facts may have a differential impact on the way facts
are processed: for example, one possibility is that learning that a prosecutor has decided, in good
faith, that a higher charge is appropriate for a certain case might have the effect of enhancing the
anchoring bias, perhaps even extending its influence to perceptions of related case attributes.
Another possibility is that attorneys who have ample time and are knowledgeable of the sentence
typically imposed on DUIs may use the anchor to process the case information more holistically,
using their knowledge and expertise to locate the confirmatory and disconfirmatory information
from the onset.
Despite converging results across different samples of mock defendants, law students, and
real criminal defense attorneys, reasonable concerns over the generalizability of these findings to
the real world remain. Participants in the current studies were tasked with imagining themselves as
defendants and attorneys rendering hypothetical plea decisions in a contrived experimental setting
instead of in a criminal setting where decisions lead to high-stakes consequences. For example, this
includes the simulated plea negotiations in Study 3, which involved law students with limited legal
expertise interacting with a mock defendant over Zoom — a situation that undoubtedly differs from
real-world plea negotiations with trained criminal defense attorneys (though the Zoom setting is
likely similar and better than pay-by-the-minute jailhouse calls). Law students, nearly half of whom
in their first year of law school and were average younger than their clients, were nonetheless highly
engaged and perceived positively by their mock clients who rated them as competent, trustworthy,
and well-prepared. Though it could be argued that even more advanced law students are not legal
professionals, their self-selection into the field, legal training and experiences (e.g., internships and
defense clinics), and criminal procedures courses makes them a viable alternative for empirical
legal decision-making studies (for similar point see Bystranowski et al., 2021). After all, the current
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work demonstrates that real practicing attorneys were no less vulnerable to the anchoring bias than
mock attorney-client pairs and a recent meta-analysis similarly did not observe any significant
differences in anchoring effect sizes among legal and lay samples (Bystranowski et al., 2021).
Several other indicators also argue for the internal and external validity of these results and
particularly of Studies 2 and 3, including the high perceived realism of the situation and the task
across studies, the access to rich evidence-heavy case materials, the length of the joint discussions
of (~11 minutes, on average), and the level of expertise of defense attorneys (~15 years, on
average). With regard to mock defendants’ engagement with the task, spontaneous mentions of
collateral consequences, measures of verbal distance, and anecdotal statements made by
defendants suggest that participants at least approached the task in good faith:
Defendant-164: “It's interesting because once its yourself, you're like ‘wait that's too
much.’ But if [it’s] somebody else you think, ‘yeah you need to be in jail, so we can
stop this problem on the streets.’ So, I’m going to say that I believe it’s [the
maximum sentence] appropriate for me. Because I did do what it says.”
Another seeming limitation may be the limited time participants were engaged with the
plea simulation (e.g., Study 3: Median = 39 minutes). Though it is true that in real-world criminal
proceedings, defendants and their attorneys may have more time to consider the factors relevant to
the plea decision than was allotted in the current study, the added time may not be that much
longer. Field data suggest that defendants do not always have sufficient time to confer with their
attorneys about plea offers. In one sample, NYC felons who submitted a guilty plea reported a
modal number of 3 meetings with their attorneys; 28.6% of defendants reported having less than
an hour to make their plea decision (Zottoli et al., 2016) — a result in line with reports of timelimited, “exploding” offers (see Zottoli et al. 2019).
Time-pressured or just time-limited (as in the current study) defendants may evaluate
anchor-relevant information less thoughtfully. But whether having more or less time would lead to
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a different outcome — one less dependent on the anchor remains to be seen. More time alone may
not suffice to decrease the anchoring bias. Thinking more about the judgment under consideration
does not decrease the anchoring effect, likely because it increases the amount of anchor-consistent
information people access (Brewer et al., 2007; Chapman & Johnson, 1999; Tversky &
Kahneman, 1974; Wilson et al., 1996). Instead, opportunities to specifically consider
disconfirmatory evidence are necessary as in Study 2 of the present research.
Finally, although the current study focused on the plea decisions of primarily culpable
defendants, all defendants, regardless of factual innocence or guilt, may be susceptible to
excessively large trial penalties that enable coercively enticing plea discounts (Schneider & Zottoli,
2018). Since the inception of plea bargaining the courts have recognized the potential for innocents
to falsely plead guilty (State v. Kaufman, 1879). There is now ample evidence to suggest that this
potential is reality: the Innocence Project (2019) and National Registry of Exonerations (2019)
have exonerated innocent defendants who falsely plead guilty to crimes ranging from drug
possession and distribution to child sex crimes and homicide.
But to what extent threatening trial sentences, in the absence of plea discounts, anchor
innocent relative to guilty defendants via the mechanisms described here merits its own empirical
inquiry. For example, innocent defendants will naturally enter plea negotiations with the highly
compelling competing self-generated anchor of desiring no punishment and are thus more likely to
engage even more deeply in an intrinsically motivated search for disconfirming evidence when
facing excessively self-threatening trial sentences.
Research suggests that a defendants’ claims of innocence may nonetheless do little to
mitigate their attorneys’ susceptibility to anchoring biases. Other work using hypothetical scenarios
suggests that attorneys disregard actual culpability, instead basing their recommendations primarily
on the strength of the evidence and estimated probability of conviction at trial (Hellgren & Kassin,
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2020; Kramer et al. 2017; McAllister & Bregman, 1986). Helm et al. (2018) found that 78% of
surveyed defense attorneys believed there were cases when innocents should accept a guilty plea
for a crime they did not commit, and 89% reported having purposefully advised an innocent client
to plead guilty. Thus, future work will need to examine whether and, if so, how anchoring biases
influence plea decision making in cases involving innocent defendants.
Conclusion
Recent years have seen a rise in efforts to bring public awareness to the issue of coercive
plea bargaining. Simultaneously, the psychological field, and the social sciences more broadly, have
begun to consider the ways in which its vast accumulation of theoretical insights can enhance our
understanding of what are the structural issues that make pleas so coercive and that lead to
inequitable outcomes for different legal stakeholders. Since at least the 1960s, overcharging has
been deployed in a manner intended to coerce defendants into accepting plea offers (Alschuler,
1968). Though legal scholars have implicated the anchoring effect of overcharging a likely culprit
in defendant trial waiver decisions, no prior work has explicitly examined how anchoring might
exert its influence in this domain.
Toward that end, I tested two pathways to judgmental anchoring: thoughtful, high
elaboration processes and relatively less thoughtful, low elaboration processes. Both pathways were
hypothesized to lead to superficially similar sentencing decisions and plea decisions insofar as key
pieces of information could be disregarded whether people engage in selective information
processing or highly limited processing. But where they diverge is in the long-term consequences.
Results from this study suggest that legal decision-makers’ perceptions of the case are not biased by
the threatened trial sentence. This means they are not confidently choosing one plea outcome over
another because they have come to a biased interpretation of their or their clients’ case. Instead,
decision-makers are choosing the outcome that conforms with their biased expectations for an
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appropriate maximum sentence. These results further suggest that if sentencing judgments
becomes biased by excessively threatening trial sentences, the cascading effects of these biased
judgment on plea recommendations and decisions may lead to the coercion of defendants’ trial
waiver decisions.
Critics of the coercive impact of overcharging have recommend policies that ensure that
charges actually correspond to offenders’ alleged misconduct(s) (e.g., Brown, 2012; Bureau of
Justice Assistance, 2011; Wright & Miller, 2002). For example, Fair and Just Prosecution, a
national network of prosecutors aiming toward merciful and pragmatic criminal justice reform, coauthored a report in 2019, 21 Principles for the 21st Century Prosecutor, in which they outline
concrete steps that elected prosecutors should take to avoid overcharging. Indeed, some DAs have
begun to take such measures: Seattle Prosecuting Attorney Dan Satterberg’s newly introduced
charging standards are aimed toward ensuring proportionality between punishment and
misconduct by avoiding overcharging (as cited in FJP, 2019).
In the absence of structural court-mandated solutions, it is clear that District Attorney
offices can adopt their own office-wide policies that ensure that threatened trial charges reflect the
factual basis of the case, and that defendants are empowered to make decisions knowingly,
intelligently, and voluntarily. The current thesis supports claims regarding the biasing and coercive
effect of overcharging on the “will” of defendants, as well as calls to change institutionally coercive
charging policies. For the immediate future, the current results serve as a warning sign to attorneys
about the dangers of anchoring biases elicited via threatened trial sentences and offer defense
attorneys a low-cost easily implemented solution in which they and their defendants consider the
case circumstances that list the reasons that contradict the threatened sentence in a more deliberate
manner. Such a practice could easily be incorporated into internal office policies. Whereas lack of
access to pre-trial discovery represents a very real barrier to defendant and attorney access to case-
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relevant evidence, inaccessibility caused by cognitive heuristics do not require extensive legislation
to correct for.
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APPENDIX A: HYPOTHETICAL PLEA DESCRIPTION AND CRIMINAL LEGAL CODE
The scenario below was nearly identical across all three studies. Attorneys read a version
that depicted a gender-neutral defendant (“your client”) in Study 3 or a male defendant (“Sam
Peck”) in Study 2. The spacing below resembles the original spacing viewed by participants in
Studies 1 and 2, though the scenario was presented as a few sentences across 6 pages participants
had to click through. Study 2 attorneys received a bullet-point version of this scenario (see here:
https://osf.io/ajcmy/).
Instructions. Imagine that you are a defendant in a criminal case charged with a felony DUI
(driving under the influence of alcohol). After speaking with your attorney, you will have the option
to go to trial or to plead guilty.
Background Case Information
On the evening of November 12th, 2019, you met up with friends for a birthday celebration. You
had a couple of beers and some celebratory shots. This wasn’t unusual for you, since you consume
alcohol in excess on a regular basis.
Out of concern, your friends suggested that you probably should not drive. You shrugged off the
suggestion that you call a cab because you didn't want to have to return to pick up your car the next
morning.
On the ride home, it unexpectedly began to rain, making the roads slippery and icy. While driving,
you made an unsafe lane change.
Since you had been in a car accident once before, one of your friends was concerned and
messaged you to check if you were home safe yet. You texted your friend back to let her know you
were not home yet. After, to be cautious, you drove slowly—well below the speed limit.
Not paying attention to the road, you ran a stop sign. Suddenly, you hit a pothole in the road,
causing your car swerve. Your car jumped the curb and hit a pedestrian.
You stopped and saw the pedestrian, a young woman, laying a few feet away. Her companion was
on the phone with 911 giving the location and requesting an ambulance. Shocked, you remained
on the scene waiting for the police and an ambulance which soon arrived.
The pedestrian was placed on a gurney and taken to Liberty Memorial Medical Hospital nearby. A
paramedic let you know that the pedestrian had only a minor injury, a sprained ankle.
An officer approached you and asked for your license and registration. He noticed that you were
just a kid—a 22-year-old college student from out of town.
The officer also noted the precise location, the direction you were travelling, and the weather and
road conditions.
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Suspecting alcohol, one of the officers gave you field sobriety tests, making you recite the alphabet,
stand on one leg, and touch your nose with one finger. He shined a flashlight in your eyes and
made you look left and right.
Though you passed the sobriety tests, because you had hit a pedestrian, the officer gave you a
Breathalyzer test.
The test reported that your blood alcohol content (BAC) was .087, only slightly above the legal
limit of .08 and well within the margin of error.
Even so, you were arrested and taken to the station.
At the station you were booked, photographed, stripped of your possessions except for your
clothing and put into a jail cell.
The police ran a check on your criminal history and found that you had no prior DUI convictions
or felonies. He also found that you had previously received a speeding ticket. Unable to pay for
that speeding ticket, your license had been suspended. Thus, you were driving with a suspended
license at the time of the current accident.
After the arresting officer completed his paperwork, documenting the arrest and his investigation,
he delivered this report to District Attorney.
The DA charged you with a felony DUI (driving under the influence).
After, an officer told you that your bail had been set and that you were allowed to make a phone
call.
You called your mother who came down to the station and posted your bail. You promised
yourself and your mother to get help for your alcohol use addiction when this was over.
You were given a summons to appear in court next week and were instructed to contact the public
defender's office.
The Present Situation
You receive a call from your public defender, Paula Laney. During your conversation, she informs
you that when deciding what an appropriate penalty will be, a court will consider any arguments or
circumstances that may be relevant to the specific case.
Some details, known as aggravating circumstances, may cause the court to decide that a harsher
criminal penalty is necessary. Others, known as mitigating circumstances, may cause the court to
reduce the penalty that is imposed.
Your attorney tells you she will represent you at your sentencing hearing and fight to reduce the
consequences of your conviction by highlighting mitigating circumstances and contesting any
aggravating circumstances that may be asserted by the state.
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After asking you several questions about the circumstances of your case, your attorney tells you that
she will talk with the district attorney handling your case and see what she can do for you.
Arizona Revised Statutes Title 28. Transportation §28-1381 (Driving or actual physical control
while under the influence)
Section 28-1381 of the Arizona Revised Statutes defines the law governing drunk driving laws in
the state of Arizona. According to this primary statute, the maximum blood alcohol level allowed
for driving in Arizona is 0.08%. Anyone caught driving with this or a higher level of BAC will be
arrested under the suspicion of driving under the influence.
In the state of Arizona, both drunk driving is against the law and may be charged with a
misdemeanor of driving under the influence. However, if their BAC level comes out between 0.05
and 0.08%, they may or may not be charged for a DUI, depending on the supporting evidences of
guilt.
Arizona Revised Statutes Title 28. Transportation §28-1383
A person can be charged with Aggravated DUI if the DUI was committed with an invalid,
suspended, or revoked driver’s license, or if the DUI was committed with a minor in the vehicle,
or if the DUI resulted in property damage, injury, or death. An aggravated DUI is considered a
felony in Arizona.
A DUI conviction under Arizona law, whether a misdemeanor or a felony, carries a number of
possible penalties.
• A jail or prison sentence
• Probation
• Community service
• Fines, surcharges and assessments
• Completion of an alcohol or drug screening program
• Mandatory Alcohol classes
• Temporary license suspension
• Once the driver’s license is reinstated, it is followed by temporary, but mandatory
installation of a small handheld car breathalyzer device that measures the amount of
alcohol in the user’s breath (known as an Ignition Interlock Device)
• Mandatory purchase of SR-22 Car Insurance Policy
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APPENDIX B: PERCEIVED REALISM SCALE
Participants rated their agreement with each statement below on a 7-point Likert scale (1 = strongly
disagree, 4 = neither agree nor disagree, 7 = strongly agree).
Realism1. It was easy for me to imagine myself in this hypothetical plea scenario.
Realism2. I could easily imagine how I might behave if ever found myself in that situation.
Realism3. I had the idea that the scenario was unrealistic (reverse-scored).
Realism4. The situation described in the hypothetical plea scenario was realistic.
Realism5. It was difficult for me to imagine anyone in this situation (reverse-scored).
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APPENDIX C. LIST OF AGGRAVATING AND MITIGATING ARGUMENTS
Item
Agg 1
Agg 2

Statement
You had a couple of beers and some celebratory shots.
You consume alcohol in excess on a regular basis.
Your friends suggested that you probably should not drive. You shrugged off the
Agg 3
suggestion that you call a cab
Agg 4
While driving, you made an unsafe lane change.
Agg 5
You had been in a car accident once before.
Agg 6
You texted your friend back to let her know you were not home yet.
Agg 7
Not paying attention to the road, you ran a stop sign.
Agg 8
Your car jumped the curb and you hit a pedestrian.
Agg 9
You had previously received a speeding ticket.
Unable to pay for a prior speeding ticket, your license had been suspended.
Thus, you were driving with a suspended license at the time of the current
Agg 10
accident.
Mit 1*
You are a 22-year-old college student.
Mit 2
It unexpectedly began to rain, making the roads slippery and icy.
Mit 3
After, to be cautious, you drove slowly—well below the speed limit.
Mit 4*
Suddenly, you hit a pothole in the road, causing your car to swerve.
Shocked, you remained on the scene waiting for the police and an ambulance to
Mit 5
arrive.
Mit 6*
The pedestrian suffered only a minor injury, a sprained ankle.
Mit 7
You passed the sobriety tests.
Mit 8
You had no prior DUI or felony convictions
Your blood alcohol content (BAC) was .087, only slightly above the legal limit of
Mit 9*
.08 and well within the margin of error.
You promised yourself and your mother to get help for your alcohol use
Mit 10* addiction when this was over.
Note. Agg = Aggravating item; Mit = Mitigating item. Astericks denote items not included in
Study 1 5-item composite scale. Exact wording of statements varied slightly between pilot
studies and the final study. This table shows the final wording.
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APPENDIX D: AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION’S CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS
FOR THE DEFENSE FUNCTION
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APPENDIX E: ACCOUNTABILITY MANIPULATION MEMOS
Process Accountable Condition:
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Process Unaccountable Condition:
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APPENDIX F: PERCEPTIONS OF MOCK ATTORNEY
Participants in Study 3 rated their agreement with each statement below on a 7-point Likert scale (1
= strongly disagree, 4 = neither agree nor disagree, 7 = strongly agree).
“My client would say that as their defense attorney I . . .”
…was trustworthy.
…was aggressive and/or competitive.
…was competent.
…was inventive.
…had their best interest in mind.
…used effective problem-solving strategies.
…talked past them. (Reverse-scored)
…asked a lot of questions.
…was well-prepared to defend them.
…cared about understanding their point of view.
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APPENDIX G: PROCESS ACCOUNTABILITY MANIPULATION CHECK
Some scale items below were adapted from de Wilde et al. (2018) and Sholten et al. (2007), others
were based on Lerner and Tetlock’s (1999) review and pre-tested prior to inclusion (n = 23). All
Study 3 participants rated their agreement with the following statements presented in a randomized
order using a 7-point Likert scale: (1 = strongly disagree, 4 = neither agree nor disagree, 7 =
strongly agree). Asterisks denote items that were included in the final scale (α = .68 [0.63, 0.72]).
Motivation to process information systematically (5 items)
*During the group discussion, we weighed all the pros and cons thoroughly and in a
balanced way before making a decision.
*During the group discussion, we tried to discuss all the circumstances and the evidence
relevant to the case.
During the discussion we made decisions based on intuition and gut-feelings. (Reversescored).
*During the discussion, making our decisions very quickly and efficiently was more
important than thinking through every option. (Reverse-scored)
*During the discussion to not delay the progress of the discussion I sometimes supported
things, even though I did not really agree. (Reverse-scored)
Outcome accountability (2 items)
At the end of the study, we will have to account for how we arrived at our judgments, not
the actual judgments and decisions we made.
After the group discussion we will have to explain the actual decisions we made, and not
the way we arrived at those judgments. (Reverse-scored)
Manipulation Stimulus Attention Check
The memo we read indicated that:
[ ] We (both participants) would have to meet with a legal decision-making expert over
Zoom at a date of my choosing after today's session.
[ ] I would have to answer questions about my past financial investments.
[ ] Our group discussion and decisions would be completely private, anonymous, and
confidential from even the researchers.
If you answered “yes” to the previous question, please indicate on the scale below how strongly you
expect you will have to justify your decision-making strategies to a legal decision-making expert and
a psychologist. (1 = “Definitely do NOT expect to have to justify my strategies” to 9 = “Definitely
DO expect to have to justify my strategies”)
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Table 1.

Overview of the Present Studies
Sample size
Study &
Registration

Prior to Final
exclusions

Design

Main measures

Pilot 1
Survey:
https://osf.io/h53k9/

42

42

• Arguments
Generated

169

84

• Memorability,
Relevance, Ease of
Imagining, Evidence
Strength

102

87

2 (Judgmental
Relevance: Self vs.
Other) betweensubjects

120

80

2 (Anchor: High vs.
• Maximum
Moderate) X
Acceptable Sentence
2 (Relevance: Relevant • Plea Decision
vs. Irrelevant) betweensubjects factorial

667

479

2 (Anchor: 24-months, • Maximum
4-months) X
Acceptable Sentence
2 (Informational
• Perceptions of the
Relevance: Relevant,
Evidence
Irrelevant) between• Plea Decision
subjects factorial

209

155

2 (Anchor: 24-months, • Maximum
8-months) X 2
Acceptable Sentence
(Consider-the• Number of AnchorOpposite Anchors
Inconsistent

Pilot 2
Survey:
https://osf.io/kh26a/

Pilot 3
Survey:
https://osf.io/j3mez/

• Unbiased Sentencing
Estimated

Pilot 4
Survey:
https://osf.io/byzrq/

Study 1
Hypotheses, Sample,
Exclusion, Analyses,
Code
https://osf.io/6ng2m

Study 2
Hypotheses, Sample,
Exclusion, Analyses,
Code
https://osf.io/y3p2e/
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Strategy: Pre, Post)
mixed design subjects

Arguments
Generated
• Plea Decision

Study 3
Hypotheses, Sample, 548
Exclusion, Analyses, (274
Code
dyads)
https://osf.io/d5wt8

530
2 (Anchor: 48-months,
(265
8-months) X
dyads) 2 (Process
Accountability:
Accountable,
Unaccountable)
between-subjects
factorial
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• Maximum
Acceptable Sentence
• Plea Decision
• Perceptions of the
Evidence
• Number of
arguments discussed

132

133
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Table 4.

Study 1 Negative Binomial Regression Model Results for the Effect of Anchor and Relevance
on Maximum Acceptable Sentences
IRR 95% CI for
b
95% CI for SE
z
df
p
R2
IRR
b
Model 1
Intercept

8.17 7.19 – 9.31

2.10

2.21, 2.67

0.07

32.30

476

< .001

Anchora

0.50 0.43 – 0.58

-0.69

-0.84, -0.54

0.08

-8.93

476

< .001

Relevanceb

0.90 0.78 – 1.05

-0.10

-0.26, 0.04

0.08

-1.32

476

.188

Intercept

7.75 6.71 – 8.98

2.05

1.90, 2.19

.07

27.58

475

< .001

Anchor

0.56 0.45 – 0.69

-0.58

-0.79, -0.37

.11

-5.40

475

< .001

Relevance

1.00 0.82 – 1.23

0.002

-0.20, 0.20

.10

0.02

475

0.99

.22

Model 2
.22

Anchor X 0.80 0.59 – 1.08 -0.23 -0.53, 0.08
.15 -1.47 475
.141
Relevance
Note. CI = Confidence interval; IRR = Incidence Rate Ratio; R2 = bias-adjusted Nagelkerke effect
size. aAnchor = High = 0 vs. Moderate = 1. b Relevance = Relevant = 0 vs. Irrelevant = 1.
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Table 5.

Study 1 Logistic Regression Predicting Likelihood of Final Plea Decision Based on Anchor and
Relevance
Wald df
p
Odds
95% CI for
Overall
B
SE
z

Ratio

Odds Ratio
Lower Upper

Model Fit

Model 1
Intercept
-1.651
.212
-7.8 476 <.001 0.19
0.12
0.29 χ2(1) = 5.6,
Anchor
0.552 0.234 2.36 476
.018 1.74
1.10
2.76
p = .018
Relevance
-0.094 0.231 -0.41 476
.684 0.91
0.58
1.43
Model 2
Intercept
-1.59
0.25 -6.48 475 <.001
0.2
0.12
0.32 χ2(1) = 1.9,
Anchor
0.45
0.32 1.39 475
.17
1.6
0.84
2.98
p = .17
Relevance
-0.22
0.36 -0.62 475
.54
0.8
0.39
1.62
Anchor X
0.22
0.47 0.47 475
.64
1.2
0.5
3.13
Relevance
Note. CI = Confidence interval; IRR = Incidence Rate Ratio; R2 = bias-adjusted Nagelkerke effect
size. aAnchor = High = 0 vs. Moderate = 1. bRelevance = Relevant = 0 vs. Irrelevant = 1.
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Table 6.

Study 1 Linear Regression Model Results for the Effect of Anchor and Relevance on Perceptions
of the Mitigating Evidence
b
95% CI
SE
t
df
p
Single-Item Measure
Model 1
Intercept
4.15
3.90, 4.41
0.13
31.81
476
< .001
Anchor
-0.18
-0.47, 0.12
0.15
-1.17
476
.242
Relevance
-0.21
-0.50 0.085
0.14
-1.40
476
.163
Model 2
Intercept
4.08
3.79, 4.38
0.15
27.04
475
< .001
Anchor
-0.04
-0.46, 0.37
0.21
0.21
475
.833
Relevance
-0.08
-0.49, 0.34
0.21
-0.36
475
.719
Anchor X Relevance
-0.27
-0.86, 0.32
0.30
-0.89
475
.37
Composite Scale
Model 1
Intercept
1.44
1.32, 1.55
0.06
24.09
476
< .001
Anchor
-0.09 -0.23, 0.041
0.07
-1.37
476
.172
Relevance
-0.06
-0.19, 0.08
0.07
-0.81
476
.418
Model 2
Intercept
1.49
1.35, 1.62
0.07
21.59
475
< .001
Anchor
-0.19
-0.38, -0.01
0.1
-2.02
475
.04
Relevance
-0.15
-0.35, 0.03
0.1
-1.62
475
.10
Anchor X Relevance
0.20
-0.07, 0.47
0.14
1.49
475
.14
Note. Single-item measure analyses used the measure completed prior to rendering a plea
decision, whereas composite measure analyses used the 5-item mitigating composite scales
completed after rendering a plea decision.
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Table 7.

Study 1 Linear Regression Model Results for the Effect of Anchor and Relevance on Perceptions
of the Aggravating Evidence
b
95% CI
SE
t
df
p
Single-Item Measure
Model 1
Intercept
5.07
4.83, 5.30
0.12
43.30
476
< .001
Anchor
-0.02
-0.28, 0.25
0.13
-0.12
476
0.907
Relevance
0.06
-0.20, 0.32
0.13
0.45
476
0.656
Model 2
Intercept
5.13
4.86, 5.39
0.14
37.82
475
< .001
Anchor
-0.13 -0.450, 0.24
0.19
-0.67
475
.50
Relevance
-0.05
-0.43, 0.32
0.19
-0.28
475
.78
Anchor X Relevance
0.23
-0.30, 0.75
0.27
0.84
475
.40
Composite Scale
Model 1
Intercept
1.48
1.37, 1.60
0.06
25.03
476
< .001
Anchor
-0.10
-0.23, 0.04
0.07
-1.41
476
.16
Relevance
0.01
-0.12, 0.15
0.07
0.19
476
.85
Model 2
Intercept
1.45
1.32, 1.59
0.07
21.18
475
<.001
Anchor
-0.04
-0.23, 0.15
0.1
-0.4
475
.69
Relevance
0.07
-0.11, 0.26
.01
0.73
475
.46
Anchor X Relevance
-0.12
-0.38, 0.15
.14
-0.86
475
.39
Note. Single-item measure analyses used the measure completed prior to rendering a plea
decision, whereas composite measure analyses used the 10-item aggravating composite scale
completed after rendering a plea decision.
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Table 8.

Study 1 Linear Model Results for the Effect of Relevance and Anchor on Related Case
Attributes
b
95% CI
SE
t
df
p
Severity
Intercept
5.09
4.90, 5.29
0.10
50.97
476
< .001
Anchor
-0.16
-0.39, 0.07 0.12
-1.37
476
.17
Relevance
0.014
-0.21, 0.24 0.12
0.12
476
.91
Estimated Likelihood
of Conviction
Intercept
73.24 70.03, 76.47 1.64
44.74
476
< .001
Anchor
0.96
-2.82, 4.75 1.92
0.50
476
.62
Relevance
1.95
-1.83, 5.73 1.93
1.01
476
.31
Leniency
Intercept
5.22
4.98, 5.46
0.13
41.71
476
< .001
Anchor
-0.44 -0.73, -0.15 0.15
-2.99
476
.003
Relevance
0.04
-0.25, 0.33 0.15
0.27
476
.78
Fairness
Intercept
5.38
5.07, 5.60
.12
43.47
476
< .001
Anchor
-0.36 -0.64, -0.07
.14
-2.48
476
.013
Relevance
-0.03
-0.32, 0.25
.14
-0.24
476
.81
a
b
Note. CI = Confidence interval. Anchor = High = 0 vs. Moderate = 1. Relevance = Relevant
= 0 vs. Irrelevant = 1.
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Table 9.

Study 2 Percentage of Comparative Judgments by Condition.

Very Lenient
Lenient
Appropriate
Harsh
Very Harsh

High Anchor
(24 months)
0
0
4.8
20.12
65.1

Moderate Anchor
(6 months)
5.5
9.72
19.44
31.94
33.33
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Table 10.

Study 2 Descriptive Statistics and Correlations.
Variables
M
SD
1. Plea Decision
2. Sentence b
3. Arguments
4. Attorneyc
5. Experience (Years)
6. Cases Handled
7. Dismissed Cases (%)
8. Plea Cases (%)
9. Trial Cases (%)
10. Prosecutorial
Misconduct (%)
11. Age
12. Genderd
a

1

n

0.55
2.91
5.33
0.68
15.63
5566
21.25
72.58
5.39
33.78

0.50
3.35
2.62
0.47
13.29
23814
18.99
19.23
5.99
28.58

155
155
155
155
155
146
155
155
155
138

44.06
0.85

13.33
3.53

154
153

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

1. Plea Decision
-2. Sentence
3. Arguments
-0.49***
4. Attorney
0.02
-0.00
5. Experience (Years) -0.01 -0.03 0.05
6. Cases Handled
-0.05 -0.05 0.07 -0.11
7. Dismissed Cases (%) 0.09
-0.06 0.11 -0.04 0.11
8. Plea Cases (%)
0.02
-0.05 0.06 -0.09 -0.23* 0.05
9. Trial Cases (%)
0.05
0.00 -0.05 0.01 0.12 0.00 -0.86***
10. Prosecutorial
-0.09 0.16 -0.07 0.26** 0.10 -0.14 -0.22* -0.06
Misconduct (%)
11. Age
0.15
-0.03 0.05 0.01 -0.13 0.04 0.12
-0.05 -0.08
***
*
12. Gender
-0.07 -0.07 0.07 -0.12 0.95 0.09 -0.18 0.07 0.08 -0.16 -0.09
a
Accept plea deal = 0 and Reject plea deal = 1. b Pre-COS intervention maximum acceptable
sentence. c Private = 0 and Public = 1. d Male = 0 and Female = 1.
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Table 11.

Study 2 GLMM Negative Binomial Regression Model Results for the Effect of Anchor and
COS on Maximum Acceptable Sentences
IRR
95% CI for IRR
b
SE
z
p
Model 1
Fixed Effects
Intercept
2.60
2.00 – 3.38
0.96
0.13
7.14
< .001
a
Anchor
0.38
0.26 – 0.55
-0.98
0.19
-5.04
< .001
b
COS
0.85
0.74 – 0.98
-0.16
0.07
-2.32
0.020
Random Effects
Within-participant
1.11
variance
Model 2
Fixed Effects
Intercept
2.74
2.11 – 3.55
1.01
0.13
7.55
< .001
Anchor
0.30
0.20 – 0.46
-1.19
0.21
-5.53
< .001
COS
0.76
0.65 – 0.89
-0.27
0.08
-3.34
< .001
Anchor X COS
1.54
1.12 – 2.12
0.43
0.16
2.65
.008
Random Effects
Within-participant
1.11
variance
Note. IRR = Incidence Rate Ratio; CI = Confidence Interval; 155 attorneys, 310 observations
a
Anchor = High = 0 vs. Moderate =1. bCOS = Consider-the-Opposite Strategy: Pre = 0 vs. Post =
1.
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Table 12.

Study 2 Linear Mixed Effects Model Results for Effect of Anchor and Arguments Generated on
Maximum Acceptable Sentences
b
95% CI for b
SE
t
df
p
Model 1
Fixed Effects
Intercept
5.52
4.30 – 6.75
0.62
8.86
156.64 < .001
a
Anchor
-2.76
-3.65 – -1.86
0.46
-6.04
152
< .001
COSb
-0.43
-0.73 – -0.13
0.15
-2.82
154
.005
c
Arguments
-0.25
-0.42 – -0.08
0.09
-2.87
151
.004
Random Effects
Within-participant variance
5.89
Residual
1.81
Model 2
Fixed Effects
Intercept
7.12
5.48 – 8.77
0.84
8.50
171.88 < .001
Anchor
-5.26
-7.27 – -3.25
1.02
-5.14
158.33 < .001
COS
-1.53
-2.37 – -0.69
0.43
-3.58
152
< .001
Arguments
-0.46
-0.70 – -0.21
0.12
-3.68
169.73 < .001
Anchor X COS
1.42
0.80 – 2.04
0.32
4.50
152
< .001
Anchor X Arguments
0.34
0.00 – 0.68
0.17
1.98
151
.048
COS X Arguments
0.08
-0.04 – 0.20
0.06
1.37
152
.171
Random Effects
Within-participant variance
5.86
Residual
1.62
Model 3
Fixed Effects
Intercept
7.14
5.46 – 8.82
0.86
8.32
187.36 < .001
Anchor
-5.29
-7.39 – -3.19
1.07
-4.94
187.36 < .001
COS
-1.57
-2.68 – -0.46
0.57
-2.76
151
.006
Arguments
-0.46
-0.71 – -0.21
0.13
-3.61 187.36 < .001
Anchor X COS
1.48
0.09 – 2.87
0.71
2.09
151
.036
Anchor X Arguments
0.35
-0.01 – 0.71
0.18
1.90
187.36
.057
COS X Arguments
0.09
-0.08 – 0.25
0.08
1.04
151
.296
Anchor X COS X Args
-0.01
-0.25 – 0.23
0.12
-0.09
151
.923
Random Effects
Within-participant variance
5.85
Residual
1.63
Note. CI = Confidence Interval; 155 attorneys, 310 observations; aAnchor = High = 0 vs. Moderate
=1; bCOS = Consider-the-Opposite Strategy: Pre = 0 vs. Post = 1; cArguments = Number of anchorinconsistent arguments generated.
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Table 13.

Study 2 Logistic Regression Predicting Likelihood of Final Plea Decision based on Anchor and
Arguments Generated
p
Odds
95% CI for
Overall
B
S.E Wald df
z

Ratio

Odds Ratio
Lower Upper

Model Fit

Final Plea Decision
Model 1
Intercept
-1.13
0.54 -2.11 149
.035 0.32 0.11
0.90 χ2(1) = 15.1,
Anchora
1.54
0.40 3.89 149 < .001 4.65 2.19
10.39
p < .001
b
Arguments
0.12
0.08 1.63 149
.103 1.13 0.98
1.32
Model 2
Intercept
-2.23
0.73 -3.04 148
.002 0.11 0.02
0.43 χ2(1) = 14.5,
Anchor
3.48
0.91 3.81 148 < .001 32.60 5.72 209.86
p < .001
Arguments
0.29
0.11 2.73 148
.006 1.34 1.10
1.67
Anchor X
-0.37
0.15 -2.45 148
.014 0.69 0.51
0.93
Arguments
Note. aAnchor = High [24 months] = 0 vs. Moderate [6 months] =1. bArguments = Anchor-Inconsistent
Arguments generated post-COS intervention.
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Table 14.

Study 3 Percentage of Comparative Judgments by Conditions.

Very Lenient
Appropriate
Very Harsh

High [48] Anchor
Moderate [8] Anchor
Accountable Unaccountable Accountable Unaccountable
0
0
9.38
4.35
4.48
1.54
18.75
14.49
95.52
98.46
71.88
81.16

151

152

153
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Table 17.

Study 3 Negative Binomial Regression Model Results for the Effect of Anchor and Process
Accountability on Joint Maximum Acceptable Sentences
Model 1
b
95% CI
SE
z
df
p
Intercept
1.79
1.63, 1.96
0.08
21.35
262
< .001
a
Anchor
-0.60
-0.79, -0.40 0.10
-5.90
262
< .001
b
Accountability
0.02
-0.18, 0.22 0.10
0.18
262
0.85
Model 2
Intercept
1.77
1.59, 1.96
.01
18.54
261
< .001
Anchor
-0.55
-0.83, -0.26
.14
-3.80
261
< .001
Accountability
0.06
-0.20, 0.32
.14
0.46
261
0.064
Anchor X
-0.1
-0.49, 0.30
.20
-0.48
261
0.63
Accountability
Model 3
Intercept
.64
0.14, 1.13
.25
2.6
240
.01
Anchor
-.71
-0.90, -0.52
.10
-7.20
240
< .001
Accountability
.14
-0.048, 0.33 .10
1.46
240
.15
Baseline Sentencec
.01
-0.003, 0.02 .004
1.52
240
.13
d
Baseline Sentence
.07
0.043, 0.10
.01
5.93
240
< .001
Likelihood of
.01
0.004, 0.01 .002
3.58
240
< .001
c
Conviction
Likelihood of
.003
-0.002, 0.01 .002
1.33
240
.18
d
Conviction
Note. aAnchor = High [48 months] = 0 vs. Moderate [8 months] =1. bAccountability = Process
Accountability: Accountable = 0 vs. Unaccountable = 1. c Mock attorney (law student) pre-anchor
response. d Mock defendant pre-anchor response.
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Table 18.

Study 3 Logistic Regression Predicting Likelihood of Final Plea Decision based on Anchor,
Accountability, Anchor X Accountability
p
Odds
95% CI for
Overall
B
S.E Wald df
z

Ratio

Odds Ratio
Lower Upper

Model 1
Intercept
-0.28
0.22 -1.30 262
.192 0.75 0.49
1.15
Anchor
1.09
0.26 4.21 262 < .001 2.96 1.80
4.94
Accountability
0.08
0.26 0.31 262
.759 1.08 0.65
1.79
Model 2
Intercept
-0.39
0.25 -1.58 261
.115 0.68 0.41
1.09
Anchor
1.33
0.37 3.57 261 < .001 3.79 1.85
8.01
Accountability
0.30
0.35 0.86 261
.393 1.35 0.68
2.70
Anchor X
-0.48
0.52 -0.93 261
.354 0.62 0.22
1.70
Accountability
Note. aAnchor = High [48 months] = 0 vs. Moderate [8 months] =1.
b
Accountability = Process Accountability: Accountable = 0 vs. Unaccountable = 1.
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Model Fit

χ2(1) = 17.7,
p < .001

χ2(1) = 12.7,
p < .001
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Table 19.

Study 3 Negative Binomial Regression Model Results for the Effect of Anchor and Process
Accountability on Number of Mitigating and Aggravating Arguments Discussed
b
95% CI
SE
z
df
p
Mitigating Arguments
Intercept
1.55
1.42, 1.68
0.07
23.31
262
a
Anchor
-0.05
-0.20, 0.11
0.08
-0.62
262
b
Accountability
-0.18
-0.33, -0.03 0.08
-2.29
262
Aggravating Arguments
Intercept
0.95
0.81, 1.10
0.07
12.81
262
Anchor
0.01
-0.16, 0.19
0.09
0.13
262
Accountability
-0.24
-0.42, -0.07 0.09
-2.73
262
a
b
Note. Anchor = High [48 months] = 0 vs. Moderate [8 months] =1. Accountability
Accountability: Accountable = 0 vs. Unaccountable = 1.
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< .001
.533
.022
< .001
.89
.006
= Process
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